

Again Korea

by Wilfred G. Burchett



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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

In the Spring of 1967, I revisited North Korea. During 1951-54, I had spent two and one-half years there as a journalist reporting the ceasefire talks that ended the Korean War. Since then, I have been covering Southeast Asia and the war in Vietnam in particular.

My visit was prompted by a number of reasons. Serious incidents reported along the 38th parallel seemed ominously reminiscent of events on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Furthermore, as in North Vietnam in the early 1960's, commando units from the South had been parachuted or landed inside North Korea. Charges by the United States that North Korean guerrillas were infiltrating the South recalled similar charges used to justify direct U.S. military intervention in Vietnam at the end of 1961. Vietnam had become a second Korea. Was Korea, in turn, to become a second Vietnam? That possibility in itself was reason enough for a visit—to probe the situation on the spot, to learn how North Korea's leaders evaluated the prospects.

There were other reasons as well. Unless the Vietnam war moved on to global, nuclear holocaust, it would be settled eventually by political negotiations. In the Western press, the ceasefire talks which ended the Korean War were mentioned with increasing frequency, either as a precedent for Vietnam or as something to be avoided. All kinds of absurdities were spread about the Panmunjom negotiations. To refresh my memory about them, from official documents, also seemed a useful reason for my visit.

When I last saw North Korea 13 years ago, it was a country totally devastated—the prototype of devastation in North Vietnam by the terrifying, indiscriminate and unrestricted use of U.S. air power. Not a city, village, factory, school, hospital or pagoda was left intact. In the name of the United Nations, North Korea's populated areas had

been reduced to wastelands of ashes and rubble, its factories to heaps of twisted scrap iron. How had the Koreans solved the problems of reconstruction? How does any underdeveloped people face up to a calamity of such magnitude? In the years to come, the Vietnamese people would have to contend with problems such as these.

Still another question interested me. There were signs that the North Korean Workers Party under Kim Il Sung was following a line of its own in the international Communist controversy, rejecting total adherence to the views of either Moscow or Peking, while seeming to aim at reconciling what was fundamental in each position. I was also interested in rumors of a "triangle" of ideas between Pyongyang, Hanoi and Havana, a kind of "third line." Later, I might add—although this is outside the scope of this book—I went on to Havana for the conference of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS), where it seemed to me that such a coincidence of positions did in fact exist. It found its clearest expression in their implacable opposition to U.S. imperialism as the worst and most dangerous enemy of mankind, to be opposed by every means, including armed struggle, where conditions are appropriate. They were also agreed that the greatest possible effort should be made to bring about unity in the world Communist and progressive movements for a coordinated and more effective struggle. Incidentally, the terms "third line" and, even more, "third force" are rejected by the leaderships of North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba. But they do not deny that they have a community of view, distinct from the views of either Moscow or Peking. The Korean position is dealt with in detail in this book.

The implications drawn from the serious situation along the 38th parallel and from plans to involve Japan in war in Korea may seem over-pessimistic to some readers. However, let me point out, plans like "Flying Dragon" were drawn up under U.S. sponsorship in expectation of a swift victory over the forces of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam. When Saigon's troops proved incapable of this, the Pentagon planners certainly believed

that the great weight of bombs in the North, coupled with the enormous deployment of U.S. troops and equipment in the South, would speedily wipe out the NLF and open up the North, paralyzed by bombing, for invasion and occupation. If such expectations had been realized, the opening of a second front in North Korea must have made very real sense to the Pentagon planners. Even today, when things have gone very, very wrong in Vietnam, it might still make sense to some of them.

At the turn of the year, the removal of Robert S. McNamara, as well as many resignations from government posts and increasing nervousness among Senators, indicate a growing awareness by those "in the know" of new, dangerous measures of escalation in prospect, not necessarily confined to Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's remark about "a billion Chinese with nuclear weapons" as the real threat to Southeast Asia and to the United States, emphasizes the strategic aims of the Washington "hawks," which remain unchanged. As set forth in the chapters that follow, Korea plays a key role in these plans.

January 1968

Wilfred G. Burchett

I

FLYING DRAGON"

"Come and visit us again," said my host. "Bring your wife and have a good holiday here. But I advise you to come soon if you want to see our country as it is now." He waved his hand toward the window which looked out on a broad, tree-lined boulevard of shining new apartment houses and shops. "It is possible that all this will be destroyed if war breaks out. I say to my comrades that they should not think they can keep our nice theaters and things as they are now; they must realize that as long as imperialism exists, war may break out again. Especially as long as the unification of our country has not been achieved, things may be destroyed again." My host was Premier Kim Il Sung of North Korea, the place Pyongyang, the date May 20, 1967.

In the weeks prior to this conversation, Korea had occasionally vied with Vietnam for the headlines. Just a week earlier, Soviet and American warships literally jostled each other for two successive days off the North Korean coast in the Sea of Japan, which Koreans know as their East Sea. Shooting incidents in and around the Demilitarized Zone which now separates North and South Korea were making the headlines with ever-increasing frequency. There were also many less dramatic happenings, news of which went unnoticed, but which explained the chilling words that accompanied Premier Kim's invitation.

The incidents on May 10 and 11, in which the Soviet destroyer bumped an American warship, took place during American-Japanese joint naval maneuvers. The day after those maneuvers ended, American-South Korean naval maneuvers started still closer to the North Korean coast. These were in turn followed

by Japan-South Korean joint military maneuvers. All three exercises were based on North Korea as the "imaginary enemy."

On the day Premier Kim received me, Washington announced a new U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, William J. Porter, who a few weeks previously had been assistant to U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon. A short time before, Washington had also named as its new Ambassador to Japan, Alexis Johnson, who had been deputy to General Maxwell Taylor, when he was the U.S. Ambassador to Saigon. Johnson's could be described as the political expert in the application of "special war" as waged by General Taylor in South Vietnam, Porter as the political expert in the "limited war" waged there by General William Westmoreland.

Premier Kim referred to President Lyndon B. Johnson's visit to the Military Demarcation Line in October 1966, after the Manila Conference. He said, "It seems he gave special instructions to his men on the spot in South Korea. Since that visit the Americans have greatly stepped up their military provocations in and around the Demilitarized Zone. They have created tension in this area."

About the time Premier Kim was giving me his views, Admiral Grant Sharp, who commands all U.S. forces in the Pacific area, arrived in Tokyo and, together with Ambassador Johnson, held a closed conference with Japanese Defense Ministry officials.

There was a considerable scandal in the Japanese Diet in the spring and summer of 1965 when Communist and Socialist deputies pried out of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, the fact that two plans under the code names "Three Arrows" and "Flying Dragon" had been drawn up by Japanese general staff officers and their American counterparts. The plans called for U.S.-Japanese joint military operations against North Korea as a first phase, to be subsequently extended against China. "Three Arrows" was prepared in June 1963 and "Flying Dragon," a much more detailed version, a year later. A third variant, "Running Bull," was worked out in 1965.

"Three Arrows"

"Three Arrows" foresees the outbreak of war between North and South Korea, on July 19, 196—. The last figure is left blank. It was drawn up by some 80 officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces," aided by American senior staff officers of colonel rank. The Japanese officers were headed by Lieutenant-General Yoshio Tanaka, who clarified during a Diet hearing that, "This is not a study theme for a staff college discussion; it is based on actual defense plans."

On the basis of these plans, a number of laws, such as "conscription and requisition," "universal national mobilization," and others completing the militarization of Japanese life, have already been drafted and could be promulgated overnight. These laws are sufficiently drastic to crush any elements of Japanese democracy still existing on July 19, 196—.

Each of the variants takes into account changes in the world situation since "Three Arrows" was drawn up. The draft laws provide for concentrating 60 per cent of the Japanese Army, Navy and Air Force in the southern and western regions of Japan. This would provide the operational and supply bases for military operations carried out essentially by Japanese and South Korean ground forces in one variant, with Taiwan-based Kuomintang forces in another. South Korean forces would be under Japanese command, but because of the special Korean situation they would be operating under the United Nations flag. Kuomintang troops would be under U.S. command from the operational and logistics base at Okinawa, where the 5th U.S. Air Force has its headquarters.

"Three Arrows," the mother of all other plans, is spelled out in 1,419 pages. The overall drafting work was supervised by the then U.S. Under-secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatrick. It provides for the use of nuclear weapons against Korea and China, combined with landing operations. And, presumably to stimulate Japanese interest, it envisages U.S.-Japanese joint landing on oil-rich

Soviet Sakhalin, which Japan seized from tsarist Russia in 1905 and held until the end of World War II.

The "Flying Dragon" operation, details of which were revealed in a Diet debate on October 29, 1965, has some curious provisos for what is ostensibly a "defense" plan. It provides for detailed military measures 30 days *before* war actually breaks out. During this period the Japanese "air self-defense force" and U.S. bases in Japan go over to a round-the-clock state of alert. In the first 10 days the armed forces communications services switch to a new code. In the second stage, which lays the groundwork for "defensive-offensive" (or "pre-emptive" in the jargon of American military semantics) operations against North Korea and China, the U.S. 5th Air Force and the Japanese Air Force are placed under the U.S. Air Command for the whole Pacific area to facilitate joint operations. Losses of aircraft which Pentagon computers, based on the Vietnamese experience, set at 18 to 30 per cent in the first month, are to be replaced by reserves from the Japanese Air Force. The Soviet Union as a target is dropped from "Flying Dragon," concentrating operations against North Korea and China.

Some Japanese forces would be moved to Okinawa, according to the "Flying Dragon" variant, and placed under a U.S.-Japan joint command. As preparations for the next phase, American forces would move from Hawaii to Okinawa and northern Kyushu, the closest Japanese territory to Korea. In the next stage the U.S. Navy would provide air and sea transport for U.S. and Japanese troops in an invasion of North Korea and China, hopefully under the cover of another UN resolution. Provision is made for the use of nuclear weapons in military operations against North Korea and China. Implicit in all of this is that July 19, 196— must be preceded by provocations of such a nature that North Korea will be forced to take counter-measures sufficient to be branded as the "aggressor."

The naval maneuvers staged off the North Korean coast in May 1967 could be considered "Three Arrows" rehearsals for July 19, 196—, as could the whole series of landing and mountain

warfare exercises by U.S.-ROK (Republic of Korea) troops, staged in increasing frequency since President Johnson's visit, Part of the naval exercises were practice blockades of the North Korean coastal area; it was this that brought about the collisions with the Soviet destroyer. Also simulated were air and sea transport exercises under enemy fire and anti-submarine maneuvers as detailed in the code plans. These were no war games between imaginary "red" and "blue" forces; they were full-dress rehearsals for plans detailed in sand-pit models of the beachheads to be secured, and lists of industrial and urban targets marked for priority destruction. Knowledge of such plans were implicit in Premier Kim's certitude that North Korean towns, industries and villages were to be destroyed again.

The Political Framework

The drawing up of military plans has been very carefully integrated with creating the political and diplomatic framework within which military preparations could be completed. There were some formidable obstacles to be overcome: the Japanese Constitution imposed severe restrictions on a resurgence of Japanese militarism; the United States had difficulty getting Japanese armed forces entirely under its control; the Korean people, North and South, felt traditional hostility toward the temporary dividing line, and toward Japanese militarism, colonialism or any Japanese penetration of the Korean mainland again. U.S. State Department experts and extremist right-wing circles in Japan and South Korea have worked to remove these obstacles. To a great extent they have succeeded, at least on the formal, diplomatic front.

Japanese and South Korean public opinion fiercely resisted policies aimed at putting the militarists back in power in Japan, perpetuating U.S. control over and occupation of Japan, and bringing the Japanese monopolies back into Korea under any pretext. The surrender documents signed in August 1945 stipulated the complete disarming of Japan and the destruction

of the mighty militarist, financial oligarchies known as the *zaibatsu*.

The United States took advantage of the Korean War to push through a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1951, behind the backs of the Soviet Union and China, both of which had suffered much from Japanese militarism and greatly contributed to its defeat.

The first step toward the restoration of Japanese military power was taken in 1952, when a coastal defense corps under a central "Defense Agency" was set up. By 1954, the "Defense Agency" was reinforced by a U.S.-Japan Joint Staff Council, the result of another unilateral U.S.-Japan agreement on "mutual defense and aid." The "defense corps" became "self-defense forces" with full-fledged ground, air and naval units. Within another two years, there was a "National Defense Council." And so, modest step by modest step, the old monopolies began to raise their heads, first as suppliers to U.S. forces during the Korean War to the tune of some 2.5 billion dollars, then as suppliers to the steadily increasing Japanese armed forces. Later, came the war in Vietnam, providing still another opportunity for the *zaibatsu*.

By 1966, Japan had a "self-defense" army of 270,000, with such a high proportion of officers and non-com's that it could be expanded to millions the moment the laws on conscription and mobilization of resources, drafted under the "Three Arrows" plan, were promulgated. Japan now also has an Air Force with over 1,400 planes, a Navy with a tonnage of 150,000, including 50 escort vessels and 10 submarines, and the world's fastest ship-building capacity, all presumably for "self-defense." Despite a most energetic Struggle waged by the Japanese people and opposition parties in the Japanese Diet, a U.S.-Japan "Security" treaty was pushed through in 1960 which in effect put the Japanese armed forces at the disposal of the United States.

Although the 1960 "Security" Treaty removed almost the last barriers to unlimited expansion of Japan's war-making ability there was still one hindrance under which the Sato government

and its senior partner in Washington chafed. That was the antiwar clauses of the Constitution drafted in the immediate postwar years under American guidance when memories were still fresh of the military humiliation of Pearl Harbor. By May 1967 Prime Minister Sato, at United States urging, was working hard to revise the Japanese Constitution in order to introduce conscription, give Japan the right to own and develop nuclear weapons, and legalize the dispatch of Japanese troops overseas. Japanese voters have persistently denied Sato's ruling party the two-thirds majority necessary to change the Constitution. But there is little doubt that constitutional scruples would be scrapped if the sort of situation envisaged under "Three Arrows" could be brought about. As for the legality of Japan getting back into Korea, this was settled by the South Korea-Japan Treaty signed in Tokyo on June 22, 1965. That it had taken 14 years to push this treaty through is a measure of the opposition by the Korean people.

Not only the gates to "economic aggression" had been opened. The 1965 treaty cleared the way for Japanese-ROK military cooperation, in the name of "joint defense," for military operations such as the "Three Arrows," "Flying Dragon," "Running Bull" and other possible variants. The authors of these plans could not have foreseen at the time that the United States would run into such trouble in Vietnam, with over a third of its army and marine divisions bogged down in a war which seemed to have no end.

Does this not make it unthinkable that the United States would want any new front opened up in Asia? It would seem to be a justifiable argument, and I was interested in probing the question. One of my first visits in pursuit of this was to Panmunjom. There, for two and a half years—from June 1951 to February 1954—I had witnessed the ceasefire talks, the preliminary political talks that followed the ceasefire, and the exchange of prisoners of war which lasted six months after the shooting stopped in Korea.

PANMUNJOM 1967

Travelling the Pyongyang-Panmunjom road evoked powerful memories. I drove over it at least a score of times during the war years. Just south of the capital, one always ran the gauntlet of planes bombing and strafing at night in the light of parachute flares. Then a gravelled road pitted with craters, the stretch was now a smooth concrete highway, with irrigated fields of even, brown mud which girls were decorating by stabbing in tender green rice plants with incredible speed and deftness. It was early May when I first drove over it in 1951, the rice transplanting season. Bullets from a strafing plane had danced madly up the road after the black limousine in which I sat with General Nam II, the head of the Korean delegation to the armistice talks. I remembered his austere face glancing straight ahead, puffing at a cigarette in a long holder placed in the corner of his mouth, not bothering to even turn his head at the roar of the diving plane and the hammering of its machine guns. The driver had put his foot down hard on the accelerator and the car fairly leapt into a tree-lined cutting and rocked to an abrupt halt, as the plane roared out of its dive just over our heads.

Then and Now

At another spot, north of Sariwon, U.S. planes had napalmed and machine-gunned the daily "attack free" convoy of delegation cars, in violation of the protocols governing the ceasefire talks, destroying the jeep next to that in which my wife and I were travelling. There was no possibility of mistake. The attack was made in broad daylight, the planes having dived low several

times to verify that the cars were indeed the delegation convoy, decorated with regulation red flags, spaced 100 yards apart as agreed, traveling within the stipulated hours. The only other regulation was that the convoy must keep moving. But after several identification passes, one of the planes dropped a napalm bomb squarely on the road ahead, forcing the jeep in front of ours to halt and back up. The jeep was then strafed and destroyed, and everyone inside, including the pregnant wife of the senior Chinese liaison officer, was wounded. The area was a bare, blackened spot in those days with not a house or tree standing; now there is a village of neat, whitewashed stone houses with grey-tiled curved roofs on each side of the road, surrounded by blossoming apple trees. Orderly beds of close-packed rice seedlings, and rows of dome-shaped pigsties are set well back from road and houses.

Sariwon city was, when I last saw it, a blackened ruin reduced to a few charred shells of buildings and stumps of chimneys, and almost emptied of people. The first time I passed through, at night, a burning petrol truck lit up the sky behind us. The plane that had hit it was still droning not far away. We traveled without lights through the ruins. Women whispered urgently to oxen as they ploughed between remnants of buildings; time bombs exploded in the fields, sending up spouts of mud and water. I wondered whether we would ever get to Kaesong, where the ceasefire talks were to start the following day.

Sariwon is now a big modern city, with forests of chimneys belching smoke, and the highway is broadening out into a tree-lined, wide boulevard, crossed by others of the same dimensions; all are lined with blocks of modern apartment houses and shops. There are other towns, north and south of Sariwon, whose names I learned for the first time, but which my guide proved had existed and were on the prewar maps. They were so completely destroyed in the first year of war that they had been ploughed over by mid-1951 when I first arrived.

Kaesong, the only city north of the battle line not to have been completely destroyed (because it was in the "Neutral"

delegation headquarters area), was now also hardly recognizable. Some old buildings remain and many new ones have been built in the classic style of half-timbered stone houses placed around inner courtyards, with the graceful, curved roofs typical of this ancient capital and seat of Korea's thousand-years-old university. From Kaesong it is but 10 miles to the two-hut site of the ceasefire talks at Panmunjom.

Demilitarized Zone

At a sign, "Demilitarized Zone. Northern Boundary," our car stopped. The escorting officer got out, entered a guardhouse with two very smart looking sentries at the entrance, and emerged almost immediately, pinning a yellow armband on his brown tunic. A yellow flag was stuck on our Volga car, the barrier lifted and we passed into the Demilitarized Zone, 2.5 miles wide, which separates North from South Korea. Twin rows of huge granite boulders led east and west as far as the eye could see and doubtless marked the whole 160 miles of its length from "the West to the East Sea," as the Koreans express it, from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea as western maps show it. An American sentry, thumbing through a comic book, looked up and seemed, interested only in how many were in the car. We crossed over a small bridge into the Joint Security Area, that part of the Demilitarized Zone where the conference rooms are located, the security for which North Koreans and Americans are jointly responsible. Within the few thousand square yards of the Joint Security Area, both sides may move freely; elsewhere within the Demilitarized Zone each side must keep to its respective side of the Military Demarcation Line. The line runs precisely through the middle of the Zone and through the middle of the tables in the various conference rooms where the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meets.

From a knoll overlooking the conference area there is a good view of the countryside on both sides of the Demarcation Line which, in the Panmunjom area, runs through the middle of the

Sachon river. On the northern side there are fields of winter wheat, ploughed land and lush green beds of rice seedlings right down to the river's edge stretching as far as one can see. Tractors were harrowing in the Panmunjom cooperative farm, located within the DZ.

What a contrast the other side presented: a wilderness of high grass and bushes through which one glimpses rusty barbed wire and fallen electric power poles; not a person to be seen, not a house, not a cultivated field. A few squat forts mark the southern boundaries of the DZ.

A jeep drove up to the foot of the knoll. Two U.S. soldiers got out, glared at us for a moment, jumped back into the jeep and drove off with screaming tires and a whirl of dust. That was the only activity on the U.S.-ROK side of the line, except for a weary-looking ROK soldier who walked across to pour a bucket of slop into a rubbish bin. (A few minutes earlier I had asked a North Korean officer what role the ROK army played at Panmunjom; he replied, "None at all except, as elsewhere, to do the dirty work for the Americans.")

It was strange to see the UN flag on one side of the green table, around which the MAC meets to discuss violations of the ceasefire agreements. I was constantly reminded that U.S. occupation of South Korea is still carried on in the name of the United Nations.

"Unfinished Business"

Between the Joint Security Area and the northern boundary of the DZ is the original hut where ceasefire talks went on, and outside of which I and other correspondents maintained our daily vigil for two years. Alongside the hut is the big pavilion where the armistice agreements were actually signed. I remembered the amazement on the faces of western journalists when they arrived for the signing ceremony. The big new wooden building, a dozen times the size of that in which the negotiations were conducted, had been built within the

couple of days between the completion of the agreements and the signing ceremony. "The structural elements had been prepared in Kaesong and Korean troops worked night and day to assemble them in time. The speed with which it was built served as a symbol of the speed with which the whole country was to be rebuilt when peace came. The American delegates wanted to de-emphasize the importance of the occasion by signing in a tent, so that nothing permanent should mark the spot where the Supreme UN Commander, General Mark Clark, signed the ceasefire documents at 10 AM on July 27, 1953.

He wrote later: "I gained the unenviable distinction of being the first U.S. Commander in history to sign an armistice without victory. ... I more than suspected that it came under the heading of unfinished business."

His face at the signing ceremony, as I well remember, expressed the bitterness and humiliation of having to sign a ceasefire "without victory." His threat of "unfinished business" could be one explanation for the situation developing around the Demilitarized Zone in the first half of 1967. The U.S. military hierarchy, like that of any other great power, does not easily accept defeat, and there must be a great temptation to take advantage of the war going on in Southeast Asia to avenge the "humiliation and frustration" which General Mark Clark admitted to having shared with his two predecessors in Korea, Generals Ridgway and MacArthur, when he signed the Panmunjom ceasefire agreements.

Two copies of the original documents, bound in red leather, remain today under glass covers on the tables on which they were signed. The Panmunjom pavilion, having been on the North Korean side of the Demarcation Line, has now been transformed into a museum. On the respective tables are the flags of the United Nations and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), just as they stood at the signing ceremony. The pavilion has been plastered outside and lined inside since that historic day and a well-documented exhibition has been prepared relating to the war, the negotiations and

the subsequent application or non-application of the armistice agreements. Through photographs, documents, maps, captured U.S. arms and sabotage equipment, it is easy to follow the course of events—from the visit of John Foster Dulles to the 38th parallel a few days before the outbreak of the war on June 25, 1950, to the series of grave violations which followed President Johnson's visit to the DZ in October 1967.

Many of these documents contain proof of systematic violations by the United States of the Ceasefire Agreements. (The physical presence of the "UN" in the continued occupation of the South, apart from the USA, is represented by one company of Thai troops.) Statistics and documents available at the exhibition hall show the following sharp increase of violations in recent months:

Violations of DPRK air space: 1960, 656 cases; 1966, 722; first 3 months 1967, 729. *Naval intrusions into DPRK territorial waters:* 1963, 342 cases; 1966, 758; first 3 months 1967, 809.

In the month of April 1967 alone, more shells and bullets were fired from the U.S.-ROK side into the DZ and across the Zone into the territory of the DPRK, than during the more than IS years since the ceasefire.

The display at the exhibition includes rubber boats, frogmen equipment, radio transmitters, vials of poison for water supplies, and a whole range of sabotage equipment captured from groups sent across the borders from the South.

An interesting facet is* the lengths to which the U.S. Command will go to get back U.S. pilots—even their bodies—that have been shot down and their elaborate disinterest in getting back any captured ROK soldiers and agents. It is obviously difficult not to admit a violation after a plane has been shot down in DPRK territory (as has been the case eight times in recent years) or a naval vessel sunk by DPRK shore batteries. But the U.S. generals who succeed each other as senior members of MAC are willing to affix their signatures (in the name of the UN) to any documents to get their pilots back. Thus, the exhibition has a photo copy of a receipt dated May 15, 1964, signed by

Major-General Cecil E. Combs, U.S. Air Force, "admitting the crimes of espionage and illegal intrusion by Captain Ben Weakley Stutts and Captain Carleton William Voltz . . . captured . . . while they were committing military espionage after illegally intruding into the air over the northern part of the DPRK . . . and guaranteeing that it will not commit such criminal acts and will strictly abide by the Korean Armistice Agreement in the future, the United Nations Command hereby receives Captain . . . Stutts and Captain . . . Voltz, U.S. army pilots from the Korean People's Army side." This letter was preceded by one, similar in tone, signed two months earlier by General Hamilton H. Howze, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief of UN Command Headquarters, and was followed by another dated May 21, 1965, signed by Major-General William Yarborough.

By contrast with the humble pie the American generals eat in order to get their pilots back, I was informed they refused to accept back any ROK intruders except pilots, dead or alive. On one occasion, the most an investigating officer would admit when faced with a ROK survivor of an illegal intruder mission was that, "a person of Asiatic race was presented"; and on another occasion: "I take note that a person apparently of Korean nationality . . ." As the ROK representative on the MAC has never been known to open his mouth, ROK violators have no protection whatsoever. They are "expendable," in U.S. military terminology.

As for the spate of recent violations, I stood on a spot within the DZ where less than a month before, on April 5, 1967, six Korean Security Guards, wearing yellow arm-bands similar to those worn by my companions, were mowed down by heavy machine-gun fire. Five were killed and one wounded by U.S.-ROK troops firing at a range of 600 yards from within the southern side of the DZ. The incident took place in broad daylight, at 1:30 P.M. on a clear day. Faced with the bodies a few minutes after the slaughter, the American representatives on the Joint Observer Teams, could not but admit the violation. The slain Koreans were carrying routine side arms as stipulated

in the regulations for the DZ; they were killed by a heavy machine gun, the introduction of which into the DZ is in itself a serious violation. This was only the most serious of almost daily shooting incidents.

President Johnson's Visit

In Kaesong, I called on Major-General Pak Jung Kuk, the senior DPRK member of the Military Armistice Commission, and asked how he viewed the situation. General Pak, a handsome, stocky man, recalled President Johnson's visit to U.S.-ROK units along the Demilitarized Zone. "We remember the Dulles visit and what followed," he said. "Johnson's visit is a similar bad omen. The Seoul radio quoted him as saying it was necessary to open up a second war front in Korea. In any case new and violent provocations started immediately. On November 3, for instance, the day Johnson left Seoul for home, armed attacks were staged in several areas. On the western part of the Demarcation Line, ROK troops, after firing red signal flares, and covered by heavy machine-gun fire, swarmed across the Demarcation Line and attacked our positions with hand grenades and rifles. Similar incidents occurred on November 4 and 5. On November 4, an enemy gunboat penetrated some four miles into our East Sea waters and stayed there for four hours. On November 5, submarine chasers also penetrated our coastal areas and on November 22, after a U.S. reconnaissance plane had been over, three U.S. naval vessels again intruded into our waters and bombarded our coast. Hardly a single day has passed since, without a violation somewhere."

Military activity within the Demilitarized Zone is strictly prohibited, General Pak reported, but since Johnson's visit there have been persistent attempts by the Americans to convert it into their forward military area. They have introduced heavy artillery, heavy automatic weapons and even tanks. The tempo of violations, including grave military provocations, increases all the time. On April 5, five DPRK security guards were killed

in the DZ. On April 13, 250 rounds of 81mm mortar and 105mm artillery shells and 5,500 rounds of heavy machine-gun bullets poured into the DPRK side of the DZ in simultaneous attacks from five different positions. On April 20, on six occasions U.S. ROK troops opened up with 81mm and 60mm mortars from two positions. These sort of activities had never been experienced since the signing of the armistice.

"In general we did everything possible to avoid being provoked," continued General Pak, "but we also had to make it clear that if they were probing to find weak spots in our defenses, they would find none. A particularly grave incident took place on January 19, this year, when a number of their patrol escort vessels penetrated our waters four miles north of the DZ and started shelling our coastal areas. Our shore batteries were ordered to return the fire, hitting PC£ (Patrol Craft Escort) No. 56 with the first salvoes, sinking it and forcing the others to flee. The Americans tried to wriggle out of their responsibility at first, giving false positions for the vessels. As we had photos and documentary evidence they eventually had to admit the violation, but accused us of 'inhuman' behavior in firing on a vessel that had 'strayed off course.'

"In fact," General Pak continued, "the situation around the DZ is only too strikingly reminiscent of that immediately after the June 1950 visit of Dulles. It is quite dear the Americans are determined to resume the war in Korea. It has all been a step-by-step process from the signing of the armistice until the present explosive situation."

He went on to give some of the highlights of the process. One was the unilateral abrogation by the United States of Paragraph 13d of the agreements which provides for inspection at five agreed points of entry each in North and South Korea, to ensure that no reinforcing arms or personnel would be introduced. The essential clauses instruct the opposing sides to: "Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition; provided however that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and

ammunition which are destroyed, damaged or worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice, may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. . . . The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof." The NNSC was comprised of officers from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland.

"As aggressors throughout history have done," continued General Pak, "the US signed the armistice to gain time to build for another attempt. Their puppet in Seoul, Syngman Rhee, until he was thrown out of the country in 1960, never ceased shouting about the 'march to the North.' The Americans started secretly bringing in new reinforcing weapons through places other than the five ports soon after the armistice was signed. But the restrictions did not suit the tempo of their buildup. So after numerous provocations, including hoodlum attacks against the NNSC teams which resulted in the deaths of three Polish officers, the Americans abrogated Paragraph 13d. They expelled the NNSC teams from the five ports and used the latter to bring in everything they wanted, including finally nuclear cannon and rocket weapons."

General Pak went on to talk about the role of the Military Armistice Commission. "The Americans do not like regular meetings at which their activities are exposed," he said. Of the 246 meetings called thus far, 185 were at our initiative; at the others, where the Americans have accused us of violations, they have never produced an iota of proof. We have never had to admit any violations. We have never sent any ships into their waters nor planes into their air space. We have never fired artillery into their zone except on a couple of occasions to silence their guns firing at us, as we fired on PCE 56 when it shelled our coast. We have never introduced heavy weapons into the DZ. Sometimes they call meetings because some American

gets beaten up in Seoul, or even in Pusan. This is ridiculous and they know it, but probably they think it looks bad if all the meetings are called by our side. At one point they proposed MAC should meet only once in six months. Often they decline dates set by us, holding up the meeting for a week or two, which in itself is a violation."

Faced by overwhelming evidence that the U.S. forces are preparing a new war, the DPRK is preparing its own defense forces, General Pak explained. Its seven-year industrial plan has been slowed down a bit to build up the national defense capacity. Much attention has been given to transforming regular forces into a cadres' army, equipping it with modern weapons, training every soldier in modern military techniques, and welding it into a force capable of rapid expansion in an emergency. The whole people have been armed. Says General Pak, "We are firmly convinced that should the U.S.-ROK forces launch another aggression, their presence on our soil would be ended for all time. Together with South Korean patriots we shall sweep them out and reunify the country."

What seems clear from the Panmunjom documents and the talk with General Pak Jung Kuk, is that if hostilities start again, there will be no more demarcation line, no more demilitarized zone, no more MAC or NNSC, and Panmunjom will continue to exist only as an historic relic. The future of Panmunjom as the Ceasefire Capital seems very shaky indeed.

EYEWITNESS

After the Korean war had been fought for about a year and General Douglas MacArthur had been replaced as Supreme "UN" Commander, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on June 2, 1951, announced to a much relieved world that a settlement of the Korean conflict along the 38th parallel, where it started, would be acceptable and regarded as a victory for the United Nations. Because North Korea and China maintained that the U.S.-backed South Korean regime of Syngman Rhee started the war by attacking the North, they could also consider such a settlement a victory. On June 23 the Soviet representative at the UN, Yakov Malik, stated that a settlement was possible, based on a ceasefire and mutual withdrawal from the 38th parallel. Acheson informed Congress three days later that "the line of the 38th parallel could be acceptable from the military point of view." This set the stage for the talks which followed. The Acheson-Malik proposals were crystallized in an exchange of six letters between General Matthew Ridgway, who had succeeded MacArthur as head of the "UN" Command, and Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai for the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers, respectively.

First Trip to Kaesong

I was in China at the time, having come from Australia as one of the first western journalists to visit since the founding of the People's Republic. I was writing a series of articles for the Parisian evening paper, *Ce Soir*. I asked to be accredited to the Korean-Chinese side of the ceasefire talks which I was told would last "about three weeks." It seemed a straightforward

enough affair, seeing that both sides had accepted the principle of a ceasefire and mutual withdrawal from the 38th parallel. Warned to travel lightly, I carried a flight bag with one change of clothes, my typewriter and cameras, and headed for Kaesong which had been agreed on as the site for the talks. I could not imagine that I was heading for the most extraordinary episode in my journalistic career, that Kaesong would be my home for the next two and a half years and that as a consequence I should be barred from returning to Australia.

From the moment of entering Korea—the route had been by train from Peking to Antung, the Chinese city on the Manchurian-Korean border, and thence by truck—one could see and feel what the Korean people had suffered and were still suffering. As we crossed over a bridge at dusk in Soviet trucks, we could see piled up, burned-out wrecks of passenger trains and trucks on the Korean side of the Yalu river. Roadside villages which had existed even within a few miles of the Yalu were now non-existent. There were shells of houses and empty, black patches where houses had been. Wisps of smoke issued from underground holes where people were living, as our truck headed into the dusk toward Pyongyang.

The marvel to us all on that first night's trip was the number of bridges that still existed on the road which crossed and recrossed dozens of streams and rivers, and which defied the efforts of the world's greatest air force. Despite all the bombings and rocketings the roads and bridges were in good shape. If planes were overhead, we had plenty of warning shouts and our headlights were switched off, but we never slackened speed.

Moving down the road to the South was a long column of horse-drawn rubber-tired carts, hauling light artillery pieces. The drivers directed the seven and eight-horse teams without reins, merely with flicks and snaps of their long whips. Horses, men, tenders and guns were draped with greenery; on one occasion they wheeled off the road into the greenery and in an instant had become part of the landscape when planes started to circle above. Two propeller planes swooped back and forth

but did not spot them. The moment the planes disappeared, whips were cracking and the teams were again trotting down the dusty highway to Pyongyang and the front.

Our driver knew the habits of U.S. planes; he had traveled the Antung-Pyongyang road often before. We left our village hideout while the sun was still high in the afternoon sky and reached Pyongyang in the early evening just after the dusk patrol had completed its sweep, and before the night bombers had arrived. At the outskirts of the capital there was an introductory hamlet of houses almost intact, then others half destroyed and after that thin crust, desolation. The desolation was all the more complete because of the shells of once large and beautiful buildings rising out of the ashes.

There was an alert, but one could not think it was meant for Pyongyang. Why waste bombs on this shelter of a few sticks and one sheet of corrugated iron where a black-eyed child sells matches and cigarettes, or a flimsy kennel where an old woman in white has a few peanut cakes and pieces of soap substitute? Though separated by a quarter of a mile of ashes, it seemed these two were military targets. After we asked our way and found we must return some miles along the road, there were flickering flashes and whip-like deafening crashes as bombs rained down. When we passed by the next evening, those two well-remembered stalls were part of the surrounding blackness.

Preliminaries at Kaesong

The talks had got under way at Kaesong even before I left Pekin. Preliminary meetings of liaison officers had set July 10 as the date for the first meeting of delegates. On July 9, Syngman Rhee released a statement to the effect that he was against any armistice "on terms short of a unified, non-Communist Korea". On July 10, the "UN" Commander stated that journalists would not be allowed into Kaesong "until there is concrete evidence that the proposed conference is on the tracks and reasonable expectation that it is going to stay on the tracks." This was a

curious position for a "free world" champion to take but the reasons became clearer in the months that followed. At the opening meeting General Nam II, then Chief of Staff of the Korean People's Army and head of the Korean-Chinese delegation, presented a three-point proposal for an immediate ceasefire on land, sea and air, a 10 kilometers withdrawal by both sides from the 38th parallel, exchange of prisoners of war and withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea within the shortest possible time. This was strictly in line with the Acheson-Malik exchanges which formed the basis for the talks.

Admiral Charles T. Joy, the aged, waxy-faced chief American delegate, as his opening gambit, produced a document pledging that only military matters be discussed, which he asked Nam II to sign. Nam II refused. Joy then proposed that the exchange of war prisoners be the first item discussed. He said nothing about a ceasefire, nor did he mention the 38th parallel.

One of the first matters agreed upon was that 20 journalists from each side could cover the talks—from outside the conference room. Our departure from Peking had been held up until this agreement was reached, in view of Ridgway's early "no journalists allowed" statement. American newsmen got to Kaesong first, but they got no news and started complaining that they had to listen to Pyongyang and Peking radio to learn what was going on—specifically that Admiral Joy refused to have the question of withdrawal of foreign troops discussed and that there was a deadlock over the agenda. Talks in fact started and stopped over various matters relating to the "UN" delegation's movement to and from the conference site. They flew in by helicopter from their delegation base at Munsan and were taken by jeep from the landing field to the conference hall, a classical-style Kaesong house with tiled roof and lacquered beams. One of the earliest U.S. news agency dispatches was to the effect that Chinese delegates were turning up in captured American jeeps "from which not even the unit markings have been removed."

The talks started slowly and adjourned July 21-25 at Nam II's request, while the matter of Joy's refusal to include "withdrawal

of foreign troops" was studied. Before they started again our group of journalists had arrived in Kaesong, fretting over delays en route, fearful that all would be over before we got there. The arrival of Alan Winnington of the *London Daily Worker* and myself, with the Korean-Chinese journalists, caused a mild sensation for the western reporters. A week or so earlier^ two British diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean had mysteriously disappeared. They were roughly the same age and build as Winnington and myself and, with the similarity of my name and Burgess, the first whispers were that we were in fact the missing diplomats. This was quickly dispelled when old acquaintances turned up and recognized me as the former *London Daily Express* war correspondent who had covered most major actions in the Pacific area in World War II. "Two White Commies" was the title I noticed one excited American photographer write on his caption sheet.

As it is a fair assumption that one day there will also be negotiations to settle the war in Vietnam, and in view of fantastic accounts as to what happened at the Korean ceasefire talks, it seems worth putting some of the highlights on the record.

When talks resumed on July 25, General Nam II proposed a five-point agenda taking into account Admiral Joy's objection to discussing withdrawal of foreign troops. It was accepted the next day: (1) Adoption of the agenda; (2) fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea; (3) concrete arrangements for the realization of a ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervisory organization for carrying out the terms of a ceasefire and armistice; (4) arrangements relating to prisoners of war; (5) recommendations of both sides to the governments concerned.

What Demarcation Line?

Discussions on fixing the demarcation line started on July 27. What followed was one of the great hoaxes of history, one which

cost tens of thousands of dead and hundreds of thousands of wounded for both sides. At the first meeting, Nam II proposed fixing the line along the 38th parallel. It was here that the war had started; it was here that both sides had already agreed it should end. At the time, the battleline ran roughly along the parallel with "UN" forces holding 2,895 square miles of territory north of the parallel, the Korean-Chinese holding 2,270 square miles south of the parallel. Admiral Joy, however, refused to discuss the 38th parallel as a basis for a demarcation line. By creating the fable that the Americans wanted a demarcation line along the actual battlefront, he actually demanded something completely different: that the Korean-Chinese forces withdraw an average of over 32 miles in depth along the whole 150 miles of battlefront, giving up nearly 9,400 square miles of highly strategic territory and defensive positions which had proved—and were to prove during the two years that followed—impregnable. Joy advanced the curious and original argument that in the event of a ceasefire, "UN" planes would have to stop bombing, "UN" ships would have to stop shelling, "UN" ground forces would have to stop shooting, whereas on the Korean-Chinese side only the ground forces would stop shooting. As a price for securing a halt to air bombing and naval shelling, the Korean-Chinese forces must abandon all they had defended in the bitterest fighting of the war and open the gateway for an advance to Pyongyang in the event of the ceasefire being broken. The fact that such a demand was advanced was the surest indicator that General Ridgway was only concerned in securing more favorable jumping-off positions to start fighting again and succeed where MacArthur had failed, in driving north and occupying the whole of Korea.

Joy was asking Nam II to permit his forces to jump over the formidable, magnificently fortified mountain ranges, just as Hitler demanded the Czechs surrender their splendidly fortified positions in the Sudetenland, to facilitate the subsequent Nazi conquest of Czechoslovakia.

To cover up this preposterous demand, which Joy knew would

not go down at all with world opinion, western correspondents were briefed that no progress was possible because the Korean-Chinese side refused to discuss a demarcation line along the 38th parallel. This made screaming headlines in the world press in the days that followed. For weeks on end the really hot news that Joy was not talking about the 38th parallel, nor the actual battleline, but something over 32 miles north of it, was completely suppressed while the Korean-Chinese delegates were being castigated for bad faith. Bit by bit the original lie that they were refusing to discuss the 38th parallel was modified to one about refusing to discuss a line along the battlefront.

On August 2, a first hint as to what was really going on was put out by Reuters, quoting "Communist newsmen" as stating that, "the UN delegation was seeking a line north of the battle-line contrary to the belief of Allied newsmen who have never been officially informed what Admiral Joy and other delegates have been demanding." The report was promptly denied by Brigadier General William P. Nuckols of the U.S. Air Force, the official "UN" briefing officer. To pin the Americans down, General Nam II walked into the conference room on August 12 with a map on which he had plotted the current battleline and the American's proposed demarcation line. He laid it down in front of Joy. "Is this what you mean or not?" he asked. Joy said it was substantially correct and repeated the old arguments about compensation for air and naval superiority. Nam II pointed out that a battlefield situation was the product of a trial of strength between opposing armed forces, each using all the arms at its disposal. The "UN" side had employed to the full its ground, air and naval strength and the end result was the present battle line which "UN" air and naval superiority had been unable to modify. He reminded Joy coldly that the days were gone forever when imperialist powers could sail in a few gunboats and get whole kingdoms in Asia by so-called "naval superiority."

General James A. Van Fleet, who commanded the "UN" 8th Army, decided to play a hand. He made an unprecedented visit

to the western press camp on the evening of August 14 and, according to pooled agency dispatches, said: "Maybe the 8th Army and Air Force will have to break that deadlock. . . . Our troops are irritated by the Communist arrogance at the Kaesong ceasefire talks. The 8th Army is fit and prepared to continue full-scale warfare if necessary." The fact that Nam II had proposed at the very first meeting an immediate ceasefire, as the whole world expected, had apparently been taken by Washington as a sign of weakness. Admiral Joy rejected it, stating that not until every item had been negotiated could he consider a halt

to the shooting. Officially this was explained as necessary to "exert military pressures" on the Korean-Chinese team to insure they negotiated properly.

A few days later Van Fleet launched a full-scale offensive on the central and eastern fronts. Admiral Joy proposed that the conference recess and that the problem of the demarcation line be handed to a sub-committee to discuss. Van Fleet was thus given a chance to move the battleline up to that which Joy was demanding at the conference table. Meanwhile Nuckols, without consulting the Korean-Chinese delegates, announced what UP reported as a "virtual news blackout," restricting the "UN" press corps to four representatives, including only one agency journalist, two photographers and one radio correspondent. Nuckols explained that an "unduly large number of newsmen could hamper the objectivity and freedom of the talks."

In his dispatch on the first day of the sub-committee meeting, Bob Tuckman of Associated Press quoted "a Communist correspondent" as stating that "the red delegation might be willing to talk about a ceasefire line based squarely on the present battle front. ... 'If the UN delegation abandons its stand,' the correspondent said, 'I will leave it to you whether we could get together on a line somewhere north of the 38th.' "

In fact I had told Tuckman that if the Americans really wanted a line along the battlefield, why not talk about the actual battleline and not something 30-odd miles north of it. And why didn't they start talking about the 38th parallel if

they wanted that instead? They would not find the Korean-Chinese delegates difficult about either solution. But even as it appeared, Tuckman's story was the first real hint that Joy was asking for something other than a ceasefire line along the battlefield. The immediate result was dynamite.

Other agencies got callbacks on Tuckman's story and started pinning Nuckols against the wall, asking for maps and texts of Joy's proposals. They began to get very hot on the trail by August 22. A great big red herring was suddenly drawn across that trail at that point.

AUGUST 22, 1951

The night of August 22, 1951, is not likely to be forgotten by any of those involved in the incident itself and its consequences. It just escaped being a Sarajevo which could have touched off World War III.

During the afternoon there had been a number of low-flying planes over Kaesong. This violated the negotiations arrangements under which Kaesong, as the headquarters of the Korean-Chinese delegations and the venue of the talks, was a neutral area. At 10:15 that night I was the only one of the 15 journalists in the press center to be in bed. A plane with a more than usually menacing sound seemed to be diving over our roof and I crawled out from under the mosquito net just as someone yelled, "Put the lights out." I had just reached the verandah when there was a rippling series of blinking white flashes; simultaneously, the sharp, shattering sound of bombs exploded nearby. "Bang goes neutrality and the talks," flashed through my mind as a Chinese guard guided me to a ditch where we crouched as the plane made another circle and a dive. Perilously close, it opened up with machine guns.

The plane pulled out of its dive, made one more leisurely circle and flew off towards the South. By this time we had all recognized it as a B-26 by its unhurried droning. Our first inquiries established that the bombs had fallen between our house and the delegation headquarters some 400 yards away. A few pieces of bomb fragments had even landed on General Nam Il's jeep, but nobody had been injured. Within 15 minutes of the attack an attempt was made to contact the American liaison officers by radio-telephone to demand an immediate investigation. Contact was finally established at 11 p.m. At first

the senior liaison officers refused to come, stating that it was too late at night. Upon the insistence of the senior liaison officers of the Korean-Chinese side, however, Colonel Kinney agreed to come and investigate.

The "Investigation"

It was a slightly cloudy night and by the time Kinney and his aide, Marine Lt. Col. Murray, drove up with interpreters but no newsmen, a slight rain was falling. Kinney stepped out of his jeep, looked around challengingly at the group of Korean-Chinese correspondents, then strode across to the verandah where the North Korean colonel was sitting. The latter motioned Kinney and Murray to chairs. As the two Americans pushed their rain capes back over their ears, the North Korean colonel gave a brief outline of what had taken place. Kinney scowled and glowered about him, tapping his foot and showing every sign of impatience and disbelief as the colonel completed his very restrained account. The colonel laid on the table the pieces of shrapnel which had fallen on General Nam Il's jeep and stated his belief that the attack was a deliberate attempt to murder the Korean-Chinese delegation members.

Kinney then started a hostile, rapid-fire cross-examination. "Who saw the planes? Any eyewitnesses?" The North Korean colonel waved his hand at the 30-40 delegation staff members and journalists: "Everyone here is an eyewitness."

Kinney sneered. "How many planes were there? How many bombs were dropped?"

The Korean liaison officer replied, "That will become clear during the investigation." Kinney dictated to his shorthand writer: "No one knows how many planes there were or how many bombs were dropped."

From the conference house we went to see what had actually happened. Less than 100 yards from a house which had been placed at the disposal of Joy and his assistants during their daily sojourns to Kaesong was a patch of burned grass, splashes

of napalm on the road and a water-filled crater about two yards from the road, with blobs of oil floating on the water. In the middle of the road was a napalm container with the metal crumpled into folds from its impact with the ground. Even at a cursory glance one could see that it had hit the rocky road siding, slid off at a tangent and exploded in a tiny stream on the opposite side of the road.

The casing had been flung back onto the road. There was a strong smell of burning rubber which came from black tar-like blobs scattered over a radius of five or 10 yards. This was pointed out to the American liaison officers. Kinney, with an over-emphasized, incredulity, asked: "Is that a bomb? That could be anything." He refused to go near the casing or the crater and stepped back when a Chinese photographer wanted to take a flashlight picture. "I've seen enough." He signalled to his interpreter and said, "Tell them. If this is the sort of thing they are going to show us, I'm getting very impatient, very impatient."

He was told sharply that this was only the beginning of the investigation and that there was much more to see. We continued to the side of a valley about 200 yards from the delegation headquarters. There were a number of small craters. Alongside the first, half-buried in the sandy soil, was a small fin, corresponding to those from 100-pound anti-personnel or fragmentation bombs. Kinney refused to go near it and refused to touch it when it was handed to him.

"That's neither a bomb nor any part of a bomb," he snarled. "How did it get here?" asked the North Korean colonel, to which Kinney replied, "You should know that better than I." In the same bullying, sneering tone he turned to the people standing around and asked, "Has anyone here ever seen the results of American bombing?" All the Koreans and many of the Chinese had had bitter experiences of American bombing, but none deigned to reply.

Ten paces away from the first crater, another bomb had struck a piece of sheer rock and flaked it off to a depth of about

two inches, with a badly twisted bomb fin lying near a small blast crater. Pieces of half-inch cube shrapnel, which could be felt in the sand around the crater, had left score marks in the rock. Kinney refused to inspect it. "It's nothing," he said and, turning to Murray, added, "Let's get back, Jim. Let's get out of here." Murray, however, seemed not entirely to share Kinney's tough attitude, and said, "We better have a look." They both hung back however when photos were taken.

When asked to inspect a third crater, Kinney, who was deliberately staying out of the cameras' way said, "No. I have seen all I want to see." The North Korean chief liaison officer spoke up very sharply and said, "We demand that you continue this investigation. That is our right."

"You what?" shouted Kinney, contemptuous overtones of racial arrogance in his voice. "Who gave you any rights? You have no right to demand anything."

There were still three craters to investigate but Kinney refused to go further. (It was discovered in daylight that at least 13 bombs, all of the same anti-personnel type, had fallen within a very small area in this valley; but only six of them had been located in the dark that night.) Kinney did not touch one piece of bomb or shrapnel, nor take one measurement, nor take or request to take one sample, nor ask to question even one eyewitness as to what they had seen or heard. As far as he was concerned at that moment, the investigation was completed and he felt free to go home. He was told, however, that he should return to the conference house, and this was done.

On the verandah of the conference house, the North Korean liaison officer pointed out that there was undisputed evidence of the attack and its deliberate nature. Reading from a prepared statement, he said, "We must point out the extreme gravity of this incident. Under instructions of our chief delegate, we hereby lodge first a most serious verbal protest with your side and inform you that tomorrow's meeting is cancelled." (The original Korean text said, "the meeting for August 23," but the interpreter said "tomorrow." Technically, as it was already

the early hours of the 23rd, it should have been "today's meeting is cancelled.")

Kinney asked, "What meeting?" and the reply was, "All meetings," meaning the liaison officers' meeting as well as the scheduled sub-committee meeting. Kinney replied in a very haughty voice, "I will relay your ridiculous protest," and, signalling to Murray and the interpreters, clambered into his jeep and drove off.

It is important to note here that Kinney's subsequent report makes no mention of having asked at this stage to continue the investigations in daylight. It appears he was quite satisfied with what he had seen at this stage and was prepared to submit his report without having questioned one eyewitness and without having taken one piece of material evidence. It seems fairly evident that Kinney believed the Air Force had succeeded in wrecking the talks and thus there was no need for even the pretense of an objective inquiry.

Meanwhile both Winnington and I had written stories about the bombing, ending with the item that meetings for the following day had been cancelled. We then heard that fresh evidence had been discovered and that liaison officers had sped after Kinney in jeeps, demanding he return and continue the investigation. They caught him before he reached Panmunjom and, after a half-hour harangue during which Kinney protested about the rain and the dark, he turned back. The Chinese and Korean cameramen had gone home, thinking the investigation was over, so Kinney felt freer this time to investigate without having his photo taken, showing incriminating evidence in the same picture. Two more napalm bombs had been found, one of which had not exploded properly. This time Kinney actually handled the casing and said: "Flush-riveting. Not our stuff."

He looked at the unburned napalm and said he would return in daylight. He asked that no evidence be removed, but was told that as it was raining and some of the evidence might be washed away, the Korean-Chinese liaison officers would take

some samples of napalm for chemical analysis and invited Kinney to do the same. Kinney replied, "Steel won't wash away and oil won't mix with water." He was told that although the evidence was conclusive, the Korean-Chinese side had no objection to Kinney returning next morning with 10 newsmen (the number Kinney himself suggested). Kinney was asked to make contact by radio-telephone in the usual way to state what time -his party would come.

The next morning, Korean and Chinese liaison officers waited in vain for word that Kinney was coming back, as promised, with UN newsmen. As there had been no word from Kinney by midday, it was decided to continue a daylight examination of evidence without him. Guards were stationed by each exhibit, to insure that everything would be intact for whenever Kinney decided to return. After carrying out the daylight investigation, there could be no reasonable doubt that the attack was a deliberate attempt to murder the Korean-Chinese delegates, carried out by a skillful pilot who had carefully studied the area and knew the precise location of the delegation residence in relation to geographic features. He failed in his task by a split-second error in navigation.

Through questioning peasant and soldier eyewitnesses of the attacks, it was possible to piece together the whole story, given a few measurements and bearings of the location of the bombs.

The plane had come from the southwest and dropped a napalm bomb near the UN rest house, continued in a circle and dropped another at the foot of Pine Tree Peak. One of these was 500 yards southwest of the delegation residence, the other some 600 yards northeast. A line between these two burning markers passed exactly over the delegation residence. The other two napalm bombs were dropped nearly together a few hundred yards southeast of the residence, perhaps to mark some geographic feature to be negotiated in relation to the mountain peaks. The plane came in on its run very accurately considering the cloudy night, and dropped its bombs with only a shade of error. It was a skillful piece of night navigation, especially

considering the hazards of Pine Tree Peak and several other razor-backed ridges that surround Kaesong. I remembered the unnecessarily wide sweeps that the American helicopters often took over the Korean-Chinese delegation residence when they brought Admiral Joy and his aides to Kaesong.

Efforts to End Armistice Talks

By the time we got back to headquarters, instead of Kinney and the 10 journalists he had promised to bring, there was the text of a fantastic account being put out to the world by Ridgway's chief press officer, Brigadier-General Frank Allen. Broadcast first over the U.S. Armed Forces Radio at 12 noon and repeated all day on August 23, Allen made three main points, each a lie: (1) The armistice talks were broken off. The North Korean liaison officer, Colonel Chang, had called off all talks "from this time." (2) The whole incident was a frame-up and fabrication. No bombs had been dropped from a plane nor had any bombs exploded. (3) The North Korean side had refused permission for any further investigation.

Colonels Kinney and Murray, according to the statement, had not seen any bombs or parts of bombs. They had seen some shallow craters that could have been made by hand grenades, some pieces of UN command aircraft, the fin from a rocket.

"Colonel Chang could not say," the report continued, "whether one or more aircraft were involved. He said he did not know how many bombs were dropped or passes made. . . . Speaking from written notes. Colonel Chang stated there will be no further meetings. Colonel Kinney inquired if Colonel Chang meant sub-delegation as well as liaison meetings. Colonel Chang replied 'all meetings are off from this time'. . . . Colonel Kinney requested Colonel Chang to continue the investigation in the morning in better light. Chang refused saying the investigation was complete. Colonel Kinney requested that all evidence be left in place for examination in daylight since darkness prevented proper observation. Colonel Chang refused, saying the

evidence had to be taken for analysis." Allen concluded his report by stating that no UN Command aircraft were in the Kaesong area at the time.

A top-level propaganda machine moved into action. Within five hours of getting Kinney's report and without even waiting to receive a formal written protest, General Ridgway broadcast to the world that the Korean ceasefire talks were finished. He produced a long detailed statement intended to cover every aspect of the case. Within another 24 hours. President Harry S. Truman "categorically" denied the Communist charge that the Allies had bombed Kaesong.

Generals and senators started speaking of the necessity of getting the war immediately into full swing again. Editorial writers, radio commentators and other pundits all over the United States said that they knew all along the Communists did not want peace, that the only thing to do was bring them to their knees in battle. While the napalm was still wet on the hills opposite the delegation house and fresh bomb fragments were still being dug up, United Press reported from Washington on the 23rd that, "Fighting in Korea is expected to whip up in full fury because of the Communist rupture of the peace negotiations . . . High American officials grimly reported that the Communist break-off at Kaesong forecasts resumption of major fighting. They are fearful of a wider spreading of the war."

General Ridgway could not conceive that after what had happened the Koreans and Chinese would try to continue the talks. He counted on an immediate resumption of full-scale fighting and was set to spread the war to the Chinese mainland. The two months which followed August 22, 1951, was the period in which escalation to World War III over Korea was to be averted. The Korean-Chinese delegates were conscious of the grave responsibility on their shoulders; they would not take the initiative in breaking off the talks but prepared for the worst from the Americans.

Very serious charges had been made against the UN command

of having tried to murder the members of the Korean-Chinese delegation. If Washington had been sincere in its proclaimed search for peace would Ridgway have been permitted to act on a report of a verbal exchange between Colonels Kinney and Chang that there would be no further investigation and no further talks? Would Chang have been permitted to get away with such a unilateral decision? There was a radio-telephone contact every half-hour, 24 hours a day, between the liaison officers of both sides. Would Ridgway not have ordered at least one more attempt to carry out the investigation, even a written request, if he sincerely wanted peace? If the whole affair were really a frame-up with bits of airplanes, rocket fins and holes made by hand grenades, would Ridgway not have made every effort thoroughly to expose this to the whole world with scientific evidence by demanding, as he had every right to do, to continue with the investigation?

Whatever else had happened, the neutral zone had been violated. Even if Ridgway had believed Kinney's report that a violation had been carried out only by somebody throwing or planting hand grenades, it was Ridgway's duty to demand an investigation. In a subsequent letter, Ridgway charged that a Communist plane was involved in the incident, but he sent nobody to Kaesong to ask if a plane had been heard that night.

The protest sent by Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai to Ridgway on the 23rd and broadcast over the radio made no mention of breaking off the talks. On the contrary it said: "We hope that our armistice negotiations may proceed smoothly and reach a fair and reasonable agreement acceptable to both sides." They concluded by stating that a satisfactory reply from Ridgway was awaited. Ridgway had not waited for this to announce to the world that the talks were over. It was unprecedented that he should have made any statement before he had received a written communication from his opposite numbers.

The bombing attack and the Allen-Ridgway-Truman declarations made it clear what to expect. Kaesong stripped for action;

thousands of residents started leaving town on August 23 and those that remained started digging shelters. The main Korean-Chinese delegates and most of the journalists were sent back to rear areas, leaving only the liaison officers and four journalists, including Winnington and myself, to cover what we felt would be a hopeless last ditch stand to save the talks before Kaesong would be blasted to bits. The Korean-Chinese liaison officers got busy as did the delegations in the rear area. Kinney and Ridgway were told at their respective levels that not only were they free to resume the investigation as agreed, but Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai insisted they should do just that. Ridgway started to wriggle. The press was after him again. The British and other governments started behind-the-scenes pressures.

Ridgway's Bombers

General Van Fleet launched his offensive, and for the next two months tried to gain by military means what Joy had been unable to secure at the conference table. Meanwhile a tenuous contact had been reestablished between liaison officers. There followed weeks of a curious hide and seek game between the Korean-Chinese delegation headquarters and Ridgway's bombers. The headquarters had been moved into an isolated house in Kaesong's outskirts after the attack. Winnington and I had moved into another building housing the liaison officers. In the early hours of August 29, a low-flying plane circled the city for several minutes, then dropped a parachute flare over the new delegation house.

V Shortly after midnight on August 31, we were awakened by the sound of a low-flying B-26; a few minutes later our house was shuddering from heavy explosions. Two 500-pound bombs had been dropped within 500 yards from the new delegation house. Colonel Chang demanded an investigation and told Kinney through radio contact that he could bring newsmen with him. As Pyongyang and Peking radio repeatedly broadcasted that there was never any objection from their side to

journalists being present at investigations, the press clamored to come. Kinney tried to deny the evidence of the two huge craters and the bits of metal by saying the only evidence was "of a metal container filled with explosives and buried in the ground." He was invited to question the entire peasant population of the region. But after speaking to four peasants, who described the noise of the plane and explosions, Kinney said: "That's enough, they're all telling the same story."

While the investigation was going on another U.S. plane flew squarely over the heads of the investigation team, a clear daylight violation of the Kaesong neutral area. All this was going down very badly with the journalists, most of whom recognized bomb craters and fragments when they saw them and were beginning to mutter. Kinney tried another tactic: "It so happens," he said, "that we had an unidentified plane on our radar screen at the exact place and time you say this attack occurred. The attack must therefore have been carried out by one of your own aircraft."

The delegation house was moved again back into the heart of Kaesong. At 1:35 am on September 10, an attack was made against the street in which the new residence was located, strafing half a dozen houses a little over 100 yards away and spattering them with machine-gun bullets. From our new press headquarters, we could see the red flashes from the plane's machine guns directly over our heads. It circled once after pulling out of the dive and flew off to the South.

More protests and demands for investigation were made. The morning after the attack, AP reported from Tokyo, "It is unlikely that Nam II would get a reply. . . . The UN Command said Monday it was making no more replies to such protests."

This time Air Force Colonel Darrow came to investigate. Due to the multitude of fresh splinters, and the bullets embedded in woodwork, and with reporters present, it was difficult to deny that the houses had been strafed. But Darrow and his "experts" tried to prove that the damage could have been caused by someone "firing a machine gun from the roof of a nearby house."

They were asked to indicate from what roof bullets could have come at the steep angles at which they were embedded in bricks and woodwork. Of course there were no such roofs. Darrow was invited to question any residents in Kaesong, selected at random, but gave up after the first three, including occupants of the strafed houses, gave evidence of hearing the plane and shooting. Because one woman described the flash and explosion of a 50 caliber armor-piercing bullet when it hit her stone bedroom wall, Darrow reported: "The Communists produced two witnesses whose statements differed on whether it was strafing or bombing."

While the news agencies were pouring out stories from Tokyo and Munsan that the violation would be denied, a message was broadcast from Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai, warning Ridgway that there was a limit to provocations and this limit had now been reached. Unless Ridgway took a "serious and responsible attitude" to the series of provocative incidents, the UN forces "would definitely bear the full responsibilities for all consequences resulting from the procrastination and obstruction of the negotiations and of breaking up the negotiations."

There were tense hours during the afternoon of September 11, with the news agencies reporting fire and thunder statements from Munsan to Washington. More planes than ever flew over Kaesong in the early evening.

I knew the Korean and Chinese leadership well enough by that time to tell that their patience was exhausted. If full-scale fighting were resumed it would be a different war from now on; war to the death with virtually no possibility it would be confined to the boundaries of Korea, or even China. The DPRK is the only socialist country, apart from Mongolia, to have common frontiers with both China and the Soviet Union. The Korean-Chinese troops in the frontline were anxious to go over to the offensive instead of just holding the enemy at bay. Time and again after "UN" attacks, chances for successful counter-attacks were presented, but orders were to defend and hold, not to attack. These thoughts were in my mind as we

waited in an air-raid shelter that night, our ears glued to the radio. It was the first time we had decided it was not worth undressing; the activity of reconnaissance planes had been so abnormal, especially toward evening that a full-scale raid was expected.

At 11 pm, the break came with the electrifying news that Ridgway had backed down, had admitted and apologized for the incident. The western journalists were caught by surprise as they had been reporting up until five minutes of the announcement that Ridgway was rejecting the violation charges. Yes, the radar screen had revealed this time that a UN aircraft had been over Kaesong at the time the attack took place.

Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai immediately proposed a resumption of the conference. Ridgway countered by asking for a meeting of liaison officers; Kim and Peng agreed on the understanding that they were to meet to fix the date and time for the full conference to resume.

Move to Panmunjom

There followed one of those awkward pauses while Van Fleet tried to persuade his superiors that with just a little more time, he could pull off a military victory. His "summer offensive" had by then ground to a halt but he was ready for a new "autumn offensive." For over a month there were daily meetings of liaison officers, usually lasting only a few minutes. Each day Kinney would turn up at Col. Chang's invitation, "to meet and discuss the time and date for a resumption of the conference." But when Kinney arrived he stated he was authorized only to discuss the "conditions," not "time and date," for resumption. The condition was that Kaesong be abandoned as the conference site. It was soon clear that this was another stalling tactic to allow Van Fleet to proceed with the "autumn offensive." Often Kinney simply walked in and said, "I have nothing new to say today," and walked out again.

On October 7, Generals Kim and Peng proposed Panmunjom

the new conference site as Ridgway was adamant about Kaesong. Ironically the main reason given for moving from Kaesong was that the various incidents had proved that it was too close to the battlefield for security. Panmunjom in fact was still closer. Ridgway accepted Panmunjom and on October 11, the liaison officers met there for the first time to discuss the rules for security around Panmunjom and the routes to and from Kaesong and Munsan. One of the rules agreed to that day was that 1,000 square yards be set aside as the attack-free zone of the Panmunjom conference site itself. The tent where the liaison officers met would be in the exact center of this zone. Within 24 hours, two U.S. planes strafed inside even that limited target. When Darrow and Murray came that evening to investigate, they were shown a 12-year old boy lying on his side, his body riddled with bullets, a fishing rod clutched in his hand, and a few small fish flapping around in a water-filled American steel helmet. Three days later Ridgway admitted the incident and apologized. Correspondents started speculating about divergencies within the U.S. armed forces with the Army in favor of ceasefire talks and the Air Force and Navy adamantly against. In the decisive months of violations and stalling, Navy and Air Force officers dominated the scene at Panmunjom. The Army was nowhere to be seen. Nor were any of the United States' "UN" allies, although the British, with a full brigade at the front, tried hard but failed to get a seat at the conference table.

Full delegates' talks were finally arranged after many more days of stalling while Van Fleet tried for his breakthrough on the eastern and central fronts. On October 25, General Nam II and Admiral Joy faced each other over the conference table for the first time since August 15.

In the three months since the delegates first met, only one of the five agenda items had been agreed upon, the adoption of the agenda itself. Winnington and I began to joke that if things went on at that speed we would be there until Christmas. We were, and for two more Christmases as well.

"FRATERNIZATION, CONSORTING, TRAFFICKING"

Within the first days of the resumption of talks, it became obvious that a new press policy was in force. Journalists who had had normal working relations with Winnington and myself were recalled to Tokyo. Some of them later let us know the reason why. The few grains of truth that had leaked into the world press during the earlier meetings had badly shaken Ridgway's public relations setup. Washington put pressure on agencies and newspaper directors to demand more "loyal" behavior from their representatives. "Fraternization" was frowned upon, to say the least./An MP lieutenant, who allowed himself to be photographed smiling with his North Korean opposite numbers, was removed from the area (even though he posed at the request of a U.S. photographer).

Drivers of jeeps for U.S. delegation personnel and correspondents, who had previously joined in the daily discussions between the journalists of both sides, were warned not to speak with "red" correspondents. Brigadier General Nuckols turned up again the first day talks resumed, with Harold Handleman of International News Service at his side.* Nuckols had a new policy for the "UN" press, consisting of distorted briefings and

* U.S. News & World Report (February 17, 1967) carried an article about my "strange role." It was written presumably by diplomatic editor Howard Handleman, an active "hawk" at the Korean ceasefire talks in his role as chief of INS's Tokyo Bureau. "The Americans balked at the Communist-arranged setting at Kaesong," writes Handleman, "and broke off the talks. They were reopened later at Panmunjom, a roadside village that could be truly neutral." At the time, Handleman and some of his colleagues were castigating the Korean-Chinese side for having broken off the talks. Handleman, Nuckols' chief confidant at the talks, should have known what was going on.

intimidation of correspondents who "fraternized." For a day or two it worked but Nuckols was quickly caught again in a bit of trickery, like that which produced the August 22 crisis. The original hoax, about the battle line, having been exposed, Nuckols tried to persuade his team of newsmen that this time U.S. delegates were "honestly" asking for a ceasefire line precisely along the actual battlefield. In fact, in the subcommittee whose job was to fix the demarcation line, American delegates were now demanding that the North Koreans surrender Kaesong and some 625 square miles of territory.

*' Meanwhile, Van Fleet was launching an offensive to try and capture the city. His troops made a frontal assault and then pincers assaults from the east and west flanks, aimed at cutting the city off from behind and encircling it. The battles went on every day in full view of delegates and press in the neutral enclave of Panmunjom. But at no point did Van Fleet's troops advance even 20 yards.

Two Maps

The fact that the Americans were demanding Kaesong was kept from the "UN" pressmen. On one occasion, Winnington and I explained to them that this demand was holding up the talks; that Kaesong was a very serious issue, the American delegates having been warned of this in the conference tent; and that disregarding such warnings before had led to serious consequences. The journalists asked Nuckols if this were so and he flatly denied it, stating that what was holding up the talks was a Korean-Chinese demand for a "de facto ceasefire." This subject had in fact not been raised since the first day of the talks when Nam II proposed an immediate ceasefire and Joy had refused. Handleman that night reported for INS that "Nuckols had warned against accepting the red newsmen's versions" of the various issues involved.

The next day when we challenged the American newsmen again, several said they were genuinely puzzled. They asked if

we would step into their press tent and show them on the map what the respective positions were regarding an eventual demarcation line along the battlefront. We agreed but said we could not draw a precise line on the map without having all the place names. We did our best and drew the positions as we understood them. The reporters could hardly believe that American delegates were really claiming what we showed on the map. One rushed after us with a tracing of the map with the American position on it, asking us to take it back to Kaesong and have our version precisely pinpointed. We agreed.

Nuckols was enraged when he heard of this and the journalist concerned did not appear at Panmunjom for many weeks. Handleman, who had been the most vociferous in challenging us to come into the "UN" press tent, wrote that night that Communist newsmen had "asked to come" to the UN press tent and demanded a map because the "Communist delegates had refused to pinpoint their version on it."

When we took the tracing back to Kaesong, we discovered that the map displayed in the Allied press tent was one especially faked for correspondents. We returned it with the precise lines pinpointed and the correspondents saw they had been tricked. They had a stormy session with Nuckols, but the story was out. The next day the American delegates dropped the demand for Kaesong.

On November 4, the Korean-Chinese delegates proposed that the demarcation line should be fixed precisely along the battle-line. The American delegates were aghast. For months they had pretended that this was "their proposal"; they had persuaded world public opinion that a demarcation line strictly along the battleline was the "fairest, most just, most honorable" solution. In fact they never did propose it but now that world opinion was prepared, the proposal was made by the Korean-Chinese side. The next morning, we learned that the "UN" press corps had not been informed. After we told them, they rushed to Nuckols and accused him of withholding vital information. They then returned to us and said Nuckols denied that any new proposals

had been made. We gave them a copy of the English text as it had been read in the conference tent the previous day. Back they went to Nuckols again, several of them livid with anger this time because, among the newsmen covering the talks, a hard core of journalists was used to digging for facts. Nuckols read through the document as if he were seeing it for the first time and tried to retreat by describing it as "a suggestion rather than a proposal." But it made the headlines in the western press the next day, and from then on even Handleman was less eager to be seen at Nuckols' side.

To cover up their confusion at having been confronted with what was allegedly their own plan, the American delegates, on the day following the confrontation with Nuckols, made the astonishing proposal to drop the whole question of fixing a demarcation line and move on to Item Three. "What's the good of fixing a demarcation line now when we still have other items to discuss?" asked U.S. delegate General Hodes, who headed the U.S. sub-committee. His Korean opposite number refused, saying this was tantamount to scrapping the agenda and disobeying the instructions they had received from their senior delegates to fix a demarcation line.

What the U.S. delegates feared was obvious. If a demarcation line was fixed, no troops would be anxious to the in further offensive action. So the new charge against the Korean-Chinese delegates was of wanting a "de facto ceasefire." Admiral Joy made an unprecedented visit to the "UN" press camp on November 11 to make just this point: "The enemy," he said, according to an INS dispatch that night, "wants all the advantages of a de facto ceasefire now . . . but we shall continue to use every weapon at our command, be it at the conference table or on the battlefield, to achieve a complete military armistice at the earliest possible time." Why fix a demarcation line, was the argument, when we intend to continue fighting and there may be a completely different battleline by the time the whole armistice negotiations are completed?

The head of the Korean-C Chinese sub-committee answered in a

major speech on November 14: "If fixing a demarcation line should create a de facto ceasefire, this was obviously the original intention of Item 2. ... If armistice negotiations are held, there can be no attempt to escape the consequences. If an armistice is reached, the consequences of peace will also have to be faced. As soon as our side made reasonable proposals for fixing the demarcation line, you start boasting about your military strength, bragging about exercising military pressure on the armistice negotiations. ... If you were as sincere for peace as our side, the military demarcation line once fixed need not be changed again. But our side has never made any unilateral request to your side for a de facto ceasefire." He said that the line could in fact be adjusted according to any changes that might be made by the time an armistice was signed.

He then uttered a warning, similar to that of Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai on September 11, which seemed to be correctly understood in Washington, London and other capitals. "There are no legal restrictions whatsoever on your carrying out any military adventures after the military demarcation line is fixed but if your side fails to take due account of our strength and dreams of using the so-called military pressure to change the military demarcation line which has been fixed, I must point out that changes in the actual line of contact can take place in two directions."

Three days later the Americans backed down and agreed to fix the demarcation line. After another week of haggling, the two chief delegates, on November 27, 1951, attached their signatures to an agreement on Agenda Item Two. To cap all the trickery that had gone on, Nuckols had the effrontery to brief "UN" correspondents that, "today's agreement gives the United Nations exactly what it asked for at the beginning of the talks in July."

Battle of the Newsmen

Throughout the two years of talks, parallel with the battle waged daily at the conference table, was another waged in a

more relaxed manner between the newsmen of both sides. In good weather we stood around on the road outside the conference building; in the deep cold of winter, we huddled around a stove in one of the two original huts standing when the liaison officers first pitched their tents at Panmunjom. The second hut was used as a sort of headquarters for journalists accredited to the Korean-Chinese side. The Americans had also pitched a press tent but, because of the fact that they were continually tricked and knew it, most of the regulars covering the talks preferred to spend part of their time "fraternizing" with the reds.

After the map incident Nuckols was largely discredited. Agency correspondents who were really after facts rarely accepted them from Nuckols without first checking them with Winnington and myself.

We were in a favorable situation. The Korean-Chinese side genuinely wanted an armistice and so anything favoring an armistice was good for them. They had no reason to be other than perfectly frank with the press. Although without much experience of handling press affairs, those responsible quickly saw the advantage of getting news out fast and accurately— especially after the hoax on the demarcation line and the August 22 incident. A number of the correspondents on the "UN" side were genuinely after the facts; others were constantly getting call-backs on the version of events being published by Winning-ton in the London Daily Worker and myself in *Ce Soir*. The paucity and dubious nature of the versions put out by Nuckols caused other papers to quote our dispatches; even the major news agencies monitored them in Tokyo and widely quoted from them.

What infuriated the U.S. negotiators was that they had to keep talking or take full responsibility for a breakdown. And they had to negotiate as equals. They had to try and put themselves in the right with the public. Time and again they thought they had some point which would go down well with the public but which the Korean-Chinese delegates could not possibly accept. As a tactical move, the latter for a time let them think the point

was indeed unacceptable. Once the American delegates were convinced they had finally found the "unacceptable," the propaganda was turned on that they had proposed the "most just, honorable, reasonable solution." And when world public opinion had accepted this, as in the case of the ceasefire line along the existing battleline, the Korean-Chinese delegates suddenly proposed such a solution themselves. This happened repeatedly in the talks that followed. The Korean-Chinese delegates did not have the propaganda possibilities to have their point of view put squarely before world public opinion. If they made such proposals too early, they were doomed to rejection.

General Ridgway and his public relations staff counted on complete suppression of the Korean-Chinese version of the talks, but their press policy forced their own journalists to rely more and more on this version, as relayed to them by their "red" colleagues.

It is impossible here to recount the whole fantastic history of the talks, but a certain basic understanding of the frame of mind of the U.S. military who ran the talks and finally signed the agreement is a key to understanding the development of events in today's Korea and, more particularly, tomorrow's Korea.

Heartbreak Ridge

During the period from the August 22 breakdown to the agreement on Item Two, Van Fleet had launched two major offensives. One of them centered around Height 1,211 as it is known to the Koreans, "Heartbreak Ridge" as it was called by the Americans. It lies in the Mt. Kumgang complex near the east coast. Had Van Fleet succeeded in taking it, he could have turned the whole eastern flank and the Korean-Chinese forces would have had to retreat dozens of miles and lose the important coastal port of Wonsan. Height 1,211 (its height in meters) became the focal point for Van Fleet's attempts to secure the positions Admiral Joy was trying to take through his "air and naval superiority" blackmail at Panmunjom.

The Americans held important heights to the east and south of "Heartbreak Ridge." They deployed four divisions, hurling upwards of 50,000 shells and bombs and launching 30 to 50 assaults a day at the height of the battle. This continued for over two months starting shortly after the August 22 negotiations breakdown. Altogether 430 assaults were launched against the ridge; the valley leading up to it, the main assault route, became choked with American tanks and corpses of U.S. and ROK troops. Tens of thousands of tons of shells, bombs and napalm were hurled at the Korean defense positions; all vegetation was destroyed, the earth and rocks were black with napalm, but when the decisive assaults came, the North Korean troops were always there to do battle. The ridge is part of a great complex of abrupt sheer mountains and was isolated from all supply routes when the Americans started the attack. But the local population, working day and night, but mainly at night because of the bombs, cut a fantastic zig-zag road up the back of the mountain to keep supplies moving through.

In charge of that sector of the Front and personally directing the battle was General Choi Hyun, an old comrade-in-arms of Kim Il Sung from the days when they fought as partisans against the Japanese in the forests of Manchuria. Now a member of the Political Bureau of the Korean Workers' Party, Choi Hyun wrote of this battle:

"Height 1,211, once clad with a thousand-years-old virgin forest was now swathed in flames like an active volcano; boulders were pounded into fragments; the whole mountain was ankle-deep in rock dust. Literally the ridge was transformed into a sea of flames." The only way to keep alive and fight back was to tunnel into the rocks. "But there were no drills, sledge hammers or wheelbarrows. ... So the troops smelted down the enemy's dud shells for sledge hammers and drills, and wheelbarrows were made from downed planes. ... At first the artillerymen built tunnels for their batteries; then the infantrymen followed suit. They built solid, comfortable living quarters in the tunnels they carved out of the rocks. When they had no

more oil for their guns, they caught badgers and squirrels for oil; they repaired their rifles from enemy cartridge clips picked up on the battlefield. . . - Our peasants drove their oxen, laden with ammunition and provisions, over Jikdong ridge on which the enemy always concentrated his fire, carrying back the wounded. . . .

"When the 'summer offensive' failed, the enemy launched an 'autumn offensive'; when the puppet 5th division was wiped out, their most vicious 3rd division was thrown into the battle. For more than two months, from September 4 to early November the enemy attacked very ferociously, only to lose 15,000 men and an enormous quantity of material, without ever piercing our line. As a result . . . Ridgway's plan of pushing the front line up to Wonsan at one stroke by taking Height 1,211 remained on his operational maps only."

The costly failure to take "Heartbreak Ridge" or any other key position during those two months was the real reason why the agreement on Item Two was finally signed on November 27, 1951.

In the Liberation War Museum at Pyongyang there is a replica of part of a company-sized tunnel from Height 1,211, just as it was at the end of the war. There are neat dormitories, each for 10 men, with sleeping mats woven from local grasses. A separate kitchen with four iron boilers for cooking rice is beaten out of cut-down American petrol drums; other cooking utensils and ladles are made from plane parts. Heat from the kitchen was diverted through tubes—as in all Korean peasant homes—to heat the floor on which they slept. A bathhouse with wooden tubs hacked out of pine trees used U.S. steel helmets as basins. In a corner they grew bean sprouts, a most valuable item of the Korean diet. An ingenious device for grinding soy beans for bean curd was made with neatly trimmed stones and part of a jeep gear-box; a smithy and a wide variety of drilling and cutting tools were built from tank remnants. There is another small room, for three people, with a field telephone for the company commander and his aides.

By the time the war ended, Korean and Chinese troops along the entire front were living in quarters like these, hacked out with primitive tools, complete with conference rooms, to accommodate a company of 100 or so men, and kitchens big enough to feed battalion-sized units. The Korean-Chinese troops despised the cold K rations American troops ate during operations; they preferred their hot rice and whatever went with it. With several dozens yards of solid rock above their heads, even atomic weapons could not have affected them in their tunnel systems. Since the war, especially in the last year or so, the tunnel systems have been vastly extended so that the entire armed forces can live and maneuver underground, to emerge whenever and wherever necessary to deal with an invader. It was the tunnel system that broke the spirit of the men Van Fleet continued to use, ostensibly to "exert pressure" at the conference table.

Suppression of News

The continuous lies of Ridgway's press officers started to break the spirit of some of the correspondents who were supposed to relay them. "There are many here who believe that the methods adopted at Kaesong and Panmunjom have reduced the prestige and integrity of the United Nations," wrote Sydney Brooks, head of Reuters' Tokyo Bureau, in a signed dispatch on December 17. "The UN demanded Kaesong. This demand was dropped without explanation. The Command is criticized for putting up basic principles as the price of horse-trading and then throwing them away as part of a bargain with a sharp trader."

Admiral Joy and Kinney, in fact, acted at the start as if they had come to dictate surrender terms to General Nam II, ignoring the harsh realities of the battlefield. There was no "clear-cut military victory" nor any prospects for one, despite the bluster of Ridgway and Van Fleet. This was the reason for the dishonest behavior of the American delegates inside the conference room and Nuckols' behavior with the journalists outside.

The suppression of news reached a new level in February 1952 when Ridgway, frustrated and humiliated by our constant exposure of Nuckols' lies, issued a formal ban on contacts between "UN" and "Communist" correspondents. In a memorandum explaining the ban, the General stated: "The UN Command viewed with growing apprehension the practices of some reporters of excessive social consorting, including the drinking of alcoholic beverages, with Communist journalists." He accused certain Allied correspondents of "abusing their news coverage facilities for the purpose of fraternization and were consorting and trafficking with the enemy."

This was a result of another of those extraordinary episodes with which the truce talks were replete. In early 1952, when the talks had shifted to Item Four, General Nam II turned over a list giving the numbers of prisoners of war, including over 3,000 Americans. One of Ridgway's officers published a document claiming the list was a fake and that most American POW's had in fact been massacred or starved to death in the POW camps. This produced demands in the United States to break off the talks, push up to the Yalu, drop the A-bomb on China, and so on.

I told American journalists that the document was a provocation and a lie, that I had visited the POW camps, and that the 3,000-odd Americans were in good shape. A day or two later I had a visit from an AP executive who said: "If you say our prisoners are alive and well, then I believe you. But we have a veteran photographer, 'Pappy' Noel, who was taken prisoner. If what you say is true, why not let us send a camera and film up the road to 'Pappy.' Let him take pictures of the prisoners. We'll publish them in the home town papers and people will start screaming to get them home again." I put this strange request to the Korean delegation and they said: "Why not? Let them send a camera up to him." And so it was done.

A few days later, every American paper was carrying front-page pictures of American POW's, smiling and in obviously good shape, playing volleyball, basketball and football.

After the fast general pictures of life in the camps, there came a stream of portraits with names and home-town addresses that were given a tremendous display in local papers. Noel was given facilities to go from camp to camp and photograph to his heart's content.

Then we were approached by a UP executive who said: "These AP pictures are killing us. Would it be possible for us to have one of our photographers parachute out with a camera, get himself captured and then work in the camps like 'Pappy' Noel?" Of course this was impossible. As the next best thing, he asked if it were possible to take some pictures of General William F. Dean, if it was true that he was alive, exclusively for UP. (General Dean, commander of the U.S. 24th Division which was cut to pieces by the Korean People's Army at Taejon, was on the POW list. Ridgway's staff had promptly produced a South Korean who provided "absolute proof" that Dean in fact was dead.) So I went up the road to Pyongyang and took pictures of General Dean, giving the negative to UP.

General Ridgway exploded when the U.S. army paper Stars and Stripes carried a double-page spread on General Dean, sleek and trim in a double-breasted suit playing chess with his Korean guards, doing physical exercises, shadow-boxing and walking in the forest. Not only was a whole propaganda myth blown to smithereens but U.S. troops began to wonder why they should be freezing and dying at the front when General Dean and the other POW's were leading a good life in safety behind the lines. The editor of Stars and Stripes was sacked and sent home. The first issue under the new editor published a scathing attack on AP and others who fell for "red propaganda." And the general issued his famous "no fraternization" order to the press.

Of course the correspondents defied the ban and the day after it was issued, even journalists who had avoided us in the past made a point of coming over, under the eyes of a very furious Nuckols, to talk with us and share a bottle of what came to be known as "antifreeze." Many of them had received cabled

instructions from their editors to ignore the Ridgway order. The "UN" press corps sent a delegation to Tokyo and forced Ridgway to withdraw the ban; photos continued to flow through AP to the U.S. press, and "Pappy" Noel was awarded the most important photographer's prize of the year. The POW pictures were the first tangible evidence for thousands of families that their soldier relatives were really alive and well.

"The Army doesn't like the newsworthy information and pictures the Communists give out," wrote AP staff correspondent Charlie Barnard, replying on February 10, 1952, to the Stars and Stripes attack on AP. "But many's the time they have given hot news stories on what is happening in the armistice tents to Allied correspondents and the stories have turned out to be correct. A few months ago the UNC announced there would be no further briefings while sub-delegate armistice sessions were in progress. But the communist journalists got briefings and they in turn 'briefed' the Allied newsmen. For days that was the only armistice news the newspapers of the free world got."

Dwight Martin, then Tokyo bureau chief of Time magazine, pointed out in the February 28 issue that "consorting" had been fostered by Ridgway's policy of news suppression. "Since summer," reported Martin, "UN newsmen have been faced with a dilemma. They have found that Communist newsmen whom they see every day at Panmunjom are often a better news source than the sparse briefings by UN's own information officers." George Barrett wrote similarly in The New York Times, as did many other correspondents.

Apart from Stars and Stripes, not a single newspaper or news agency that I know of came to the defense of Ridgway and Nuckols on this issue.

UNDER THE "UN" FLAG

My last assignment in World War II took me to Hiroshima. I wandered around in the brick dust and cinders of that first experimental target of nuclear arms, while the Japanese surrender documents were being signed aboard the battleship USS Missouri. At that time I thought I had seen the ultimate in civilian destruction. But by the time I left Korea I knew that I had been wrong. Hiroshima was a city totally destroyed. But Korea was a country totally destroyed in the most literal sense of the term. In Pyongyang, a city of 400,000 at the war's outbreak, there were but two buildings intact. They are still there as museum pieces.

Total Destruction

"Except for land and people," General Pak Jung Kuk said to me, "everything in our country is less than 13 years old." Not a town, not a village, not a factory, school or hospital escaped. Even isolated temples far from human habitations were bombed to bits. During the war I saw mainly the northern regions along the Yalu and the eastern coastal areas, the towns and villages along the road and railway that lead from the Yalu river to Kaesong. But friends who travelled to the west and other areas described exactly the same scene of total destruction. No country in history suffered so much material destruction, except some small states in the direct path of the Mongol invaders.

Pyongyang, the population of which was reduced to 80,000 by the end of the war, mainly by evacuation, received 390,000 bombs altogether. The most devastating raids took place after

the ceasefire talks started, to pressure Kim Il Sung to yield on the various points discussed.

Everything the Korean people had inherited over the millenia from their ancestors was destroyed; everything they had been able to salvage after 35 years of Japanese occupation; everything they had been able to build up in the five years of peace between the defeat of Japan and the start of the war. All was destroyed under the flag of the world's most universal peacekeeping organization. Although Hitler sometimes killed a higher proportion of people in the countries he occupied, he never managed anything like the total destruction of North Korea.

It was not for want of trying by the "UN" air force that the entire population of North Korea was not wiped out. They would have been, together with the buildings that sheltered them, had they remained in their towns, villages and peasant huts. Syngman Rhee indeed boasted that the population of the North had been reduced from 12 to three million by the end of the war.

Along the road that led south from the Yalu, places where villages had once been could sometimes be recognized by the level, black patches ready for the plough, with piles of bricks and tiles stacked along the roadside. Here and there bits of chimneys poked up out of the black like grotesque plants growing in cinders. Further south, it was sometimes the stumps of gate-posts showing above the green of crops that marked the place where once a village had stood. One wondered where the survivors, if any, lived. But when one looked more closely at the surrounding landscape—in Korea one is never out of sight of hills and mountains—there were trails of smoke from early morning fires seeping through holes in the slopes. Whole villages, as I saw later when I traveled the roads in daylight, had moved underground into primitive cave shelters, devoid of any comfort save protection from bombs. Even on my first drive south, just one year after the war started, there was no hospital, church, school or any public building along the road that had escaped destruction.

All this came back to me in May 1967 as I visited places like the Hamhung chemical fertilizer factory. First attacked on July 11, 1950, just three weeks after the fighting started along the 38th parallel, it had received 36,000 bombs and shells by the end of the war. American warships, almost permanently stationed offshore, poured streams of shells into everything above ground at Hamhung. Similarly, the Hwanghae iron and steel plant had taken 30,000 bombs; even a small Pyongyang textile plant received over 9,000. Figures are useless to describe the number of factories, hospitals, schools and houses; it would mean listing everything that existed when the war started.

But life and production went on. People and machines went underground, turning out munitions, transport equipment, even textiles and books. Machines were built, scientific research continued, papers printed. People went to school and even to cinemas and theatres in caves and tunnels hewed out of the country's plentiful mountains. If people had to stay underground by day they emerged at night to till the fields, gather in the harvest, repair bridges and roads to insure that their sons and husbands got food, bullets and warm clothing at the front in winter, and that those in transit had their clothes washed and mended during stop-overs.

"Strictly Military Objectives"

At one period, when Item Four was being discussed at the ceasefire talks and American delegates were demanding the right to detain scores of thousands of Korean and Chinese prisoners of war under the principle of "voluntary repatriation," terrorist raids were launched against 78 North Korean towns and cities, named in groups, with the avowed aim of bringing the Korean people to their knees. The "UN" Command in Tokyo boasted, to prove its "humanitarianism," that it published the names of the targets in advance. At least 6,000 civilians were killed on August 29, 1952, in one such raid on Pyongyang. World reaction to the raids produced statements from the "UN" Command that only "strictly military objectives were being attacked."

AP reported that in another raid on Pyongyang, on July 11, 1952, 870 tons of bombs and 43,000 liters of napalm were dropped, 650 rockets and 50,000 rounds of machine-gun bullets and cannon shells were fired. "This will have an immediate bearing on the ceasefire talks," the AP dispatch concluded.

On summer days in Kaesong, I used to watch Korean children swimming. In any group, half were covered with napalm burns. (A higher concentration of such children were in Kaesong than elsewhere because they had been sent into the neutral zone to give them a better chance of survival.) Ears which were shapeless blobs melted into the rest of the face; arms and legs contained great rubbery, raised weals (keloids, in medical language). One boy with a terrible, fixed smile, seemed to have stepped out of Victor Hugo's *L'homme qui rit*, with a burned, distorted mouth which would never close. There were other cases in the hospitals, too terrible to turn loose among other children, faces that were dead, horrible pink and purple masks, orbless sockets where bright, black eyes had been; red eyes between eyelids that never closed, eyes which glittered only through slits of eyelids that could not open; limbs fused to the body, twisted feet and hands that were horrible, useless claws; flesh that had been boiled and grilled. There is no other word than "genocide," in its literal, dictionary meaning, to describe the policy applied by the "United Nations" to the Korean people north of the battleline and indeed those that supported them south of the battleline.

I do not mean to imply hostility toward the United Nations as an organization. But what has been done in the name of the UN in Korea remains on the record. It can never be erased. Korean towns and villages have been rebuilt, the economy more than restored. But the dead remain dead; the maimed remain maimed. Above all, the body proper of Korea remains maimed. All this was done under the UN flag. The composition of the UN today is very different from that which gave a free hand to the United States in Korea. Many new members from Asia and especially Africa have been added. Had the new members been there in June 1950, history might have taken a different course.

Blot on UN

When I revisited Panmunjom in May 1967, I was with a number of journalists and delegates of African, Asian and Latin American newspapers, governments and organizations. Most of them were astounded to see the UN flag on the conference table at which meetings still take place today; horrified to see UN notepaper used to excuse violations of North Korean territory, as when the Americans wanted to get back their captured pilots; embarrassed that Korea remains divided in the name of the United Nations and under UN military occupation in the southern half of the country.

All this is clearly in violation of the UN Charter. Korea was a problem of World War II, an enemy-occupied territory. The only justifiable outside intervention arose from the defeat of Japan. The World War II allies agreed at the Yalta Conference that Soviet and American forces would enter North and South Korea respectively, advancing to the 38th parallel in order to disarm Japanese troops there. The Soviet Union withdrew its troops in September 1948 after vainly trying to persuade the Americans to do the same and let the Koreans settle their own affairs.

Article 107 of the UN Charter stipulates that the UN has no competence in postwar settlements related to World War II. Furthermore, Article 2, Paragraph 7, states that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."

Nevertheless, American occupation of South Korea has continued for 22 years, and for the past 20 years the UN has provided the cover. In 1947, at U.S. insistence, the "UN Commission on Korea" was set up, as a means of preventing the country's reunification. In October 1950 this was replaced by UNCURK (United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) under which U.S. policies are imposed on the South;

any moves towards real "reunification" of the country or real "rehabilitation" of the South are blocked. Unless changes occur soon, UNCURK will also be the cover for future aggressions.

Every dictatorship from Syngman Rhee on has found nothing but praise and favor from UNCURK. The United Nations will not have removed the terrible blot which the attempted destruction of the Korean nation represents until UNCURK is dissolved, the UN flag removed from U.S. military headquarters in Seoul (ROK mercenary troops in South Vietnam even arrive under the UN flag), and all resolutions on Korea adopted from 1947 abrogated. In three years of war, the United States destroyed infinitely more than did the Japanese colonialists—brutal as they were—in 35 years of occupation. For what the United States intends to do to Korea in the future, let it at least hoist its own colors.

FLYING HORSE

When the first of 12,700 "UN" war prisoners were handed over at Panmunjom, the huge crowd of western correspondents gathered for the event asked how they had been transported. When it was learned that they had traveled from Pyongyang to Kaesong by train, there were gasps of incredulity. Had not the mightiest air force in the world bombarded the bridges and tracks of those 125 miles of railway, every day and night for three years? Had not Air Force communiqués repeatedly announced the utter destruction of the whole North Korean railway system and produced hundreds of photos to prove it? The prisoners insisted they really had come by train, right to Kaesong, the first batch just two days after the Panmunjom signing ceremony. How was it possible? The secret was Chollima, the flying horse.

Chollima

A huge bronze statue of Chollima, a winged steed racing towards the future, with a youth and a maid on its back, atop a pedestal 150 feet high, dominates the Pyongyang skyline today. According to Korean legends going back for centuries, Chollima was capable of bearing those fortunate enough to clamber on its back a thousand li a day toward the "land of happiness." Chollima has been adopted as the symbol of the speed with which the country was to be rebuilt. Its name was officially given to a movement launched in 1957 to fulfill the five-year industrialization plan ahead of time. The Chollima spirit was around from the first days of reconstruction.

*A Chinese unit of measurement, about one-third of a mile.

"Where do you start when faced with a country of ruins?"

I asked myself when I saw the mangled remains in Pyongyang after the ceasefire was signed. The twisted metal and broken concrete pillars, covered with collapsed girders and roof structures, had once been factories; the hillocks and landslides of rubble had been multi-storeyed buildings now disintegrated, obliterating streets and squares.

I asked the same question in May 1967 of the managers of the various industrial plants I visited in Pyongyang, Hamhung and Hwanghae. How do you start putting together an economy so totally shattered? The question is pertinent today as the Vietnamese go through what the Koreans did in 1950-53, and when the Korean people are warned they might soon have to go through it all again.

The basic lines of reconstruction were laid down by Kim Il Sung in his August 5, 1953, report, which, among other things, called for a three-year plan "for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy to regain pre-war levels in all economic branches." This would be followed by a five-year plan, "to lay the foundations for industrialization, which will mean the first stage of industrialization in our country."

"In postwar economic reconstruction we must follow the line of giving priority to the rehabilitation and development of heavy industry, simultaneously developing light industry and agriculture. This alone will enable us to consolidate the economic foundations of our country and improve the people's living conditions in a short period of time."

Many outsiders thought the strain of war had been too much for a young man like Kim Il Sung (he was only 38 when it started). He must be slightly deranged, they thought, to propose rebuilding from scratch within three years everything that had been destroyed. In fact they would rebuild from less than scratch considering the scrap and rubble that had to be cleared away, and the heavy toll of manpower the war had taken. The overwhelming majority of industrial workers were still in uniform, if they had survived the bitter war.

But his "madness" went further. "In railway transport," continued the August 5 report, "all the major trunk lines in our Republic should be restored to traffic within 20 to 30 days; by the end of 1953 railway transport should be normalized throughout North Korea. Thus, in 1954, 12-15 million tons of freight turnover should be ensured, and in 1955, 15-18 million tons guaranteed, to exceed the prewar level. . . . The railway communications network should be put in perfect order by the end of 1953." This was a gratuitous insult to U.S. air power. The restoration of the Pyongyang-Kaesong line could perhaps be written off as an enormous propaganda exercise, but it was a bit much to order that all major trunk lines be restored in 20 to 30 days. After all, one fifth of the U.S. air force, plus several squadrons of those of her allies, had worked for three years to destroy them.

Premier Kim continued, "Under the Japanese, industrial establishments were built in places convenient for shipping materials from Korea to Japan. . . . These plants far from centers of raw materials had tremendous difficulties and troubles in transportation. . . . We should not follow the course of mechanically restoring the destroyed factories on their former sites but should redistribute them." But many plants could be restored on their former sites for the sake of speedy reconstruction, and among those he listed was the Hwanghae iron and steel works, on the West coast, about 35 miles southwest of Pyongyang.

Hwanghae Steel Mill

I went there in May 1967. "This plant received an average of two heavy bombs per square yard," the deputy director of the Hwanghae iron and steel mill, Choi Suk Yun, told me. "There were 30,000 bombs in all; 85 per cent of our machines and installations were completely destroyed, the rest more or less seriously damaged. Three thousand of our workers had gone to the front, but with the rest and some machinery we salvaged, we continued

some types of production underground." I asked how they tackled the job of rebuilding, and what were the priorities.

"Three days after the armistice was signed," said Choi, "Premier Kim Il Sung came down to the ruins. He visited everything and discussed with the workers how they thought it could be rebuilt. After thorough discussions, he gave us his ideas and we agreed as a priority project to clear away the rubble and then start work on the open-hearth steel furnace. We had all sorts of difficulties at first. We didn't have tools of any sort, not even crowbars to clear the debris, nor bricks to start rebuilding, nor any housing, or supply service. But workers started turning up again, they slept on the spot and we started by making iron bars and then bricks. We all tightened our belts and understood very well when Premier Kim said the country could not do much in reconstruction without steel. He showed an intense personal interest in our progress. He came down 15 times to see how things were going and many more times than that he was on the telephone to us.

"Gradually buildings started going up and equipment we needed took shape on the spot or started arriving from other plants. We rebuilt the open-hearth steel furnace in six months and then concentrated on the rolling shop according to the priorities Premier Kim had set. The target given was that it should be completed within the three-year rehabilitation plan. In fact we had the rolling shop in operation within one year and seven months." And so the story went; prewar production was attained before the three years were up. Today's annual output is 720,000 tons of pig iron, and 560,000 tons of steel, of which 350,000 tons is rolled steel.

At Hamhung

At the Hamhung machine-building plant on the East coast the story was similar. Kim Byong Han, the 50-year-old director, is a jolly, portly figure with a raucous voice acquired by shouting to make himself heard above the thunderous clatter of a

heavy machine-building shop. Like almost every other director I met in North Korea, he had come up from the rank and file of workers in the plant he was now managing.

"Premier Kim Il Sung came down here a few days after the war finished," said director Kim. "He said: 'If we want to rebuild our industry, we must start with Hamhung. And first of all we must rebuild this plant.' In fact we didn't know where to start or how to start. In three years of war, the plant was reduced to rubble. But we had saved a good deal of equipment and kept war-time production going in tunnels in the mountains. Young workers went to the front, the older ones stayed behind to produce for the front. So we had old workers to start with and we brought back the evacuated machines. Young ones were demobilized and came back. Everyone rolled up their sleeves and tore into the work. In 18 months the plant was rebuilt and before the end of the three-year plan our production was up to normal. The five-year plan we finished in exactly half the time.

"We're a long way from Pyongyang, but Premier Kim came eight times to see how we were making out and to discuss our problems. From the beginning he paid great attention to welfare and educational facilities for our workers. 'If we want to develop industry,' he insisted, 'we'll need a huge army of specialists.' So we built a college and higher technical school inside the plant and we have 800 workers studying in each." He escorted me around the plant—a huge affair employing 6,500 workers, 35 per cent of them women. Whole lines of women workers bent over lathes and other machine tools, driving overhead cranes and waving bunches of paper flowers in honor of the visitors. They showed me some of the machines that are the pride of the plant: 3,000-ton presses, eight-meter turning lathes, 200mm boring machines, all of them normally made by only technically advanced countries.

"What with our production and that of other plants like ours," said Kim, "our country is now 95 per cent self-sufficient in machines and industrial equipment."

New Villages and Cities

Other, more significant facts and figures illustrate the astonishing Chollima speed of the country's reconstruction. The plane bringing me back to Korea, after an absence of 13 years, flew in low enough to see tractors working in the fields; neat whitewashed villages nestling against hillsides and surrounded by blossoming apple orchards, fields intersected by irrigation canals, neat beds of nylon-covered rice seedlings. Driving in from the airport, I realized that despite all the time I had spent in Korea, I was seeing Korean villages for the first time. They were a joy to behold, beautiful villages of stone or whitewashed adobe, with the graceful, grey-tiled, curved roofs, set among well-tilled fields and orchards of cherries, apples and peaches. Spring everywhere is beautiful, but the new Korea in the spring of 1967 was particularly so.

Pyongyang was unrecognizable. In the past I could neither imagine how it looked before nor how it might look in the future. One drove hurriedly through silent, black ruins, never stopping, hoping to get through without being caught in a raid. I remembered only four landmarks: Moranbong hill where, just after the ceasefire, I attended an unforgettable performance in a huge, underground theater; the remnants of the Kim Il Sung university; the shattered railway station and the twisted ruins of a textile factory. Pyongyang now is a beautiful modern city of over a million inhabitants, with very wide boulevards lined with trees, interspersed with gardens and small parks and residential areas spreading over to the southern bank of the Taedong river. Buildings, mostly six to seven stories high, are predominantly cream or pastel colored. The whole impression is of light, space and greenery.

Cities like Hamhung, Wonsan, Sariwon, Kaesong and others I saw later are rebuilt on similar, generous lines with maximum use of space and greenery and light colors, just as the villages in between are invariably laid out, solid and bright with whitewashed adobe walls or light-colored stone.

In North Vietnam, which I had just left to go to North Korea, a phrase of President Ho Chi Minh's was posted up everywhere: "The war may last five, 10, 20 or more years. Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as a certain number of other towns and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will never allow themselves to be intimidated. Nothing is more precious than liberty and independence. After the victory, our people will rebuild the country better and will endow it with bigger and more beautiful constructions." Everything one could see in North Korea confirmed that this was possible.

"I tell my Vietnamese comrades," said Premier Kim Il Sung at our meeting in Pyongyang, "that whatever the Americans may destroy through bombing, if you have the people, united behind the party and government, you can quickly reconstruct all that was destroyed. I can say this quite definitely, based on our own experience. The imperialists do not believe in the strength of the people but we do. It is on this great latent strength of the people that we relied. The Americans said the DPRK could not rise again in a hundred years. But in that they miscalculated."

New Skilled Workers

In 1945 when the country was liberated from the Japanese there were virtually no Korean engineers or skilled workers. It was rigorously forbidden for a Korean to learn skills or even watch many of the manufacturing processes. In the five years that elapsed between liberation from the Japanese and the outbreak of war against the United States, much effort was put into forming technical cadres. But the overwhelming majority of the cadres immediately took up arms when the war broke out.

Where the Japanese built factories, they used Koreans as an inexhaustible and expendable source of cheap labor to process Korean raw materials for Japan's own needs. Thus at the Hwanghae iron and steel works, most work was done by hand. Twenty thousand unskilled workers turned out less than one third the output of iron and steel that the 15,000 employed

today produce. And as deputy-director Choi points out, a large proportion of today's 15,000 workers are employed on building work connected with the continued expansion of the plant's capacities.

The head of the steel mill, 50-year-old Pak Jung Kun, who worked at the plant for 33 years, showed me the callouses on his shoulders from carrying wooden buckets of iron ore to tip into the furnaces: "My neck is still stiff from that," he said. "The Japanese bosses never let us learn a thing. Before they left, they let the furnaces run down; so the first thing we had to do was start hammering and dynamiting the cold iron out of the open hearth furnaces until one by one we got them cleared. One difficulty when we started to rebuild was that not a single worker knew how to read a blueprint and very few could read anything. Before they left, the Japanese dumped hundreds of tons of key parts into the Taedong river. They said we would never get the works going again for 20-30 years."

From a port they built at Hwanghae, the Japanese shipped the entire output back to feed their war machine.

"Just one year after they left," continued Choi, "we had put the open hearth furnace into operation, and- by 1947 we had the steel rolling mill working again. By 1949 we had already outstripped the highest output under the Japanese. . . . Next year the war started and American bombers destroyed all we had rebuilt and everything else besides."

When one talks with men such as these one understands why work has gone so quickly. Their whole life has been spent in overcoming seemingly impossible difficulties with nothing but their bare hands. Twice the Hwanghae plant has been destroyed; twice the same workers have rebuilt it, and they all know there is every possibility it will be destroyed again. And it was the same at most other plants I visited.

With the Chollima speed at which things developed, Kim Il Sung was able to make an optimistic progress report at another Plenum of the Workers' Party's Central Committee on November 3, 1954. It is interesting to compare the target figures then with results later

achieved. He referred to the building of 20-30 machine-building plants and a target of 100 million yards of cotton, silk and rayon textiles by 1957. He reported that factory and office workers, who numbered 300,000 at the time of Liberation and had doubled by the time war broke out, had increased, despite war losses, to 810,000 and would soon number over a million. The population of Pyongyang had again reached 400,000 compared to 70-80,000 during the war.

Noting that 21.5 per cent of peasants had already formed cooperative farms, Kim urged that this be encouraged. (The first cooperatives were formed by families whose manpower, draught animals and farming implements had been drastically reduced by the war; the only way to produce at all was by pooling labor power and implements. It was a movement that started from below.) But Premier Kim warned against rushing ahead too fast with the formation of cooperative farms. He referred to one party delegate who reported with pride that he had formed a farm with 500 households: "I am afraid this is somewhat too large," Kim commented. "I consider it appropriate to incorporate at first 15 to 20 households and then as conditions mature, increase the member households to 30, 50 or 70. Unless we have cadres and unless conditions are ripe for mechanization, it is impossible to run large-scale cooperatives in a proper way." He was not turning his back on Chollima, but just feeding him the oats before another big race ahead.

The start of that race was set in April 1955 when targets for the Five-Year Plan were announced. The plan called for the production of one million tons of pig iron, nine million tons of coal, 400,000 tons of chemical fertilizers, 3.5 million tons of grain and 150 million meters of fabric. Goals were set for an increase of electric power capacity to 1.85 million kilowatt hours. And 130,000 highly qualified engineers and assistant engineers should be graduated, according to the plan.

Again one of the main difficulties was the lack of skilled workers. The great expansion of the industrial working class was shown by the fact that only four per cent of workers in heavy

industry at that time had 10 years' experience; more than half had less than one year's experience. But every factory by then had set up technical high schools and colleges, where workers could study in after-work hours.

The problem of grain was one of the most important the North had to solve at that time. As in Vietnam, the South was the country's natural granary while the North was the center for whatever industry had existed. Any relief map of the North shows it mostly covered by mountains, with a very narrow strip of plains along the east coast. In many places this is reduced to only small pockets where the mountains come right down to the sea, with a much broader strip along the east coast. Less than 20 per cent of the North consists of arable land.

Incidentally the settlement of the ceasefire line along the battlefield instead of the 38th parallel favored the North from this viewpoint. Almost all of the 2,300 square miles of land south of the parallel which the North gained were plains suitable for rice-growing; almost all the 2,900 square miles the U.S.-ROK side gained north of the parallel were barren mountain land. Economically the Americans would have done far better to settle for the 38th parallel. But they were only interested in the military aspects, in securing strategic mountain heights as jumping-off points for a new "march to the North."

In general the goals set in 1955 were breath-taking. If it were not for what had already been done at Chollima speed, they could not have been taken seriously. The fact is that the main trunk railway lines were running within a month of the ceasefire; the whole communications system was restored to perfect order in less than six months; the national economy was restored to pre-war levels within three years. Generous help came from the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries. But the most generous help in the world could not be decisive or even effective without the really heroic spirit of Korean workers, peasants and intellectuals who rolled up their sleeves, pulled in their belts to a painful degree, and literally set about building a new world on the ashes of the old.

FACTORIES AND FIELDS

Just as the 1917 May Day parade was about to start, leaders and guests having taken their place on the tribune, there was a tremendous outburst of equine neighing and squealing. I was not the only one to think that some trouble had broken out among restive horses, probably a cavalry unit kept waiting overly long to start the parade. The noise reached an alarming pitch and everybody—all the foreign guests near me, at least—turned toward the corner from which it seemed to be coming. But Korean friends quickly nudged us into looking in the opposite direction. Twenty-seven enormous flying horses, many times life size, came charging, rearing on their hind legs, leaping into the future at a thousand-li speed past the loudspeaker from whence came their most realistic neighing.

Salvos from 300-odd cannon crashed out as the horses disappeared; the parade was on. Along came the floats depicting the so recent past: the bitter days of Japanese occupation; epics of the anti-Japanese struggle; the defense of Height 1,211 in the 1950-53 war; scenes to illustrate the struggle of the Vietnamese; of African and Latin American peoples; then happier scenes to illustrate highlights of peaceful construction. The people's militia marched past followed by their motorized units with heavy mortars, howitzers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, the latter manned mostly by young women. Graphs and figures showed production targets reached; slogans urged reunification of the country, parallel increases in production and defense capacity; self-reliance; early fulfillment of the seven-year plan. Figuratively, steel poured from furnaces; fertilizer pelted down like snow from giant hoppers; enormous roosters crowed; cows with udders like sacks of flour mooed. The procession flowed on endlessly, troupes

of dancers and acrobats pausing long enough to do swift turns in front of the tribune. The spectacle, in which some 600,000 people moved past the tribune shouting their greetings to Kim Il Sung and other leaders, was all over in precisely two hours.

I was assured there had never been a May Day like this one; never had there been so much to celebrate; never so many foreign guests; never had the achievements been as great or the tasks ahead more ambitious.

Industrial Growth

Statistics are an inadequate way of presenting human advancement, but until literary works can reflect in more human terms what the Korean people were celebrating that day, a minimum of statistical presentation must tell the story. One set of figures overshadows all others. In 1946 industry accounted for 28 per cent of the gross national product, agriculture and fishing 72 per cent. By 1967 the figures had been more than reversed, industry accounting for 76 per cent of the total. (In fact the last figure available was for 1964, but the ratio may not have changed much because of the recent appreciable increase in agricultural and fishery production.)

Industrial output was 11 times higher than in 1949, the last prewar year, 37 times higher than 1946, the year after the Japanese left. The trolley-buses that provide the main public transport in all cities are made in Korea, as are the electric locomotives that now haul most of the freight and passenger trains, the excavators that work at the construction sites, the tractors that till the fields, the these locomotives that work in the forests and mines, and the trucks and command cars used by the army. All are made in Korea and by equipment and skills acquired in the past 13 years; not only the finished products but the machines that make them are by and large produced in Korea. The Koreans assured me that only 10

countries in the world manufacture electric locomotives; Korea is one of the four socialist countries that do.

Machine-building, which together with steel output provides the backbone of industrial expansion, accounts for just over 25 per cent of the country's industrial output. As noted earlier, the machine-building industry provides 95 per cent of all necessary industrial equipment. Machine tools are being produced in excess of requirements. They are now an important export item; certain types are sold to such advanced countries as Czechoslovakia. A few program-controlled machine tools have been produced and a big drive is now under way to catch up with advanced world levels in this important branch for automated industry.

In many fields it is useless presenting percentage increases over prewar years. Textile production has reached 25 yards per capita annually, or three times the target set by Kim Il Sung in 1954. This is 195 times the maximum achieved in the pre-liberation years. In agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, insecticides, etc., production increased 17-fold between 1961 and 1965. No comparison with prewar output can be made, because whatever agricultural chemicals were produced were shipped straight from the factory to Japan.

Cooperative Agriculture

If one turns to agriculture the picture is no less impressive. By 1967, the whole peasant economy had been reorganized into 3,843 cooperative farms, with an average of 300 households and about 500 hectares* of land each. Premier Kim's shrewd "go slow" advice in 1954 had paid off. By 1958 individual peasant farms had long disappeared in favor of 13,309 cooperatives averaging 80 households and 130 hectares each. These had been the products of mergers of tens of thousands of smaller units of 15 to 20 households. But by the end of 1958 more machinery

*One hectare equals 2.471 acres.

was available and the need to undertake large-scale irrigation and electrification projects made larger units more economical. The 13,000 merged into the 3,800 which meant that cooperative farms were organized at ri or village level; the chairman of the local village council became automatically also the chairman of the cooperative.

All farms are now fully irrigated, and drought has been abolished forever. As irrigation works have gone hand in hand with anti-flood control, the danger of floods has been greatly reduced. By the end of 1965 electric power had been brought to 96 per cent of all cooperative farms and to 81 per cent of all homes. In 1958 the figures were 67 and 49 respectively. (In some cases electric power is still only available for pumping stations and grain husking and threshing machines.) Each farm has an average of five tractors and is supplied with enough chemical fertilizer to apply 660 lbs. per hectare. This is admittedly not enough but the quantity is increased every year and supplemented by some 10 to 20 tons of natural manure per hectare on the farms I visited.

As a result of all this, grain production has gradually increased. In a report to the National Congress of Agricultural Cooperatives on January 5, 1959, Kim Il Sung was able to announce that grain output in 1956 was 2,870,000 tons, easily surpassing the best prewar year. In 1957 it was 3,200,000 tons and in 1958 3,700,000 tons, almost double that of the first year after liberation. By 1965 5,000,00 tons were produced with all the prospects for further increases in 1967. In the early years after the war, North Korea had to import grain from China and the Soviet Union. Now she is fully self-sufficient in food grains and people's living standards have improved accordingly.

National Dignity

What is striking is the way in which these racing steeds have been kept in harness, the tempestuous ones restrained, the laggards urged

forward, to maintain the same rhythm of development. I do not know whether the number of 27 Chollima steeds at the May Day parade was symbolic but if so one can only admire the driver. Driving a four-in-hand is considered difficult enough, but a 27-in-hand defies the imagination. Heavy industry had to be harmonized with light industry and both with agriculture; similarly benefits with achievements, otherwise speed might have slackened. The raising of technical skills had to keep pace with the new technical demands in factories and fields. But it all seems to have been handled properly.

I do not believe it an exaggeration to state that no country in history has moved so far and so fast in all fields of development as the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea. The workers and peasants have achieved national dignity; perhaps one has to know Koreans to understand how important this is. They have been pushed around for centuries by foreign invaders, but have always fought back. The last terrible period under Japanese occupation is fresh in the minds of most people.

If the proportion of those who took part in actual armed struggle against the Japanese was few, the proportion that took part in political struggle against the Japanese and in armed struggle against the U.S.-ROK forces was enormous. Above all there is pride that in 1950-53, with the help of the Chinese volunteers, they kept the mightiest of all the western powers at bay. But they can also look around and see everything built with their own hands. Every town, village, factory and school, and most of the machines as well, were built up by this generation, which remembers the misery and humiliation of life and work under the Japanese. National dignity—you feel it in the bearing and attitude of all North Koreans today. Koreans in general are a fiercely proud people and history justifies this pride. Today it is history, together with deeds in war and peace, accomplished in the life of this generation, that gives a special content to their national dignity. The material benefits are also substantial. The eight-hour day for workers was introduced in the first great reform law on

June 20, 1946. Equal pay for women doing the same work as men, and insurance benefits for sick and aged workers were begun at the same time.

Under the Japanese, the work day was 12-14 hours and sick workers were thrown like dogs to the scrap heap. With the development of cooperative farms, the eight-hour day has become the rule for peasants too, with seasonal adjustments for busy and slack seasons. Gradually other benefits were added, a six-hour working day for mothers with over three children, two and a half months pre- and post-natal paid leave, at first only for factory and office workers, now for the women on the farms as well. Workers and peasants also receive paid leave of from 15 days, with free places at sanatoria and free travel from farms and factories to rest homes. That cooperative farmers share such benefits is rare even for many socialist countries.

Red Star Farm

At the Red Star cooperative farm, some 12 miles from Hamhung city, the manager, Han Hu Bang Nyo, seemed a remarkable woman by any standards. She has the deeply bronzed face and wrinkled eyes of one who has spent most of her life out of doors; everything about her expresses courage and steadfastness. She told how the farm grew and the people with it. Like the factory managers, she was a member of the community she managed; she'd been born on the spot where the farm stands. She and her husband were poor peasants and she spoke of the joy of all their village at land reform. "We were 320 peasant households," she said, "and six landlords who owned 70 percent of the cultivable land. When the land reform came it was the poor and landless peasants that got the land. We had just started to enjoy life when the Americans came and smashed everything." The area was occupied by U.S. marines. Her husband, daughter and father-in-law were all killed because they were suspected of sending supplies to the front; she herself was arrested and tortured but managed to escape.

"The youth went to the front to fight the Americans," she said. "The old people and women carried on, working hard to supply the front as our contribution to the war. After the war, 30 of us who had lost husbands, fathers and sons in the war decided to pool our implements and labor power to form a cooperative. Apart from human losses most of our draught animals had been killed and our implements destroyed. Within a few years, five cooperatives were formed and our living standards started to go up. In July 1956 we merged the five co-ops into one. We have just under 400 households now, in the one cooperative farm, with about 900 working members and 483 hectares of arable land and orchards, 1,300 head of livestock and 4,000 poultry. Irrigation is 100 per cent and every household has electricity."

The land now yielded twice as much as under the Japanese. Threshing, rice-husking and pumping was done by electricity. The farm had five tractors and one truck, "all made in Korea," Madame Han pointed out proudly. Fifty-five children of the farmers were university graduates, most of them back on the farm working as irrigation engineers, agronomists, veterinarians, biologists, secondary school teachers and other professions. Ninety-eight were either at university, doing a university correspondence course or attending night courses at a higher technical school. There were 383 babies and, small children in the farm's nurseries and kindergartens.

Taxes had been abolished the previous year and the state had already built 147 solid stone houses; more would be built in the months to come. "We have firmly decided to defend with our lives everything we have built," said Madame Han, who is also a deputy to the Supreme People's Assembly and a Heroine of Labor. "We have our own militia in which every co-op member is enrolled. We are well armed with automatic weapons and modern anti-aircraft guns. Our militia holds regular military exercises."

From a hill overlooking the neat cottages, surrounded by blossoming apple trees, she pointed out with modest pride the electric-powered rice-husking plant, the repair shop where they

had their own lathe and other metal and wood-working tools; the sheds for silkworms, pigs and poultry. Voices of children singing in the kindergarten floated up to us. The trunks of apple trees matched the white blossoms in some hundred hectares of orchards; they had been freshly painted with white insecticide. Beds of rice seedlings were covered with films of vinyl-chloride from a nearby chemical plant, to promote growth and keep birds away. Three of the farm's tractors were harrowing the fields at our feet, smoothing them down for the rice transplanting. We could hear the rhythmic pounding of irrigation pumps in the distance; water flowed, gleaming in the sun along geometric patterned-irrigation channels. Everything seemed neat, orderly, prosperous.

"We have got to the point where further advances are not possible," said Madame Han, "without raising the general cultural and ideological level of our farm members. So we are concentrating on that now." When I asked for a more precise definition of "cultural" level, she explained this meant the technological-educational level. Though there were specialists at hand, the ordinary farm members needed to grasp elements of soil structure, seed selection, different types of chemical fertilizers. They needed to learn how to repair tractors and other machines, and improve their general education level to enable them to read technical literature. As for ideological education, this meant bringing the class consciousness of the farm members into line with that of the urban working class, against exploiters and for socialism.

Toward State Farms

From conversations with farm managers like Madame Han and from certain speeches of Premier Kim, it is clear that the nation-wide drive to raise the ideological level of cooperative farmers was to prepare for another great qualitative change in the countryside. That is, to transform cooperative farm property

into the property of the whole people, like factories; in other words, state farms instead of cooperative farms.

My visit to the Red Star farm left me with much food for thought and new fields of inquiry. At the Sambong cooperative farm, some 45 miles north of Pyongyang, an exceptionally big one with 916 households and over 1,200 hectares, I asked the 40-year-old manager, Mun Kwang Hyok, in what way the worker-peasant alliance was manifested. "It is felt very strongly indeed," he said, "first because of the tractors and other machinery, which we get from the State, much of it without payment." He explained that any implement that cost over 50 won (about 20 U.S. dollars) was supplied free. "But the workers also come here and help us with rice transplanting and with harvesting. Each big factory is responsible for one big cooperative farm to see we get the sort of machinery we need and to help out with manpower in the busy seasons. The factories give us lots of technical assistance.

"Another important thing is that we now have a lot of our own technical personnel. They can draw up blueprints of special-type equipment we need and send it to 'our' plant for them to make it. It may be a new machine or an improvement of an old one. This is an important means of raising the technical level of agricultural implements." He went on to explain that there was a farm implements factory in every province and in every county. Some machines designed by local technicians may be suitable only for one particular county, and would be made at the county plant; others for a whole province, at the provincial plant. If some are of universal interest they would be manufactured at a big central plant for the whole country.

Abolishing the difference between town and countryside, the class outlook as between factory workers and peasants, has long been on the order of the day but it has proved difficult even in the advanced socialist countries. But it is clear that Kim Il Sung has set his sights on this and is going to try to do it

quickly. Peasants, or cooperative farmers, all over the country are studying to acquire the technical skills of industrial workers and the class outlook of the working class.

The Korean peasants have come a long way in a short time. Only 20-odd years ago they were exploited tenant farmers. Then they passed rapidly from small landowners to small cooperative farmers, but still commodity producers getting part payment in land rent. Now they are big cooperative farmers working regular hours and getting regular wages. They have not remained in any of the transitory stages long enough to acquire the "man of property" or "kulak" mentality. Life itself has brought them step by step closer to the working class, and this has been consciously fostered by the Korean leadership. Technologically, the drive is on to transform the farms into food producing factories; ideologically, the drive is on to make those food-producing factories-to-be, like others, the property of the whole people. By then the peasantry as an economic or class expression will have disappeared in Korea.

Will the charm of the countryside disappear? It seems there is less intention to make the countryside look like cities than to give the villages city facilities and make the cities look more like the countryside.

I had a long talk with Dr. Mok Yong Man, dean of the Faculty of Geography at Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung University. He was one of those intellectuals from Seoul who had come north when war broke out. One fascinating aspect of his work at present is that of planning the rational distribution of cities, based on far smaller units than exist at present, with much space devoted to gardens, orchards and greenery in general. I found that every big factory, apart from having its special links with one cooperative farm, also has its own livestock farm. It is clear that the task of diminishing and then eliminating the differences between factory and farm is also going on at Chollima speed. It was no accident that a horse with wings was chosen to symbolize the super-speed with which every problem is being tackled.

"The peasant and agrarian questions can be finally solved only when the distinctions between town and country and the class distinction between the working class and the peasantry are obliterated," said Premier Kim in his "Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Our Country" in February 1964. On this and on many other questions, Kim Il Sung has very original and independent views. He is ploughing virgin fields in building a new society.

KIM IL SUNG

In the West, little is known of Kim Il Sung and his origins, although a study of the man and his background does much to explain the policies and attitudes of the DPRK today. Every stage of its development bears his strong personal imprint.

Family Background

The story of Kim Il Sung is the story of the tragedy and glory of 20th century Korea; it is one of unendurable suffering and martyrdom of a family and a people, and relentless, uncompromising struggle born of that suffering. Two years before Kim was born in a peasant's cottage some 12 miles from Pyongyang, the Japanese annexed and occupied Korea. This completed a process started in 1876 when they imposed a gunboat treaty, so prevalent in those days, on Korea's feudal rulers. A "protectorate" followed in 1905 and then outright annexation.

The gobbling up of Korea was to be but an appetizer for the big meal ahead in China, but it proved difficult to digest. The Korean people fought back from the very first days of the occupation. Among those that resisted was a Pyongyang school teacher, Kim Hyong Jik who, in 1917, formed the Korean Peoples' Association. It quickly became the largest underground, anti-Japanese society in the country, and helped prepare the ground for a nation-wide uprising which started in Seoul on March 1, 1919, and rapidly spread throughout the country.

The Japanese put down the uprising in a veritable blood- bath.

Kim Hyong Jik had been arrested and imprisoned before it broke out. Released from prison, he, like tens of thousands of others, trudged off to voluntary exile in Manchuria in 1919. He took with him his wife and children, including their seven-year-old son, Kim Song Ju, who later took the name Kim Il Sung.

At Mangyongdae (Place of Ten Thousand Beauties) village, the thatch-roofed peasant's cottage where the Kim family lived has been preserved. It was built for one of the family's ancestors over a century ago in order that he might look after the family graveyard of the local landlord. It is a typical poor peasant's cottage, with one long common room where the whole family lived, ate and slept, a kitchen to the left and a guest room to the right. Opposite and separated by a few yards is a building of equal size with the main "room" an ox-stall and storage room for ploughs and a fodder-chopper, and annexes for a primitive loom and spinning wheel. In this cottage Kim Bo Hyong, Premier Kim's grandfather, eked out a living by making grass mats in the ox-stall—he never was rich enough to own an ox—until three months before his death at the age of 85 in 1955. On the walls of the living room and guest room are portraits of family members: Kim Hyong Jik, twice arrested, who died in exile at the age of 32 (the average life span of a Korean in those days); Kim Hyong Kwon, younger brother of Hyong Jik, arrested by the Japanese and beaten to death in prison at the age of 31; Kim Chol Ju, younger brother of Kim Il Sung, arrested for anti-Japanese activities, and executed at the age of 20; Kim Won Ju, cousin of Kim Il Sung, arrested and tortured by the Japanese and died of wounds at the age of 31.

Such a tragic honor board was typical for patriotic families of the period. In 1923, Kim Hyong Jik sent the 12-year-old Kim Il Sung back to Pyongyang from Manchuria so he could have some schooling and not grow up a stranger to his motherland. He lived with his mother's family, in a hut almost identical to the one described, at Chilgol village, not far from

Mangyongdae. About the time of his return, his mother's brother, Kang Jin Sok, was arrested and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for anti-Japanese activities. He later died as a result of prison treatment. At the beginning of 1925 word filtered back to young Kim that his father was arrested. He headed back for Manchuria but his father had died before he arrived.

In 1927, Kim Il Sung joined the Young Communist League, and two years later was arrested, tortured and imprisoned for a year. By the time he was released, at the age of 18, he was already a determined revolutionary.

In 1931, after assassinating the old Manchurian warlord Chang Tso Lin, the Japanese moved into Manchuria. They immediately turned the full force of their repressive machinery against the tens of thousands of Koreans who had settled in the eastern border regions. Whole villages and even districts were wiped out to the last woman and child. The Japanese, after bitter experiences in Korea itself where resistance had never ceased, knew full well the fighting qualities of those who had gone into exile. They did not want the virus of resistance to spread among the Manchurian Chinese and were determined to give the latter an object lesson by their brutal extermination of the Koreans. Japanese avowed policy was that it was worth killing a hundred to wipe out one revolutionary.

The First Guerrilla Unit

In 1931, Kim Il Sung joined the Communist Party. On April 25, 1932, celebrated today as an historic landmark in the Korean revolution, he formed the first guerrilla unit, an armed workers-peasants-youth detachment. From that time on an armed struggle was launched for national liberation. A main base was set up in Mt. Baekdu, in the Manchuria-Korea border area where, by that time, Koreans made up 80 per cent of the population. The young revolutionary (he had just turned 20) realized it was all-important to have a revolutionary base among his own

people. From a geographic viewpoint Mt. Baekdu was advantageous. A very rugged, forest-covered mountain, it made up a long section of the frontier with Korea. With him from the earliest days were Choi Yong Kun, now president of the Supreme People's Assembly; Choi Hyun, member of the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party; Kim Il, first vice-premier; Kim Chaik, former vice-premier and outstanding military leader, who died in 1951, and others prominent in government and party affairs.

As is usual in such movements, the first difficulty was acquiring arms. Without any support from regular troops, or from outside, they had to make their own weapons or capture them. They had to be completely self-sufficient in food and supplies. They soon carved out a liberated area and set up an administration of sorts, carrying out land reform and introducing an eight-hour working day. They set up arsenals where clumsy grenades, as big as pineapples, were first turned out. As Japanese repression turned more and more against the Chinese, Kim Il Sung worked hard to establish unity with local Chinese units; certain joint operations were carried out. But, in general, the local warlord-type military commanders hated Communists in general and Korean Communists in particular, making cooperation a difficult and often hazardous business.

At the end of December 1933, the Japanese sent 5,000 troops to wipe out the bases in the East Manchuria area. When their two months' offensive resulted only in more arms captured by Kim Il Sung and his men, the Japanese encircled the whole area to starve them out. For a period of eight months the partisans were completely cut off from grain or any other cultivated food supplies. They lived off a variety of wild fruit and nuts, edible leaves, bark and roots but they managed to hold out. Kim was successful in sending agents across the frontier to carry out political and military reconnaissance work inside Korea.

By early 1935 there were serious factional disputes among the Koreans in China. Kim's "Peoples' Revolutionary Army" was one of a number organized against the Japanese. Two other

groups in the northern and southern parts of Manchuria were waging armed struggle.* The question arose whether their role should be limited to that of a vanguard unit of the Korean minority in Manchuria, or should they become a branch of the Chinese resistance movement beginning to take shape as the Japanese exploitation of the Manchurian population increased. These and kindred matters were thrashed out at meetings in Dahongwe and Youyunggoo in March 1935. Kim Il Sung's view was that Korean Communists, Korean revolutionaries, should wage a national liberation struggle to free their own country. When he first crossed the Yalu river, at the age of seven, his father had instilled in him that they must work to liberate Korea from the Japanese invaders. The outcome of the 1935 conference was that he wound up the Mt. Baekdu bases and led his main force to frontier areas further north, where there were better facilities for forays into Korea proper.

Into Korea

In those years Kim was literally "in the wilderness," cut off from any contact with outside, forced to rely on his own strength for the survival of his units and his ideas. The attitudes he formed then have remained guides for policies he has initiated ever since.

In those early years from the late 1920's through the early 1930's, Kim Il Sung had to face up to the sort of problems which are today burning questions for revolutionaries in Latin America and parts of Africa. Where and how is the armed struggle to be started? What geographical, political, economic and social phenomena provide the optimum conditions for bas-

*A Communist Party was first formed on Korean soil on April 17, 1925, but was dissolved by the Comintern three years later due partly to terrific repression by the Japanese military-police regime and partly to a weak leadership, torn asunder by factional disputes. These disputes were obviously reflected in the differing views as to what should be the role of revolutionary Koreans in Manchuria and in China in general.

ing the first armed units? What should be the relationship between armed forces and masses; between party, armed forces and front? What form should the activities of the masses take and how should these be coordinated with the armed struggle? What should be the relationship between military and political, legal and illegal forms of struggle? The historical task of Kim Il Sung was to lift the anti-Japanese liberation movement beyond the realms of theory and factional strife and concentrate on the armed struggle as the principal line of action. Fundamental weaknesses in the anti-Japanese movement and within the Korean Communist Party till that time had to be overcome before the armed struggle could be put on a proper footing, its roots solidly based in the masses of the Korean population in Manchuria; with clear strategic aims certain to be supported by the workers and peasants inside Korea itself and with a decisive leadership capable of guiding the struggle and rallying the whole nation to support it.

It was extraordinary to discover that this isolated group of young revolutionaries, deep in snow-bound forests, surrounded by overwhelmingly superior enemy forces determined to destroy them, had studied the 7th Comintern Congress decisions on united front tactics to oppose the rise of fascism. In February 1936, Kim Il Sung decided to expand the anti-Japanese national front movement on the basis of previous successes and the valuable experience gained in the anti-Japanese struggle during the first half of the 1930's. This took concrete form in May of the same year in the setting up of the Fatherland Restoration Association. Kim was elected president and a 10-point program was adopted aimed at overthrowing the Japanese inside Korea, the establishment of people's power, land reform, an eight-hour work day and other reforms. Through a network of agents already established deep inside Korea, the activities of the FRA became widely known. Its formation and program was "the one ray of light in what was otherwise a black night of despair under the ferocious Japanese occupation.

In January 1937, a National Liberation Union was formed inside

Korea as a branch of the Fatherland Restoration Association. That was the year of the Japanese invasion of China; this opened up new possibilities of collaboration between Korean revolutionary groups and the Chinese Communist Party.

In June 1937, Kim personally led a unit over the frontier to attack a major Japanese outpost at Bochonbo, wiping out the Japanese police post and all other administrative organs. He addressed a mass meeting on the spot, explaining the aims of the FRA and the necessity of waging a united struggle on every level against the Japanese occupation. The Bochonbo attack was a severe warning to the Japanese, but another wave of terrible repression followed. By the end of 1937, around 5,000 patriots had been arrested. They were executed to the last man and woman in March 1945, on the very eve "of victory.

In the winter of 1938-39 the Japanese, with 200,000 troops, made a major attempt to encircle and wipe out the headquarters base and main body of the partisan units. Kim led them in an epic fighting march through the mountain snows, fighting up to 10 battles a day for months on end until they broke through the encirclement. By May 1939 they were active again in the Musan area of northeast Korea not too far from the Soviet border.

Anti-Japanese War

When World War II broke out and before the great anti-fascist alliance including the Soviet Union and China was formed, Kim Il Sung appraised the new situation as opening up real possibilities for Japan's defeat. In August 1940, he advanced the line of preserving as far as possible his nucleus of well-trying revolutionary forces and making an all out effort to form them into first class military and political cadres, capable of giving inspired leadership inside the country after liberation. * As a

* Ten years later, in the 1950-53 war, Kim started pulling out of the front line those troops and cadres who had distinguished themselves two or three times in battle, sending them back to China or the Soviet

contribution to the general struggle, decisions were taken on new military tactics to support the united front line internally and internationally. The armed forces went over to small unit operations aimed at harrassing the enemy, tying him down in fortified positions, attacking lines of communications, bridges and barracks, and pushing many more armed propaganda units into Korea proper. Japanese forces in the frontier areas were forced to retire into defensive stone and concrete "mirador" tower fortresses (like the French were to do later in the final stages of the Algerian war).

When the Soviet Union attacked the much-vaunted Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria, on August 9, 1945, and swept down into Korea, Kim Il Sung's forces were well placed in the northeast to support the Soviet landings at Chongjin. They immediately moved to effect a junction. The main part of the Japanese forces in Korea were caught in a giant encirclement and smashed to bits by the Soviet Army; 35 years of Japanese rule over Korea ended on August 15, 1945.

The rich revolutionary experience of the armed struggle led by Kim Il Sung; the creation and development of a liberation army,, tempered by over a decade of incredibly tough partisan warfare—its prestige capped by participation with the Soviet Army in the final shattering of the Japanese occupation forces —this was the real guarantee for full-fledged victory of the revolution after liberation. The revolutionary forces, during those long years in the forests and mountains of the border areas, had been themselves the future state in embryo, developing policies and carrying out reforms wherever they operated. This was a key factor in the speed with which the government of Kim Il Sung was established and consolidated in Pyongyang, and a whole series of revolutionary measures introduced, accepted and supported by the overwhelming majority of Korean

Union to be trained as technical cadres for the future reconstruction of the country. The bravest of the brave should not be sacrificed on the battlefield, he considered, but as far as possible should be saved to bring that same spirit of self-sacrifice and heroism to bear on the tasks ahead.

workers, peasants, progressive intellectuals and most of the urban middle class.

Without the armed struggle and without real power in the hands of the people, defended by the revolutionary forces that had waged that armed struggle, the course of events in Korea North of the 38th parallel might have been very different. This is evident from the experience of numerous African states where even progressive regimes which came to power with the overwhelming support of the people after nominal political independence was achieved, proved incapable of defending themselves against local reaction backed by neo-colonialism. In North Korea the revolutionary forces were able to eliminate very rapidly the last vestiges of the power structure erected by the Japanese. They were able to ensure a smooth transition to a socialist regime in which not only the means of production, but effective power to defend them, were in the hands of the people.

True, in those first years the Soviet Army was also in North Korea, but this was a factor keeping external enemies at bay; it could not be a decisive element in internal affairs. The Soviet Army made no attempt to set up the sort of occupation regime that MacArthur had set up in the South. Real power from the beginning was exercised by Kim Il Sung's revolutionary forces. The unity of the North Korean people, the energy with which they successively tackled the tasks of construction, defensive war and national reconstruction, are to a great extent the fruit of the long years of revolutionary struggle; experience learned in the most exacting of all schools—that of armed struggle.

When American troops pushed north across the 38th parallel in the autumn of 1950, they found no centers of counterrevolution waiting to support them. They found individual traitors—mostly landlords ready to denounce the peasants who had expropriated them, but that was about all. The Korean people by June 1950 (like the Cuban people by the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961) had already opted for anti-imperialism, for independence, for people's rule, for socialism,

and they were prepared to defend their choice with their lives. This was not a question of theory or well-phrased slogans. It was one of conviction based on very recent history which their brothers, husbands, sons and fathers, had written with their own blood. Not to understand all this is to ignore the lessons of the very recent past in numerous independent countries of the Third World.

Personal Leader

When I arrived in Pyongyang, at the end of April 1967, Kim Il Sung had just turned 55. The Korean press was celebrating his formation of the first anti-Japanese armed units 35 years before. At 55, this veteran revolutionary leader is still a young man of exceptional mental and physical vigor with experience as a practical leader that few world statesmen can rival.

One of the things which impressed me most before I met him, was the extent to which he had personally supervised seemingly every detail of the postwar reconstruction. I had visited a dozen or so factories and farms, and to each of these places Kim Il Sung had come, not just once, but many times to see how things were going, to study conditions on the spot, to discuss with workers and peasants and learn of their problems as the first step toward solving them. At the Pyongyang textile plant, for instance, he had come no less than 28 times. The phrase, "the development of our factory is inseparable from the personal interest shown by Premier Kim Il Sung," seems to be a nation-wide truth. Before he developed his theses on the socialist agrarian question, he went to one village in Konson-ri county and stayed there for 15 days, living with the peasants, digging down to the very roots of their problems, the insufficiencies of party and government work, the fundamental aspirations of the peasantry—just as formerly he made no military move without the most detailed reconnaissance of the objectives to be tackled.

During the war years, I had not met Premier Kim and he referred to this within the first minutes of our meeting: "I wanted to meet you

then," he said, "but you were at Kaesong and I was busy at that time elsewhere." He certainly was. He had the biggest fight on his hands that any Korean leader in history has had. But he left it at that: he was "busy!" I could visualize him sitting down with peasants under a tree, perhaps chewing on a bit of straw, getting them to open their hearts. He has the warm, human touch, the simplicity of the great, and a down-to-earth manner, rare among men in his position. This comes through in his speeches. Even dealing with such unromantic problems as heavy industry, there is always some little aside, to remind his listeners, especially if there are bureaucrats amongst them, that the end result of everything is to make life better and gayer for everyone. Machines are not being built for machines but to lighten and brighten the human lot.

"When we in North Korea eat well, dress well and live comfortably, when all of us have jobs, and labor has become much easier, what an influence all this will exert on the people in South Korea," he said in a 1958 speech on communist education. "Even the spies sent in by Syngman Rhee will not be able to conceal what they have seen in the North. Everybody has a job, work has become easier, incomes are high, all eat and dress well and live comfortably." And in the same speech: "We must advance faster than other people for we have lived too long in poverty. . . . Wherever you go in European countries you will find the roads well paved and even the rural people living, for the most part, in brick houses. . . . But as for us, we lived in shabby, straw-thatched hovels from generation to generation." In his speech on October 23, 1962, urging fulfillment of targets for the seven-year plan, he said this "will enable all of our people to lead an abundant life, inhabit tile-roofed houses, eat rice and much meat and wear good clothes. This means that the long-cherished desire of our working people will be accomplished in our time—a most happy and proud circumstance for us."

The seven-year plan, launched in 1961, has not yet been ful-

filled; it will span another three years because of urgent defense needs. But tile-roofed brick houses have become the rule over virtually all the countryside and peasants now eat rice all year round. The only thatch-roofed houses I saw were the two museum pieces belonging respectively to the families of Kim Il Sung's father and mother.

In the drive to bring the countryside nearer to the cities, Premier Kim has picked the county seat as the model for the new urban-type village into which the cooperative farms should transform themselves. The county seat "must be built in a beautiful, neat, cultured and hygienic way so that the villages may follow its example. In every sphere . . . with its cultural and welfare facilities, schools, hospitals, cinemas, bookshops and libraries . . . the county seat must be an example for the farm villages and a model of the new, socialist way of life." This is typical of the concrete way he expresses problems and guides the Korean people forward. Managers of the cooperative farms I visited all spoke of this service Kim Il Sung had given. They had built or were planning to build and introduce city-type facilities wherever possible and give an urban-type profile to their life. The introduction of the eight-hour working day and the freeing of mothers of much household work by the excellent nursery-kindergarten facilities has done much to make this possible. The peasants have leisure now and want the facilities to enjoy it.

A better deal for women in the countryside has been another of Kim Il Sung's constant themes. In a speech on cooperative farm management at the end of 1962, he complained that, "At present, many able-bodied men are loitering about with brief cases under their arms, on the pretext that they are some kind of leaders or are doing some highly technical job. So the farm work is left almost entirely to women. As far as possible, the women in fact should be given the lighter jobs and the men the arduous ones. If possible, clerical work such as compiling statistics and book-keeping should be left to the women and all the men should do field work."

Style of Work

Fifteen years as a guerrilla leader, sharing the daily life and dangers on an absolutely equal basis with his men and women fellow-partisans, have left an indelible imprint on Kim Il Sung's style of work. He is just the opposite of an armchair theoretician. In early 1959, in an attack on bureaucratic methods of work in the Korean Workers' Party and the former Communist Party, he said, "If a few thousand revolutionary core elements who had taken part in the Korean revolution as guerrilla fighters had been preserved and if at least one of them had been allocated to each cell at the time the party was formed, the bureaucrat Ho Ga Yi* could not have spread his bureaucratic style of work which . . . led many people to believe that party work was something that should be conducted only by a sort of administrative method and by issuing orders. This has never, from the first, been the correct method of party work. . . .

"It need hardly be said that the guerrilla units, being an armed force, carried out military activities upon orders. But military orders had to be explained patiently at party meetings until all accepted them consciously and everyone was determined to do his utmost to carry them through. To save their meager ammunition, the guerrillas fought the enemy with bayonets, facing up to all dangers. With military orders alone, without persuasion and education such heroism could hardly be expected. There was no means of control over guerrillas except their own will. There was no such thing as jail or lockups.. . . It was persuasion and education that were of exceptional significance. Education was conducted even during meals, marches and battles. . . .

"The prestige of the chairman of a Party organization should be maintained by his real ability of leadership, not by brandishing party authority. . . . You should not try to boost your

* Referred to several times by Kim Il Sung as that "notorious bureaucrat," Ho Ga Yi was in charge of organizational work for the Workers' Party's Central Committee for several years until 1952.

prestige with the help of a big desk and an armchair. No red tape is needed for our party work."

Bureaucrats are anathema to Kim Il Sung. He has waged vigorous campaigns to rid party and government of that style of work acquired, as he once told leading party officials, because "all that many of our comrades had seen and learned was the working method of Japanese imperialist officials."

It is almost certain that the success of imposing his own style of work at all levels in party, government, factory and farm management, has been decisive in building up the country at such speed. The country in fact bears the strong imprint of the personality of Kim Il Sung, and he bears the strong imprint of the militant revolutionary environment of his most formative years and most of his youth and adult life.

TWO-STYLE LIBERATION

Within hours after word came on August 15, 1945, that Korea was liberated, Koreans all over the country discarded the drab, ungainly Japanese-imposed dress and appeared in their graceful, snow-white garments as a spontaneous salute to liberation.*

Guard Colonel-General Chistiakov, who commanded the Soviet Army which swooped down and crushed the Japanese army of occupation, issued a proclamation addressed to the Korean people in the name of the Soviet Army:

"The Soviet Army and Allied forces have driven the Japanese plunderers from Korea. Korea has become a country of freedom. However, this is only the first step in a new era of Korean history. An abundant fruitful orchard is the result of man's effort and foresight. Therefore the happiness of the Korean people will only be achieved by the heroic efforts that you Korean people will exert. Remember those bitter days that you have suffered under Japanese rule. The very stones testify to your sufferings. You are all aware of the fact that the Japanese could afford to live in lofty spacious pavilions, well-clad, well-fed, despising Koreans and humiliating Korean customs and culture. Such a past of slavery will never be repeated. Like a nightmare, this humiliating past has now disappeared forever.

"Korean people Remember you have your future happiness in your own hands. You have attained liberty and independence. Now everything is up to you. ..."

Under a war-time agreement between the Great Powers, the

* Under American air attacks, five years later, the people refused to abandon their white clothes, even though it made them easier targets for American bombs and bullets. The symbol of liberation became a symbol of defiance also.

Soviet Army was to enter Korea to accept the surrender of the Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel; American forces were to accept the surrender south of the parallel.

Less than a month later, two more proclamations addressed to the Korean people were published, these by General Douglas MacArthur whose forces arrived in South Korea on September 8, 1945. The cold, arrogant wording of these documents was like a bucket of icy water dashed in the eager faces of Korean patriots. They sounded suspiciously like occupation edicts of the Japanese occupation regime itself. Included in the first proclamation were commands that, "All powers of government over the territory of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the people thereof will be for the present exercised under my authority. . . . Persons will obey my orders and orders issued under my authority. Acts of resistance to the occupying forces or any acts which may disturb public peace and safety will be punished severely. . . . For all purposes during the military control, English will be the official language. In event of any ambiguity or diversity of interpretation or definition between any English and Korean or Japanese text, the English text shall prevail."

The second proclamation said that anyone committing acts "calculated to disturb public peace and order, or prevent the administration of justice, or willfully does any act hostile to the Allied Forces, shall, upon conviction by a Military Occupation Court, suffer death or such other punishment as the Court may determine."

For those who heard these proclamations, it was a stunning blow. Within a few days, they were posted up all over the South in English and Korean.

Suppression of People's Committees

People's Committees had sprung up all over the country, North and South, immediately after August 15; by the time the Americans arrived, the Japanese were already disarmed

in the South, except in Seoul and a few other urban centers. The leaders of the Committees awaited the arrival of the American forces to hand over their captives, and expected the Americans to round up the Japanese in Seoul, arrest the notorious Japanese Governor-General Abe and the worst of the Korean puppet officials.*

The U.S. military governor, General Arnold, launched an all-out assault against the People's Committees, which were, as in the North, the concrete expression of democracy in Korea.

On instructions from Arnold, Japanese-trained Korean police from USAMGIK (U.S. Military Government in Korea) disbanded the Committees and confiscated all their documents. Many of the Committees' leaders were returned to jails from which they had only recently been released after years of imprisonment under the Japanese. USAMGIK was to be the sole administrator in South Korea and its power was based at first on Japanese police and later on Japanese-trained Korean police.

Popular outcry in the first few weeks of American occupation forced the Americans to revise their original plans for maintaining Japanese administrators. By the end of 1945 most of the latter had been shipped back to Japan. But the Korean quislings, the hated janissaries who had served the Japanese to suppress and torture their own people, now replaced the Japanese in all key positions in the USAMGIK administration, especially in the police. The deputy chief of Korean police, Choi Kyang-chin, who worked under Colonel William Maglin, the American police chief at USAMGIK, was one of the highest ranking police officers under the Japanese. He was commissioned by Maglin to organize the new police force.

Unification would have been very simple if the Americans had not decided to suppress the People's Committees and set up their own totally unnecessary military government as the

* One of the first acts of General Hodges, who commanded the American forces, was to demand that all Koreans continue to obey Abe and that all Japanese officials be retained, or restored to office if they had been dismissed.

supreme administration in South Korea. For General MacArthur and the U.S. government, the 38th parallel was immediately frozen into a cold war barrier.

Another of those icy occupation edicts, published on November 2, 1945, read in part as follows: "Until further ordered and except as already repealed or abolished, all laws which were in force, regulations, orders, notices or other documents issued by any former Governments of Korea, having the force of law on 9th of August, 1945, will continue in full force and effect until repealed by express order of the Military Governor of Korea."

Soviet-American Joint Commission

MacArthur was determined not to allow the Koreans any say in their own affairs but to deal with them as an enemy people to be ruled. He reported to his government that "the unification of Korea was beyond his powers," and accordingly handed the problem over, in December 1945, to the Moscow meeting of the foreign ministers of America, Britain and the USSR. The problem of unification was in fact one for the Korean people to solve. They had no desire for their country to be politically divided because of a military arrangement between the great powers on disarming the Japanese. MacArthur knew he had no case for preventing the Korean people from uniting politically as the Soviet Union wanted, but the Americans were sure of a two-to-one vote in their favor for any policy they wished to put across at the foreign ministers' conference.

As a result of the Moscow discussions, at which the Americans made it clear they would not allow the Koreans themselves to unify the country, it was decided to establish a Soviet-American Joint Commission charged with the task of "working out, with the participation of the Korean democratic government and Korean democratic organizations, the assistance required to promote political, economic and social progress and to establish the national independence of Korea. These measures to be considered by the three powers in working out an agreement

on trusteeship for Korea covering a period of up to five years."

The Moscow decisions were first made known in a Moscow radio broadcast on December 27, 1945, followed by a Tass commentary explaining that American aims at the conference had been to secure a permanent division of the country and that the Joint Commission was the best compromise that could be salvaged at that time.

North Korean Reforms

In February 1946, a North Korean Provisional Committee was set up, elected from the local People's Committees and Kim Il Sung was made its president. On March 23, 1946, Kim announced a 20-point program he said should be adopted by the provisional government which, it was hoped, would emerge from the deliberations of the Joint Commission. The Commission had started its work in Seoul three days earlier. Kim's program called for the complete liquidation of "all survivals of Japanese imperialist rule in the political and economic life of Korea." It provided for an eight-hour working day and fixed minimum wages; a ban on employment of children under 13 and a six-hour day for those between 13 and 16; complete sex equality and an end to forced marriages and concubinage; universal, compulsory education; free elections by secret ballot for all echelons of administration; nationalization of big enterprises, banks, mines and forests; confiscation of Japanese property and irrigation facilities; distribution of land that had belonged to the Japanese and traitors, and other needed reforms.

The demand to nationalize enterprises, banks and so forth, was, in fact, only a demand to take over Japanese property. Before liberation 91 per cent of the total investment in the Korean economy, excluding agriculture, was held by the Japanese. In industry the figure was 94 per cent and in banking, communications and mining, 99 per cent. According to a conservative estimate made by the U.S. State Department, the U.S. military government in September 1947 was still holding in

South Korea "former Japanese properties in 24 basic industries which amount to 80% of the South Korean economy."*

In the North, Japanese industries and property had nominally been taken over by the Soviet commander but, in fact, from the very first days of liberation, they were being administered and worked by Koreans for Korea. As soon as the nationalization decree was passed, the Soviet commander formally handed over to the North Korean People's Committee the entire Japanese assets in North Korea. Local Korean capitalists and industrialists, unless they had been active collaborators with the Japanese, were allowed to keep their enterprises and were given financial help to develop them.

No progress was made in the Joint Commission; the Americans refused even to admit to its hearings many of the most important parties and social organizations in the South which supported unification. Reforms in the North could not await the outcome of its interminable and unproductive sessions. Land reform, as already noted, was carried out in March; on June 20, 1946, a labor law embodying Kim Il Sung's 20-point program was approved by the North Korean Provisional Committee. On August 10, Kim Il Sung announced another nationalization law to a mass rally of Pyongyang citizens: "All the factories, mines, plants, railways, communications, banks, commercial and cul-

* It was claimed later that these were gradually being handed over to the Rhee government. Actually Rhee was parcelling them out to political cronies on the understanding that American capital would be invited in to set them on their feet. By September 1948, for instance, contracts had been signed between the U.S. and Rhee governments allowing American commercial firms to exploit the So Lim gold mine and the valuable San Dong tungsten mine. American capital was already dominant or in complete ownership in the Greater Korea Electric Co., Greater Korea Oil Tanker Co., Far Eastern Import and Export Co., Associated Mica Exploitation Co., Mining Exploitation Co., Mining Development Co., and many others. American firms had the sole right to exploit, produce, distribute, fix rationing and price policies for coal and petroleum products in South Korea. American capital in fact replaced Japanese and the workers had about the same rights and conditions as under the Japanese.

tural establishments, etc., which the Japanese imperialists built with the sweat and blood of the Korean people, have become the property of the people, their sole legal owner. In addition, all the factories and other enterprises which formerly belonged to those who fled with the Japanese, to the pro-Japanese elements and to the traitors, have been confiscated and placed in the possession of the Korean people."*

The Provisional People's Committee was still the supreme power in North Korea at the time these major reforms were carried out. The People's Committees, as we have seen, were set up first on a village and district basis, then elected on a county and provincial basis from which the Temporary People's Committee and later the People's Committee for North Korea were elected. It had been hoped parallel committees would be elected in the South to form a provisional administration until nation-wide elections could be held. Politically there was no North Korea and South Korea until the Americans carried out separate elections in South Korea in May 1948. In the North, where the overwhelming majority of the people favored peaceful political unification, there could be no question of holding elections for a legislature in the North alone. This would be taking the first step to make the division at the 38th parallel a permanent one. At the time of the reform laws, the Joint Commission was still supposed to be trying to unify the country on the basis of the expressed wishes of the majority of the people.

Joint Commission sessions in fact had become a mockery. The Moscow decisions called for all democratic parties and organizations to be consulted on unification. A U.S. State Department brochure reported that 38 organizations in the North and 422 in

* These same factories, mines and other installations were blown to bits by American bombers in 1950, starting within days of the outbreak of hostilities. As long as they were in the hands of "respectable" Japanese capitalist concerns, even at the height of World War II when many of them worked exclusively to feed the Japanese war machine with which the U.S.A. was locked in deadly combat, they were never touched. In the hands of the Korean people, they were immediate and primary targets.

South Korea submitted applications for consultation with the Joint Commission. The report fails to mention that 95 per cent of the organizations of the South were manufactured by the Americans or Rhee, specifically to oppose unification; many consisted often of only one or two members. (One protest made by the Soviet delegate on the Commission was against the inclusion of the "Old Men's Association Worrying About the Fate of Our Country," which had just six members.)

In April 1947, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov wrote to Secretary of State Marshall about the developments on unification: "The United States has included 17 political parties and social organizations opposed to the Moscow decisions in the list of their candidates for consultation in the establishment of a provisional government of Korea, and has included three parties and organizations from our camp which whole-heartedly support unification. It has excluded such organizations as the National Federation of South Korean Trade Unions, the Federation of the National League of Peasants, the Korean People's Patriotic Party (a right-wing party), the Federation of Democratic Youth Leagues, which comprises the largest social organization in South Korea." The trade unions, peasant associations, youth leagues and women's federations (which were also excluded from expressing an opinion) represented the vast majority of the organized citizens of South Korea.

People's Conference in Pyongyang

Had the Americans really been interested in a democratic society in a united Korea, albeit one with no place for American capital investments, they could have paid heed to the North Korean People's Conference in Pyongyang in March 1947, with the participation of all political parties and social organizations, and delegates from provincial and district People's Committees. A drafting committee elected at the conference drew up a provisional constitution for a Korean People's Republic, with Seoul as the capital. According to this constitution, sovereign power

rests with the people and is based on the Supreme People's Council which is the highest organ of the People's Committees, themselves local sovereign powers. All representative organs, from the People's Committees up to the Supreme People's Council, are elected through direct secret ballot. Every person over the age of 20 has the right to vote and to be elected. Committee members at any level may be recalled in case of irresponsibility in carrying out assigned tasks. Freedom of press, speech, organization, assembly, demonstration and religious expression are guaranteed. Security of the home and secrecy of mails are also guaranteed. Habeas corpus is recognized and arrests can only be carried out after court decisions or by procurator's order.

Primary education is compulsory, and the state guarantees assistance for higher education. Parents are responsible for the care of their children, including children born out of wedlock or the children of only one of the parties to a marriage. No discrimination against children born out of wedlock is permissible. Minorities have the same rights as Koreans, and also the right to speak their mother tongue and develop their own culture.

In the economic field, all the means of production belong either to the state, municipal, public or cooperative organs, or to private individuals. Also belonging to the state are mineral or other underground resources, forests, rivers, mining enterprises, banking, railways, canals, irrigation works, navigation, waterworks, natural power, and those enterprises formerly owned by the Japanese imperialists and Korean traitors. Foreign trade is conducted or directed by the state. The land belongs to those who cultivate it. The general maximum per household is five acres, but up to 20 acres are allowed in cases of large families or poor land. The state and cooperatives have the right to own and cultivate land.

Individual ownership of land, stock, agricultural implements and other means of production, of small industries and enterprises, houses, facilities, furnishings and personal bank deposits are guaranteed and protected by law. The state encourages individual initiative in production, as well as the development

of cooperatives. The state develops economic plans to utilize to the full the nation's resources. Workers of both sexes have the right to work and to paid vacations and social insurance. Women have equal rights in all fields with men.

The draft constitution embodied the dreams and hopes of generations of Koreans. It corresponded to the aspirations of the broadest masses of the people. It was circulated to every political party and social organization both north and south of the parallel. In the North it was openly discussed; in the South, discussions had to be held in secret, but most political parties, trade unions, peasant associations and other social, religious and cultural bodies discussed the draft. Together with those in the North, they submitted their resolutions of approval, comments and amendments. The constitution was to be adopted only after nation-wide general elections had been held.

In the interests of unification, those who drew up the draft made considerable concessions to private enterprise in small industry and trade, to generous land holdings and democratic forms of life. If genuine North-South discussions had taken place agreement could have been reached on terms that would have suited 95 per cent of all Koreans. And the murderous war might have been averted.

The Seoul Regime

In the South no free discussion, let alone unification, was possible. Syngman Rhee was adamant against any contact with the North. The Americans, and later Rhee, had at their disposal armed thugs whom the Japanese had organized as so-called "anti-air raid corps." But in effect these were plainclothes security police who worked directly, though unofficially, under the regular police. They were available for any special work, from breaking up meetings to assassinations.

At the end of 1946, USAMGIK had begun to organize a Korean "interim" government with an "interim" Legislative Assembly. The chief of government would still be General

Arnold but a special position of Chief of Civil Administration, open to a Korean, was to be created. In order to conform to the theory that Koreans were not fit to govern themselves, the person concerned would be nominated by the Military Governor and his power would be limited to advising the Military Governor. Half of the 140 members in the Assembly would be nominated by General Arnold, the other half recommended by such political parties and organizations as wished to take part. The South Korean Workers' Party which was formed on November 15, 1946, by fusing the Communist Party, the People's Party and the New People's Party, decided to boycott an Assembly which was to be a mockery of self-government. Rhee also took no part in the Interim Assembly. He preferred to remain in the background and consolidate his machine. He feared the Assembly would probably take some action against Japanese collaborators and he did not want to compromise himself at this stage with those he might need as allies later. He was playing for much bigger stakes, for complete power when the Americans withdrew.

The inaugural meeting of the Interim Assembly was held in Seoul on January 1, 1947. By early 1947, the witch-hunt was on with a vengeance in the South. The fact that one was for unification, or even for talks with the North, was sufficient proof of being a "Communist." Whole families were arrested, tortured and even executed on the suspicion that one of their members was a northern "sympathizer." A delegation of the World Federation of Trade Unions, to which the British Trades Union Council and the American Congress of Industrial Organizations were then affiliated, visited South Korea in 1947. The group protested in writing to USAMGIK that, "organized terror deprives the Korean people of their right to exercise freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of political expression and freedom of organization." Such were the conditions in which the Joint Commission was supposed to be hearing the people's views on unification.

That was the last year of overt American military rule in Korea. By the middle of the following year the Rhee government

was in power. The oppression remained the same as before; the change at the top was one of nationality only. Real power was exercised by the same police and thugs as formerly. Colonel William Maglin justified his policy of putting the Japanese-trained police back in office in an interview with the journalist Mark Gayn: "Many people question the wisdom of keeping men trained by the Japanese. . . . We feel that if they did a good job for the Japanese they would do a good job for us."

By the end of 1947, there was no choice for any Korean patriot. If he was for a free, independent and united Korea, he was necessarily an enemy of USAMGIK, and he had to fight it just as he had previously fought the Japanese. USAMGIK had exactly the same apparatus at its disposal, manned by mainly the same personnel, as the Japanese had for dealing with patriots. The apparatus was placed completely at the disposition of their chosen man in Seoul, Syngman Rhee.

Having effectively wrecked the work of the Joint Commission, the United States took the question of Korea to the United Nations, sure of an automatic majority vote for whatever policies it wanted. Without the formal consent of the Korean people, or even a sample test of Korean public opinion, the American delegates sponsored the appointment of a commission to come to Korea "to unify" the country through UN-controlled elections. The implication that Koreans could not arrange their own affairs was rejected by every political and social organization in Korea except the Japanese collaborationists, on whom Rhee's party was based, and the Democratic Party, composed of landlords who feared land reform. Indignation was expressed throughout the country and in the majority of newspapers in South Korea when it became known that separate elections under UN supervision would be held in the South on May 10, 1948.

The Unification Conference

On the invitation of the Temporary People's Commission of North Korea, a conference was held in Pyongyang in April 1948

to discuss the question of the unification of North and South. Representatives of every political party, except Rhee's and the Democratic Party, and every social organization in South Korea of any importance at all, took part in the conference. Most of the parties from the South were moderate or right-wing, but the left-wing probably had the strongest participation in actual mass support (Korea is a country of workers and poor peasants with a comparatively small and weakly-developed middle and capitalist class.) The decisions of the Pyongyang conference were signed by delegates—in most cases leaders—of the following participating parties and organizations from South Korea:

The Korean Independence Party*, Party of National Independence, Working People's Party, People's Republican Party, New Progressive Party, Social Democratic Party, Chung Do (national religious party), Korean Peasants' Party, Laboring Masses Party, Mass League Party, the very powerful South Korean Workers' Party, and others.

Organizations represented included the General Federation of Trade Unions, Federation of Peasants' Leagues, Union of Democratic Youth, Democratic Women's League, Federation of Cultural Leagues, League of Christians, League of Confucians, Association for the Unification of the Korean People, the South Korean Press Association and a score of others.

Many of these bodies were extremely right-wing, but all were genuinely interested in Korean unity. They represented more than 90 per cent of all organized South Koreans; and most Koreans were members of some organization. The two most important mass organizations in both North and South, were the trade union and peasant groups, with the bulk of the workers and peasants enrolled in their ranks.

All political and social organizations from the North also participated in the conference. Altogether delegates from 56 political and social organizations from both sides of the parallel,

* A right-wing party headed by Kim Ku, head of the Kuomintang-supported Korean provisional government in Chungking.

with a total membership of over 12,000,000 people—an overwhelming majority of the adult population of Korea—took part.

The decisions were announced in a communiqué on April 23 and read in part as follows: "The United States has used the Little Assembly of the United Nations to decide to hold separate elections in the South to establish a so-called 'National Government' which in substance is bound to be a puppet regime. By this plan, the United States intends to divide this country at the 38th parallel. At present we are faced with the most critical moment in our history, with such reactionaries as Li Seung-man (Syngman Rhee) and Kim Sung-su (leader of the landlord-capitalist Democratic Party) rampantly active in the South and supporting the American reactionary policy. We brand them as traitors and we will brand as traitors all those who collaborate with them. Because of these reactionaries, the South Korean people have been unable to obtain the precious privileges of democracy. On the other hand, in the North, which was liberated by the Soviet Army, the people are able to create what they desire and, through the People's Committees which they established, they were able to realize democratic reforms and lay down a firm foundation for a sound national economy and revive our national culture. We are in firm opposition to the American policy of colonizing backward countries and we oppose traitors and pro-Japanese who have now been established in power by the Americans. We are also opposed to the United Nations Commission to Korea which is designed to deceive the Korean people. In order to prevent the colonization of our country by American imperialists, we, both South and North Korean political parties and organizations, are united so that we can further develop a movement throughout the country to oppose separate elections and to support the Soviet proposals to establish a unified, independent country by having foreign troops withdrawn from Korea. To this end we will exert all our efforts."

This declaration was the authentic voice of the Korean people and represented a most sweeping repudiation of American

policies in South Korea. It cut through the artificial arguments that the Koreans themselves did not know what they wanted.*

The fact that right-wing parties and virtually every leading political figure from the South, some of whom the Americans had been grooming for top positions, took part in the conference and lent their prestige and names to denouncing American policy, was a bitter blow to USAMGIK. Bitterest of all was that the aging, conservative elder statesman Kim Ku, who had headed the provisional government in Chungking and had great prestige among the conservatives, took part in the conference and signed the decisions.

Despite clear opposition to separate elections, the Americans went ahead as planned, as if the Pyongyang conference had not taken place. In the "Little Assembly," which the Americans had maneuvered into being at the UN to deprive the Soviet Union of a voice in anything to do with the Korean question, only the Kuomintang representative strongly supported America on the separate elections issue. Even Australia and Canada added their voices to India in vehemently opposing this measure to partition Korea permanently.

American correspondents who observed the elections, held on May 10, 1948, reported at least 500 people killed, some for refusing to go to the polls, others in riots at the polling booths. Rhee's party of course was the winner; on May 11, USAMGIK issued a statement that the elections had taken place in a "free atmosphere" and that more than 95 per cent had voted. But USAMGIK could not escape the fact that the main political parties and organizations, even those led by Kim Ku and the

* This hypocrisy of the American position of sincere efforts for unification was exposed by the passing of the Korean Aid Bill by Congress in February 1950. The Bill contained a proviso that would terminate aid "in the event of the formation in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) of a coalition government which included one or more representatives of the Communist Party or the party now in control of the government of North Korea."

State Department choice for president, Kim Kyu Sik, demonstratively boycotted the elections.

Democratic People's Republic

The following month, another unification meeting, between the same organizations that met in Pyongyang in April, was held at Haeju, just north of the 38th parallel. The meeting decided to carry out nation-wide elections in August under the auspices of the political parties on each side of the parallel. A regular election campaign was waged in the South, despite terrorism by USAMGIK and Rhee police against those taking part. In the South, 1,080 candidates were nominated and 1,002 actually stood for office. Voting was by secret ballot and was supervised by representatives of the political parties which attended the Haeju and Pyongyang conferences. Of the 8,681,746 eligible voters in the South, 6,732,407 or 77 per cent actually voted; in the North, 99 per cent voted. The South elected 360 deputies, the North 212 in strict proportion to the population. The election took place on August 25. On September 8, the deputies elected in the South went to Pyongyang where Kim Il Sung was unanimously elected Premier of the Korean Democratic People's Republic.

One of the first acts of the newly elected all-Korean Supreme People's Assembly was to send a request to both occupying powers informing them that the Democratic People's Republic was founded and requesting the occupying powers to withdraw their forces. The formal request was handed in at the respective headquarters in Seoul and Pyongyang. The Soviet commander was prompt in replying; he greeted the foundation of the Republic and promised that Soviet troops would be withdrawn. But the Americans refused. After several proposals by Soviet representatives for the simultaneous withdrawal of all forces had been rejected by the United States, Soviet forces withdrew from Korea in December 1948.

In the meantime Rhee was consolidating his power and attempting to liquidate by force all who opposed him. By the beginning of 1949, a person could be arrested merely for affiliation with a trade union, the Writers League, Lawyers League, Musicians Union, or any of the mass organizations which, without exception, supported unity and the government in the North.

An early victim of the Rhee government was Kim Tai Jum, the foremost historian in Korea. A specialist in Korean history, literature and literary criticism, and lecturer at Seoul University, he was arrested in 1949. Without any reason being given, he was courtmartialled and shot.

Another such case was that of Yu Dong Jun. Arrested in 1948 because he was a prominent member of the Lawyers League, Yu was tortured at the Yung Deung Po, or South Seoul police station. Eventually petrol was poured over him and he was burned alive.

Kim Ku, the Korean elder statesman who had headed the Chungking provisional government, was another victim. The Americans had great hopes for him, but Kim Ku was above all a patriot. He boycotted the Rhee elections and took part in the Pyongyang and Haeju conferences. He was assassinated in the streets of Seoul in 1949 by a Lieutenant An Do Hai of Rhee's army. No action was taken against the assassin.

An end had come to any hopes of peaceful unification of the country, or the all-Korean independence for which so many Korean patriots had fought and died. Even the United Nations Commission reported in August 1949 that, under Rhee's "National Peace Protection Act," 89,710 people were arrested in *South Korea* in the eight months prior to April 30, 1949.

Rhee's Minister of the Interior, Kim Huo Suk, who fled to the North at the outbreak of the war in 1950, estimated that between August 1945 and the outbreak of hostilities on June 25, 1950, a quarter-million persons had been massacred and 600,000 imprisoned, all under liberation, American style.

II

A BEGINNING AND AN END

For American policy in the Far East, 1950 was a bad year. Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang forces, heavily backed, armed, financed and advised by the United States, having been chased off the mainland of China, had fled to Hainan island. They were then chased off that island by a surprisingly efficient amphibian operation of China's People's Liberation Army, and went to Taiwan. The PLA by mid-1950 was preparing to deal the final blow by another amphibious assault on Taiwan itself. People's China had been recognized by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as Britain, India and a number of Asiatic and neutral countries. It was only a matter of time before she would replace the delegate of the Kuomintang remnants in the UN Security Council. President Truman had announced that no more military aid was to be sent to the fugitive regime in Taiwan. Secretary of State Dean Acheson went further, stating, to the horror of the China Lobby, the United States had no intention of helping defend Taiwan.

In South Korea, Rhee and American policy had suffered a stinging defeat in the May 30 elections, when less than 20 per cent of Rhee's supporters were elected, despite the extensive use of Rhee's gangs of thugs, and despite the banning of the powerful Workers' Party and all other democratic parties. Even the right-center National Independence party of Kim Kyu Sik boycotted the elections. For the "hawks" of those days, with Dulles and MacArthur at their head, the situation looked very bleak indeed. It could only be rectified by the most urgent and desperate of measures, and Korea seemed to be the best bet.

Preparations for Invasion

Once the door to peaceful reunification had been slammed shut, Rhee and his U.S. advisers immediately started planning and agitating for "reunification" by armed force. On October 7, 1949, for instance, Syngman Rhee gave an interview to Joseph I. Johnston, then vice-president of United Press. Published in the Seoul Skimbun on October 8, under the banner headline: "Possible to Occupy Pyongyang in Three Days. Unification of Our Country at Hand," the report quoted Rhee as stating, "that his government is able to occupy North Korea, thereby bringing about the unification of the country, but that in doing so he had been warned that it may bring about a possible third world war. What he told me," continued Johnston, "is as follows: 'North Koreans have requested that I should broadcast a message appealing to the loyal Koreans in the North to rise and overthrow the Communist regime and they are expecting that we will join them. I am firmly convinced that we can occupy Pyongyang within three days. To defend our country on the borders of Manchuria and Korea would be easier than defending it along the 38th parallel. Despite this fact, what are the reasons that make me refrain from action? It is because the United Nations and United States have warned me to the effect that such an action might create another world war. This is the reason why we are still patient and we are awaiting the time when the problem of Communism will be resolved parallel with other world problems.'"

A week before the Johnston interview, while the Korean question was being discussed by the UN at Lake Success, Rhee had given an interview direct to the Seoul Shimbun published under the title: "Korea is Completely Prepared—I Hope to Wipe Out North Korea." "I am doing my best to be patient," said Rhee, "but I hope that the statesmen at Lake Success should take the following facts into consideration: (1) That we can restore the lost territories of North Korea and that our compatriots in North Korea hope that we will wipe out their

regime. (2) That we are afraid the longer we leave matters, the more difficult such steps will become. The Republic of Korea government and its people are completely organized to fight communism but how much longer should such patriotism and self-restraint be continued? People are tired. North Korean compatriots desire that we rout the Communist army and defend the natural borders of the Republic of Korea—the Yalu and Tumen rivers. This is what we should do and what we should have done a long time ago."

The year 1949 drew to a close with Rhee firmly determined that, come what may, the invasion of the North would take place in 1950. In a New Year's message to the Korean people, published in all South Korean papers on December 31, Rhee said: "In the New Year we shall all strive as one man to regain the lost territory. Up to now, in view of the international situation, we have pursued a peaceful policy corresponding to the peaceful policy of the United Nations and the United States. We must remember however that in the New Year, in accordance with the changed international situation, it is our duty to unify Southern and Northern Korea by our own strength."

No one who read the South Korean press during the latter half of 1949 could doubt that Rhee intended an armed invasion of the North during the coming year.

The year opened with an "Agreement for Joint Defense and Mutual Assistance" between the United States and Rhee, signed January 26. South Korea was thus placed within the perimeter of the American "line of defense." The New York Times, March 14, 1950, reported that Rhee had arrested 13 members of his own Assembly, and sentenced them to from 18 months to 10 years' imprisonment for violations of the Security Act. Among the five charges levelled against them was that of *opposing the invasion of North Korea by the ROK Army*.

Times correspondent Walter Sullivan reported later, after a tour of Korea in May, that, "Of all foreign troops trained by American officers, the South Korean troops are the most Americanized. They have American-style uniforms, ride in American

vehicles, carry American-made weapons. After intensive training which has gone on for several years, they even march and in many respects behave like Americans, so much so that a visitor is startled into thinking that American forces are still in occupation. . . . Five hundred American military advisers have desks throughout the Ministry of National Defense. They are also assigned to *South* Korean units down to regimental and sometimes battalion level."

On June 5, three weeks before the invasion started, the New York Herald Tribune reported an interview by Marguerite Higgins with Brigadier General W. L. Roberts. "In Korea," Roberts stated, "the American taxpayer has an army that is a fine watchdog over the investments placed in this country and a force that represents maximum results at a minimum cost." General Roberts added, writes Miss Higgins, "that his Military Advisory Group is 'a living demonstration of how an intelligent and intensive investment of 500 combat-hardened American officers and men can train 100,000 men who will do the shooting for you. . . . I've got at least 13 to 14 Americans with every division. They work with the Korean officers . . . they live right there with them in the field at the front (the 38th parallel) and stay with them in battles and in rest periods." This was the first admission by Roberts that there was already a "front" at the 38th parallel and that there had been "battles" in which American officers had taken part. Presumably, the announcement was made to prepare public opinion for events to take place later in the month.

In the North, desperate efforts were made to avert what was clear to every Korean by 1950, that a fratricidal war was being foisted on the country from outside. In early June, the Fatherland Democratic Front for Unification (FDFU) again made an appeal for peaceful unification; it offered to cooperate with all politicians in the South except eight who were named as national traitors. These were Syngman Rhee; Kim Sung Su, the leader of the Democratic Party, Cho Byung Ok of the USAMGIK Korean police and South Korean representative at the UN;

Chang Myun, Ambassador to the U.S.A.; Shin Sung Mo, then the Defense Minister, and three other former Japanese collaborators. A personal invitation was sent to 300 members of parliament and other prominent leaders inviting them to a unification congress. As all North-South communications had been cut by this time, an announcement was made over Pyongyang radio that two representatives from the FDFU accompanied by a journalist would deliver the invitations at a specified date and time at Ryo Hun on the 38th parallel near Kaesong. The news of the invitation was suppressed in the Seoul press. The delegates from the North turned up at Ryo Hun at the time mentioned, but were met with a hail of machine-gun and mortar fire. One of the delegates was wounded. They reported back to Pyongyang but were asked to continue to South Korea and personally deliver the invitations. It became known that on arriving in the South the three were arrested and tortured. The invitations were never delivered and nothing further is known of the final fate of the delegates.

Then the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, on June 16, proposed to the National Assembly of South Korea that the two representative bodies join together and achieve a peaceful unification of the country. To this there was no reply, apart from the attack by the ROK army nine days later.

The Attack

John Foster Dulles arrived in South Korea on June 17 and went straight to the 38th parallel. Here the famous photos were taken showing him with U.S. and ROK officers looking at a map of actual operational plans for the attack to the North, and at a sandpit model of the heights north of Kaesong to be taken in the first hours of the attack. "No adversary, not even the strongest can resist you," Dulles told a unit of front-line ROK troops, according to the Seoul press next day. "The time is not far off when you will be able to display your prowess."

The next day Dulles addressed the National Assembly in

25th, there was a tremendous noise of artillery and heavy machine-gun fire, the sound moving forward over Pine Tree Peak. By afternoon however ROK troops were in a disorderly flight back through the town, abandoning arms and even uniforms as they fled, the Korean People's Army (KPA) troops hard on their heels.

The Seoul press reported on June 25 and 26 that the KPA had attacked across the parallel, but that the ROK Army had valiantly resisted the initial assault, launched a counter-offensive and were continuing a glorious advance on Pyongyang. On the afternoon of the 26th, while papers were being sold on the streets proclaiming victories and advances, Syngman Rhee and his American wife, taking with them the country's gold reserves, fled by plane to Tokyo. Merchants, high government officials and wealthy capitalists began an exodus from Seoul by train, automobile, truck and taxi. The city was dead except for ROK troops and police in command of the streets, and the wealthy in flight. Pedestrians and loiterers were liable to be shot on sight. Schools were closed down; the people remained indoors.

On the morning of the 26th, Kim Il Sung appealed to the Korean people over Pyongyang radio: "The army of the puppet government of the traitor Syngman Rhee started on June 25 an all-out offensive against the areas of the North all along the 38th parallel. . . . The Government of the DPRK, having discussed the prevailing situation, ordered the People's Army to start a decisive counter-attack and wipe out the enemy's armed forces. . . . The People's Army drove the enemy from the areas north of the 38th parallel and has advanced 10-15 kilometers (6-10 miles) south. It has liberated a number of towns including Ongjin, Yonan, Kaesong and Baechon and many villages."

Rhee had promised to occupy Pyongyang in three days, but, by the third day, KPA troops were in Seoul.

Washington's wrath knew no bounds. By faked reports to the Security Council, in session without the Soviet delegate present, and incredible demagoguery—including waving a captured Tommy-gun as proof of a "Soviet plot"—a resolution was rubber-stamped

approving, after the deed, U.S. intervention under the UN flag. Truman had already ordered "U.S. air and sea forces to give the Korean government troops cover and support," several hours before the Security Council met.

Contrary to the assertions of the U.S. delegate, there was no UN Commission report that the North had invaded the South. Rather, the report specifically said: "The government of South Korea states . . . ," which was a very different thing. The "Tommy-gun" proved to be a copy of a Soviet model, mass-produced in North Korea. No evidence was produced to prove the North attacked the South or that the Soviet Union was in any way involved.

A belated attempt at proof came in May 1951, with some demonstrably false documents. Apparently in order to cover up their embarrassment for the incriminating documents abandoned in Seoul, the Americans claimed to have captured two documents which "proved" an invasion of South Korea had been prepared weeks in advance. The first document was an "Order of the Second Section of the Supreme Headquarters of the North Korean Army"; the second was a "Battle Order of the Commander of the Fourth Division of the North Korean Army." The term "North Korean Army" was one used exclusively by the Americans to describe what was known from its foundation by only one name, "The Korean People's Army." No other term could possibly be used, as was pointed out at the time by General Nam II, Chief of Staff of the KPA. A second major blunder for the counterfeiters was that many place names mentioned in the documents were referred to by their Japanese names. But, by a decree issued on March 24, 1947, the North Korean People's Committee banned the use of Japanese names and strictly enforced the ban. No Japanese place name could possibly appear on military maps or military orders.

Within a few weeks the American-manufactured ROK army was smashed to bits. The U.S. 24th division was rushed from Japan to halt the debacle. It was sent to Taejon over 125 miles south of Seoul. (Taejon was designated the capital after Seoul

fell) After a night march of almost 40 miles, the KPA attacked at dawn and in a 10-hour battle shattered the 24th division. Its commander, General Dean, managed to slip away but was captured a month later. Within six weeks the KPA, supported by the local population, had liberated 90 per cent of the territory and 92 per cent of the population of South Korea. Hundreds of thousands of young people, 400,000 altogether, volunteered in the KPA forces as they swept South. The remnants of the ROK forces were bottled up in a triangular-shaped beachhead at Pusan in the extreme southeast tip of the country. The ROK army "voted with its feet" against Rhee.

Then came MacArthur's massive landing of "UN" forces at Inchon, the west-coast port near Seoul. Even with overwhelming numerical and material superiority it took the "UN" forces 20 days to capture Seoul, much to MacArthur's chagrin. He had intended to make a swift dash to the east coast, cutting off the KPA troops and wiping them out completely. The 20-day defense of Seoul thwarted these plans. The main part of the KPA forces withdrew to prepare for the defense of the North, or reformed into guerrilla units to operate behind the enemy lines. Despite warnings from Peking that China would intervene if "UN" forces invaded North Korea and approached the Chinese frontier, MacArthur sent his forces across the 38th parallel. Chinese volunteers entered the North. Fighting shoulder to shoulder, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers inflicted the heaviest defeat ever, up to that time, on American troops, in a series of big encircling movements. In less than 10 weeks between October 25, 1950, and January 8, 1951, Mac-Arthur's army had been driven back south of the 38th parallel. For the next few months the battle swayed back and forth in the general region of the 38th parallel until the ceasefire talks started at Kaesong. In the meantime MacArthur was sacked by Truman at a dramatic meeting at Wake Island, ostensibly because he was again making policy by threatening to carry the war to China. More likely, he was fired because he had taken a terrible beating at the hands of Korean and Chinese peasant

armies—"hordes," as MacArthur referred to them in his communiqués.

Rhee's Sabotage of Agreement

If the fable of how the war started was dubious enough, the fable of how it ended, being circulated in Washington today to head off any realistic moves to end the war in Vietnam, is even more so. The general line is that it was the fault of the Koreans and Chinese that the ceasefire talks dragged on. Only when Washington got "really tough," according to columnist Joseph Alsop, or threatened to use nuclear weapons, according to General Eisenhower, did the Korean-Chinese negotiators rush to the conference table and sign the armistice agreements. The truth, as revealed in the official records of the last days of the armistice talks, is very different.

At Panmunjom, an agreement was finally signed on June 8, 1953, on the exchange of POW's, after 18 months of talks on this item alone. The reason for the long drawn-out discussions, ostensibly due to American insistence on "voluntary repatriation" of prisoners, was, in fact, to give the American generals a chance at the "clearcut military victory," which they craved. Agreement on Item Four paved the way for an armistice; the date for signing was fixed for June 25, the third anniversary of the war's outbreak.

On May 28, ROK Foreign Minister Pyun declared to the National Assembly that, "South Korea was prepared to fight on alone—even bare-handed—to unify the country." He asserted that the government "would not accept any armistice which leaves Korea divided and makes North Korea a Chinese colony." On June 7, Rhee declared a state of emergency and recalled about 300 South Korean officer trainees from the United States. At the same time he disclosed that he had informed President Eisenhower by letter that regardless of what was signed at Panmunjom, South Korea "would fight on alone and unify the country by driving north ourselves."

At this point, it is appropriate to explain why Rhee was still president in 1953, despite his defeat in the May 1950 elections. This was brought about by a camouflaged coup d'etat in the summer of 1952, under the protection of the "UN" military force.

According to the ROK Constitution, only the National Assembly could elect the President. As noted earlier, only 20 per cent of Rhee's followers were elected in the 1950 elections and his term expired in 1952; it was clear he could not be re-elected. When the time came for the vote, Rhee imposed martial law, arrested a number of deputies and suspended the Assembly. Some deputies demanded a session of the Assembly to lift martial law and secure the release of those arrested. Under the Constitution, Rhee could not refuse the request to convene the Assembly but he could, and did, arrest a sufficient number of members to prevent a quorum in the Assembly. Rhee maintained that the Assembly did not represent the will of the people, and that the Constitution should be changed to allow the President to be elected by direct vote. With martial law, ROK troops and police in charge of the voting machinery, and any real opposition branded as "Communist," there would be no doubt of the results. The deputies refused Rhee's demands; when he persisted, they boycotted the Assembly. Rhee's police rounded up all those who were taking part in the boycott and locked them in the Assembly, warning them they would not be released until they had passed the necessary legislation. Five hundred of his plain-clothes thugs with clubs paraded outside the building. Two deputies who succeeded in getting out were brutally beaten up on the pavement opposite. After 48 hours, the deputies gave in and granted Rhee the powers he wanted. He was elected President on August 24.

It was embarrassing for Washington and the Allies to have their "great democratic leader of the Korean people" exposed for what he was—a gangster and a fascist dictator. Protests were made by the State Department, and the British and French Foreign Offices. The U.S. Ambassador was recalled to Washington

and returned with a testy reprimand for Rhee from Truman. But at that time Rhee was in a strong position. He had only to hint at making a peace with the North, or at withdrawing ROK troops from the front because of a national emergency in the rear, and Washington was terror-stricken. Rhee even felt himself strong enough to ban American publications and stop Voice of America broadcasts from Seoul, because of VOA's faint criticism of his crude, fascist methods. For Washington, however, he was still a great "free world" hero, to be maintained in power by "UN" force of arms.

Thus it was that Rhee was in a position to sabotage the Panmunjom agreements. A key provision of the agreement on Item Four was that POW's, whom the Americans said did not want to be repatriated, be brought to a neutral zone at Panmunjom to hear explanations as to their rights to accept or refuse repatriation. On June 18, a week before the armistice signing, 25,000 North Korean POW's were driven out of the camps in the South at bayonet point, in order to thwart the agreement that had taken 18 months to negotiate, and thus destroy the basis of the whole ceasefire accord. Those who refused to move quickly enough were mowed down from behind; those who moved too quickly were mowed down from in front. At the Inchon camp U.S. marines, according to U.S. official figures, killed 40 and wounded 100 as the POW's were forced to break out by their Korean guards.

Meanwhile, Rhee's representative at the armistice talks was boycotting the conference. Although he had never opened his mouth during two years of talks, the boycott was claimed by Rhee as proof that his government and army would not be bound by any agreement. The ROK army would "go it alone," their hands had been tied too long by politicians in Washington. Faced with this situation, and after giving Mark Clark, who had replaced Ridgway as "UN" Commander, a reasonable time to apologize and return the prisoners, Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai launched a shattering offensive on a large sector of the front. They tore to pieces the ROK's 5th and

8th "elite" divisions on which Rhee was counting to "go it alone," making serious breaches in depth in key sectors of the front. They accomplished in a few days major breakthroughs such as the Americans had tried and failed to do in the two years of armistice talks. They opened the route to Seoul again. According to the "UN" version, the Chinese alone threw 30,000 men into this action, preceded by the heaviest artillery barrage of the war, 112,000 shells fired within the first 12 hours of the offensive, shattering enemy bunkers like matchwood. The "UN" line broke in key sectors and the Korean-Chinese forces poured through the breaches. There was nothing to stop them from sweeping on South and outflanking Seoul. But Mark Clark began making urgent signals that he was ready to talk business. When exchanges of letters indicated that the Americans would now be responsible for Syngman Rhee also honoring the armistice agreements, the Korean-Chinese delegates returned to the conference table.

Their troops returned to their original battle-line positions, having inflicted on the ROK army and U.S. troops, which occupied the flanks of the focal points of the attack, the severest thrashing they had experienced since the first days of the war.*

U.S. Guarantees

At a key meeting on July 19, General Nam II read into the record of the conference the answers to a number of questions he had put to his opposite number. General William K. Harrison (who had succeeded Admiral Joy) at meetings during the nine previous days. As to whether an armistice would include the South Korean government and its forces. General Harrison answered on July 16: "On July 12, I stated: 'You are assured that the UN Command, which includes Republic of Korea forces, ' prepared to carry out the terms of the Armistice. ...' I again

* The whole demarcation line would have had to be renegotiated had not withdrawn, and the Korean-Chinese delegates did not want afford further pretexts for procrastination.

assure you we have received from the Republic of Korea necessary assurances that it will not obstruct in any manner the implementation of the terms of the Draft Armistice Agreement." Harrison also agreed that the South Korean forces would cease fire within 12 hours after the Armistice Agreement was signed and withdraw two kilometers from the Military Demarcation Line, and that "the UN Command will not give support during any aggressive action of units of the ROK Army in violation of the armistice."

Nam II specifically asked if "the UN Command means that it will not give any support to South Korea, including support in equipment and supplies, if the South Korean forces undertake aggressive action. . . . and we take necessary action to resist their aggression"? General Harrison replied on July 13, "The answer is yes."

Asked "whether the South Korean government would be bound by the entire period of the Armistice and not just the 'post hostility period' mentioned in one of General Harrison's replies," General Harrison replied on July 13: "There is no time limit to the armistice."

Another question posed was: "Whether the safety and operational facilities of the personnel of the neutral nations and the Korean-Chinese personnel of the Red Cross teams who go to South Korea to exercise their functions in accordance with the Armistice Agreement will be assured?" General Harrison replied on July 10:

"The UN Command will furnish police protection to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the joint Red Cross teams."*

* Rhee had threatened that there would be "violent actions by Koreans" against the personnel of the "Communist nations" Poland and Czechoslovakia and the "Communist nation" India who formed three of the five members of the NNRC and, omitting India, two of the four members of the NNSC, the other two members in both cases being Sweden and Switzerland. In fact, three Polish members of the NNSC were subsequently killed in South Korea.

On the basis of these replies, General Nam II said he was prepared to go ahead and sign the armistice. The nature and manner of General Harrison's replies, and the humiliation that this represented for Rhee, would have been unthinkable had the Korean-Chinese delegates been forced to come to the conference table because, as Eisenhower claimed 14 years later, he had threatened to use the A-bomb in Korea.

On August 8, just two weeks after the Armistice Agreement was signed, the United States and Rhee signed a Mutual Security Pact which provided for the indefinite presence of U.S. troops in South Korea. This in effect violated Article Five of the Armistice Agreement which stipulated: "In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries on both sides that, within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc."

Preliminary talks to set up a political conference were held in Panmunjom with Arthur Dean, a partner in Dulles' law firm, as the American representative. Dean unilaterally broke off the talks after seven weeks of fruitless discussions when the Chinese delegate, Huang Hua, used the word "perfidy" to describe the U.S. attitude toward the political conference. Fourteen years have gone by and the political conference has still not been convened. Officially the United States is still waiting for the Chinese delegate to withdraw the word "perfidy," as they considered the preliminary talks "temporarily suspended" and not abandoned. But the term "perfidy" seems destined to remain.

JUCHE

Among thousands of Seoul residents who took advantage of the 20-day defense of the capital to head for the North, was the director of South Korea's Technological Institute, Dr. Li Sung Gi. Today, at 63, he heads the Hamhung branch of North Korea's Academy of Sciences, directing the work of four research institutes in that thriving center of the country's chemical industry. Tall for a Korean, with a lean, clever face, Dr. Li has seen his life's work come to fruition in Hamhung in a manner that surpassed his wildest and most optimistic dreams. At least that is what he told me when we met in his spacious, book-lined office, in May 1967. His story, like Kim Il Sung's, is a facet of the tragedy and the glory of the Korean nation.

Vynalon Saga

"I was a lad of 15 when the March 1, 1919, uprising broke out against the Japanese," he said by way of introduction. "It failed and the repression was bitter. There was hardly a school friend of mine whose family did not suffer. But it fired many of us with the idea of doing something to make our country strong and rich; of building it up once we had got rid of the Japanese. In my case this took the form of a strong desire to become a scientist. I studied at a Seoul middle school. But to go on to any higher education, I had to go to Japan. I took my doctorate and continued to do research in Kyoto. At that time many Koreans were studying in Japan, but always with the aim of eventually serving our own country. That is why I and some others specialized in synthetic fibers. If we could clothe our people from our own resources would this not be a contribution?

"In 1939," continued Dr. Li, "I discovered the synthetic fiber of vinalon and made public my discovery by publishing a thesis: 'Study of Synthetic Fiber by the Polyvinyl in Solution State Method.'"

"When the war ended and we thought Korea was free and independent, I went back to Seoul, in November 1945. I was full of enthusiasm and thought that I could now put my discovery in the service of my own people. I went right and left to interest the authorities in giving me facilities to continue experimental research. 'Go and see the Americans, discuss it with them,' I was told. The U.S. military government authorities in turn said: 'Sure, we will help you. On a very big scale.' Months went by and I heard nothing. I went back to see the same official: 'Sure, we'll help you,' he said, 'But let's do it on a smaller scale.' But nothing came of that either. I left no stone unturned, trying very hard to get research facilities in Seoul. In the end, I failed. I never got as much as a piece of carbide, let alone laboratory equipment and materials. During the five years I was in Seoul, I did no research at all."

Dr. Li, who had been speaking with great intensity of feeling, took off his horn-rimmed glasses to wipe them and leaned back in his chair. He said he had not been a Communist but was not anti-Communist. He was a scientist, not interested in politics or economics. Through his own experience he came to dislike the Americans. "I thought," he said, "we had lived under the most heinous enemy, the Japanese, but I found the American occupation regime still worse, more cunning, more cruel. The only people they were interested in were those who had most faithfully served the Japanese and so would most faithfully serve them. Those that had opposed the Japanese they considered their most dangerous enemies."

When the war broke out," Dr. Li continued, "I made up my mind to go to the North and see if I could put my discovery to use there. This was a period of great difficulties and suffering for the Korean people. American troops occupied large parts of the North. But I was well received and, by March 1952, was

able to start research work again. The war was still in a very harsh phase, but Kim Il Sung personally saw to it that I was provided with everything necessary to continue my research, including laboratory assistants. I went up to Chongsu and there I was given help to dig out tunnels where we set up underground laboratories. By that time everything in the way of research and laboratory equipment had been destroyed. But Kim Il Sung looked into our requirements and instructed us to buy abroad all the equipment and chemical reagents needed. We built a pilot plant at Chongsu and actually succeeded in producing vinalon. After the war when we had proved that we could really produce from local materials, Premier Kim came with us to Hamhung and helped select the site for a factory."

At the factory itself, the 43-year-old director, Yun Ryon Hwan, took up the story. It was typical of another aspect of long-range policy in the DPRK that, as a student of chemical engineering when the war broke out, he was not allowed to go to the front as he wanted. He was told his job was to continue his studies in order better to serve his country after the war. Yun was the only factory director I met who had not graduated from the workers of his plant; no such plant existed before.

"Immediately after the end of the war," he said, "Premier Kim directed great attention to solving the question of clothing the people by industrial methods. We have too little arable land to try and grow our own cotton. This plant is an all-Korean affair. It was designed and built entirely by Korean specialists; no foreign specialists were employed at all. A little over a year after the site was selected, the plant was in operation."

Today, the February 8 vinalon factory turns out enough thread to produce 90 million yards of cloth a year, enough to give every man, woman and child in the DPRK one winter and one summer dress or suit. The basic raw material is limestone, the deposits of which in the DPRK are among the greatest in the world.

The plant itself is huge, employing around 5,000 workers. And because workshop after workshop is entirely automated,

the plant is far bigger than even such a large labor force would indicate. The process starts with the crushing and burning of limestone to obtain carbide gas and then acetone. The mixture of acetone and gas effected while travelling through many miles of pipes, produces a jelly-like substance sprayed out through underwater jets and then rolled out into white rubbery sheets, like latex. These are passed through dryers and eventually emerge from hoppers in fluffy bolls of thread, exactly like raw cotton. From then on, it can be handled by ordinary cotton textile machinery to produce finished cloth.

Dr. Li was amused recently when, being shown through an East German synthetic fiber factory, his guide explained that the whole process was originally developed just before World War II by some "Japanese scientist" whose name he couldn't remember.

Intellectuals and the Revolution

To a certain extent, there was some basis for the warning that Dr. Li's friends gave when he contemplated "going North." At that time they told him that Communists were against intellectuals, especially Koreans trained in Japan. In fact this mistrust of intellectuals, and especially those whose education and careers had been acquired in capitalist countries, has been prevalent at one time or another in all the socialist countries, and did much harm. That Korea was no exception is clear from a speech by Kim Il Sung, "Improving the Party's Organizational Work" on November 2, 1951. That he put his finger on this weakness so early, and at the height of the war, is as creditable as it is surprising in view of his long isolation from any real contact with urban intellectuals, and his own uncompromising attitude toward anything connected with Japanese imperialism.

'More prejudices are held against intellectuals who studied under Japanese imperialist rule than against the new intellectuals who have been trained in the six years since liberation," said Premier Kim in introducing the subject. "They have been

remolded noticeably in the past six years and have displayed devotion and initiative in the course of democratic construction. The overwhelming majority of them have fought courageously during the war. Many of them went down as far as the Rakdong river [the southernmost limit of the KPA's advance, and which formed the northern perimeter of the Pusan beachhead] to fight the enemy, and during the temporary retreat, they followed our Party, overcoming all difficulties. What else do we have to demand of these intellectuals and why should we distrust them? We should promote them boldly, without suspecting them, inspire them to render active service to the country and the people, and remold them thoroughly into people's intellectuals.

"There is nothing wrong in intellectuals having acquired knowledge and technique in the past. They are now passing on this knowledge to workers and peasants, and have played a big role in rebuilding factories and other enterprises since the liberation.

"The service rendered by the intellectuals is great. They are not to blame for their parents having been landlords or capitalists.

"Some intellectuals think: 'We belong to the transition period and will be replaced later by the new intellectuals.' They are wrong. If someone does not progress, he will be replaced. Whatever is old and stagnant is sure to be replaced by the new. That is the law of development of things. But those intellectuals who advance continuously in the direction that conforms to the requirements of the new society—who will reject and replace them? We expect the old intellectuals to advance continuously. We will continue to help them to advance."

Such a policy seems reasonable and realistic enough, but had there not been strong forces opposing it. Premier Kim would not have felt impelled to speak out as he did—and this speech was by no means the first or the last on this subject.

The Korean Way

The policy of juche (pronounced chew ché) is original, fundamental, and audacious, especially in its application; and difficult for some socialist states to understand and endorse. I think it can best be appreciated when it is understood that the Koreans claim it as suitable for their own country and under present conditions.

The first official reference to juche that appears in the translated works of Kim Il Sung was in a speech on December 28, 1955, "Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work." Kim Il Sung explains juche as "holding to the principle of the revolution and construction in conformity with the actual conditions at home and mainly by one's own efforts." Another way of expressing juche is that Korean problems should be dealt with in a Korean way. In economic construction the vynalon plant was obviously the bright, glowing symbol of juche.

"What is juche in the ideological work of our Party?" asked Kim Il Sung in the December 1955 speech. "We are not engaged in the revolution of another country, but in our Korean revolution. Precisely this, the Korean revolution, constitutes juche in the ideological work of our Party. Therefore, all ideological work without exception must be subordinated to the interests of the Korean revolution. When we study the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the history of the Chinese revolution, or the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, it is all for the purpose of carrying out our own revolution correctly."

The juche line undoubtedly grew out of Kim Il Sung's own experiences when he launched the anti-Japanese armed struggle, knowing full well that "he could depend on no outside help; that he had to "go it alone" in the most literal sense of the term. "Self reliance" then had to be the watchword. It needs to be emphasized that the juche line was formulated long before there was even the shadow of ideological dissensions between Peking and Moscow.

"Hearing us emphasizing the necessity of establishing *juche*," continued Kim, "some might simplify matters and form a wrong idea that we need not learn from foreign countries. But that would be quite wrong. We should learn from the positive experience of all the socialist countries.

"The important thing to know is the aim of this learning. The aim we pursue is to turn to good account in our Korean revolution, the advanced experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries." He then referred to quarrels between some party leaders during the war as to how political work should be carried on in the army. "Those from the Soviet Union insisted upon the Soviet method and those from China stuck to the Chinese method. Thus they quarrelled, some advocating the Soviet fashion and others approving the Chinese way. That was sheer nonsense. Whether one uses the right hand or the left; whether one uses a spoon or chopsticks at the table, it doesn't matter much. Irrespective of the way one eats the result is the same. ... At that time, the Party Central Committee maintained that we should learn both Soviet and Chinese methods and on this basis, work out a method of political work suitable to our actual conditions."

And then came the real cry from his heart which is the essence of *juche*. "Some advocate the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is it not high time to work out our own?" He then referred to the tendency of mechanically copying all sorts of tendencies from other socialist countries, even to the extent of putting Korean women into western dress, which clearly exasperated him. "When there are very graceful Korean costumes for our women why should they foresake them and put on dresses unbecoming to them?"

Patriotism and Internationalism

It is clear from this that the tendency in the West to see North Korea at first as a "Soviet satellite" at the outbreak of the 1950-53 war, then as a "Chinese satellite" in the immediate

postwar period, and later as having switched back to a "Moscow line," was quite erroneous. North Korea under Kim Il Sung followed and still follows a Korean line, just as North Vietnam, as I have consistently maintained in everything I have written about the latter country and its Workers' Party, follows a Vietnamese line. The Koreans object to the implication that they should "pick sides," and to the assumption that they follow any line other than that which accords with their own national interests. Does this mean they are against international solidarity? Kim Il Sung touched on this problem also in the speech referred to:

"Internationalism and patriotism are inseparably linked with each other. . . . The love of Korean Communists for their own country does not run counter to the internationalism of the working class but conforms fully with it. To love Korea is as good as to love the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, and likewise to love the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, means loving Korea. ... It would be wrong to advocate patriotism alone and neglect international solidarity. . . . Thus patriotism and internationalism are inseparable. He who does not love his own country cannot be loyal to internationalism, and he who is unfaithful to internationalism cannot be faithful to his own country and people. A true patriot is an internationalist and vice versa. If we cast aside all that is good in our country, and only copy and memorize foreign things in ideological work, it will certainly cause harm to our revolution and thereby prevent us from properly carrying out our internationalist obligations to the international revolutionary cause."

The juche line in specific relation to the dissensions within the socialist camp was developed in greater detail in a major speech in October 1966, but the basic guiding lines were laid down in December 1955. It became the anchor of internal and external policies and the main line of economic development. I«e use of national resources for national needs; the development of skills strictly related to these resources and needs; the drive for self-reliance in skills and techniques to the utmost

degree, were stressed in every visit I made to factories and educational establishments.

Juche Tractors and Locomotives

The development of a Korean tractor is a typical example. Soon after the war a plant had been started from scratch to produce farm tools, built on the site of a former small chemical plant which the Americans had wiped out with some 3,000 bombs. As usual, not even a single building was left. When Kim Il Sung came down to get the project moving, the discussion took place under a few trees that had survived. In the first years the plant turned out hand tools, sickles, hoes and rakes; then moved up to ox-drawn implements, ploughs, harrows and seed-drills; and then power-driven chaff-cutters and other fodder cutting and crushing machines.

"On October 10, 1958, Premier Kim came down to see us again," said Mun Kwang Yok, the 40-year-old manager of the plant. "He explained that, with the development of the cooperative farms, the country was going to need tractors. He asked us to produce them with our own techniques, materials and efforts in the *juche* spirit of self-reliance. So we set to work. We had many difficulties; we had no blueprints, no experience, no equipment for that sort of work and not nearly enough skilled workers. Some conservatives here said it was impossible to build complicated machines in a country with such a backward technological level. But our whole collective set to work. We got hold of an imported model and took it to bits. From that we drew blueprints and workers here or in other plants started making the parts. We had all sorts of setbacks. We had 32 failures in casting the head, before one came out right. Even such a simple thing as making a headlight had us baffled. It was an old handicraft worker who solved that by making a mould and beating the headlights into shape with a hammer. It took him one week to make the first one and his right hand was swollen to twice its size before he finished. Grinding the crank-

shaft down to the required tolerance was another major problem. We had no grinding machines but we rigged up a push-pull grinding gadget, the workers standing on each side and hauling back and forth on ropes.

"By such methods we made our first tractor. When we put everything together we had great difficulty in getting the engine started, but finally it started up with a great roar and all our workers and thousands of peasants gathered to see it make its first run. To our great embarrassment it would only go backward; someone had made a mistake in assembling the gears. We corrected that and just 35 days after Premier Kim had given us the task, we drove our first hand-made tractor into Pyongyang for him to see. He was delighted and regarded this as a real victory for juche. When he came to us in 1958 he said we had to liberate the peasants from the hard life of our ancestors. 'Our parents lived in straw huts and wore A-frames* on their backs to haul ploughs,' he said. 'Let's put the A-frames in the museums for our children to recall how hard the life of their ancestors was.'"

Once the first model was made, the parts were put into mass production and output was gradually stepped up to produce over 5,000 standard 28-horsepower tractors a year plus a few hundred big 75-horsepower units for adapting as bulldozers and for heavy work in the forests. Having turned out enough to provide an average of five tractors to every cooperative farm throughout the country, tractors from this plant are now working in the ricefields of North Vietnam and Cambodia, where they are highly appreciated, compared to other models, because they are specially tailored for work in the mud and slush of paddy fields.

A similar development to that of the tractor plant took place at the Pyongyang electric locomotive factory. Under the Japanese, this had been a machinery repair shop. After the libera-

* An A-shaped wooden frame which Korean peasants customarily wore on their backs for carrying heavy loads or hauling ploughs when there were no draught animals.

tion, it was devoted to repairing locomotives and rolling stock. During the war, the plant itself was destroyed but a major part of the equipment had been moved out into tunnels in time. Locomotive and rolling stock repair departments continued to function underground and played a major role in keeping supplies moving by rail during the war. The factory was rebuilt afterward and started not only to repair but to manufacture passenger and freight cars.

"In 1959 Premier Kim came to see us and asked us to manufacture electric locomotives," said Pak Su Bom, the director of the plant. "He asked us to do this by our own technique and efforts, based on the *juche* policy of self-reliance. We had no experience of such a job and no blueprints. Comparatively few countries in the world manufacture electric locomotives. We had to design one taking into account the very special characteristics of our country, steep gradients and many curves. It took us six months to complete the design. We had enormous difficulties, but from the time we completed the design, it took us just under a year to produce our first electric locomotive."

At present capacity, the plant turns out 30 electric locomotives a year, each 120 tons, powered by six 530-kilowatt motors, which enable them to haul up to 2,700 tons at 75 miles per hour on level terrain, 1,200 tons in the mountains. Output at the plant also included seventy 75-horsepower diesel locomotives for mining and forestry work; fifty 45-ton passenger cars; 8,000 tons of spare parts for steam locomotives; and the plant undertakes the repair of the whole country's rolling stock.

As in every other heavy industrial plant I visited, the proportion of women workers was about 30 per cent (1,200 women out of a work force of 3,700), reflecting the heavy toll the war had taken of Korean men. Eight hundred of the total labor force were engineers and specialists, and of the engineers 35 were women. The plant had its own hospital, a 500-room hostel for those who preferred to live on the spot, nurseries with 500 beds and kindergarten space for 500 children, and a higher technical school. "Self-reliance," as in most other plants I visited,

had been applied not only in dealing with new and very complicated production assignments, but in welfare facilities that included bath-houses, laundries, hairdressers, and all sort of shops, including tailors and dressmakers.

Juche, as a line applied to building up the country by their own efforts, is one which eminently fits the Korean psychology. It was the sort of challenge that appeals to Korean pride, courage and national traditions. It has succeeded on a most impressive scale. The all-Korean nature of the economy, from consumer goods to heavy industry, and the fantastic speed with which everything has been accomplished, is the best proof of this.

REUNIFICATION?

Reunification is the dominant thought in the minds of all with whom I spoke in the North. The great waves of demonstrations for unification that unfold from time to time in the South seem to indicate the same feeling there. It was one of the main themes at the 1967 May Day parade in Pyongyang, in the speech from the reviewing stand and in the speeches and toasts at the celebrations which followed. Huge posters all over the capital, the provincial cities and villages, and in every factory I visited, dwelt with the themes of reunification, defense, and solidarity with Vietnam. But those for reunification far outnumbered all others. It is a theme on which everyone speaks with great passion; above all, those with families in the South from whom it has been impossible to even receive a postcard for over 20 years. Apart from the political and economic catastrophe of a country artificially divided, there is the sheer human tragedy of hundreds of thousands of families, separated by the military demarcation line, who can never exchange a word, let alone a visit.

Mak Yong Man, head of the Faculty of Geography at the Kim Il Sung University, like Dr. Li Sung Gi, came North after the outbreak of war. One of the few geographers in the South, he had tried hard, from 1945 onward, to found a Geography Faculty at Seoul University. His proposals were turned down because he was a suspected "progressive," so Seoul University was without a Geography Faculty until 1961. Mak Yong Man worked as an ordinary schoolteacher until he got the chance to come North. Within two months, he was installed at the Geography Faculty in Pyongyang, and given the task of heading a team to survey the possibility of reclaiming tidelands for agri-

culture. Preliminary research started during the war, actual on-the-spot surveying as soon as the war ended.

"From 1953 to 1956," Mak Yong Man told me, "we had surveyed the whole west coast from the mouth of the Yalu to the mouth of the Raesong river which marks the demarcation line. We found it was possible to reclaim 300,000 hectares of land, of which 125,000 were suitable for rice cultivation. But as a scientist, it was very frustrating to halt the work at the Raesong river, because south of the river, in our own country, we knew were more hundreds of thousands of hectares waiting to be reclaimed. Personally it was frustrating too: in our team were two young men from Kanghwa island, in the mouth of the Raesong. Their families were still there. They could look across the water and see people walking about—perhaps their parents were among them—but they could not even cry greetings back and forth.

I asked about his own family. "My wife was just about to give birth to our fourth child when the fighting for Seoul started," he said. "I had sent her to a safe place with the other children. With the battle raging we got separated. The only word I got was from a friend who came North just after me and told me the baby, a girl, was born safely. If they are still living I have a daughter 28 years old, two sons 23 and 20, and the 17-year-old daughter I have never seen. I can't even imagine what the children look like now; we could pass in the streets without recognizing each other. When I think of them I can't suppress my hatred of the Americans for keeping our country divided. You can multiply my case by tens of thousands."

ROK Deserters from Vietnam

Another aspect of the situation was that presented by two former ROK soldiers I met in Pyongyang. They had recently arrived from South Vietnam, where they had deserted from the

ROK army, passed over to the NLF of South Vietnam and asked to be repatriated to North Korea. What they told of life in South Korea today sounded just like "the old days under the Japanese," which prefaces any description by a North Korean of life today compared with a past which has become a bad memory only.

Pak Song Ryol is from a poor peasant family in a village in North Chungchong province. His parents work for landlords just as in the "bad old days" in the North. He was the only one of five children to have even two years of schooling; the rest have none. Over 80 per cent of the peasants in his village work for the landlords. For four to five months a year, in what is known as the "lean, spring season," they eat wild grasses and roots because the rice has run out.

Pak went to Seoul to work as a shoeshine boy at 14. He eventually got a job in a factory that made scales, weights and measures, sending most of his wages back to his family. When he reached 20 years of age he got a conscription notice and had to join the army. After four weeks' training, he was sent to a forward position near the Demilitarized Zone on the east coast, attached to the 15th division. His pay was less than the equivalent of a dollar a month. His mother wrote to say she and the children were starving without his earnings. Pak deserted, ran away to Seoul, earned money as a shoeshine boy and sent it home. Two weeks later, his mother turned up in Seoul to say the military police had come and said if he did not report for duty immediately his four brothers would be killed. There was no alternative but to report back to the 15th division. He was beaten up and jailed for 8 months.

Another letter asking for help came from his mother, by now bed-ridden and dying from hunger. Pak said, "I decided I must get away so I dropped a huge boulder on my foot, hoping to get my discharge. No one could prove it was not an accident. I spent three months in a hospital but, since the bone was not crushed, I was sent back to my unit. Then at midnight one night I was awakened and told I was going to

Vietnam. I was transferred to the Tiger Division. Two of my comrades protested and refused to go. They were dragged before the whole company, made to lie down and the company commander, Captain Jong Bong Ryu, beat them unconscious with a club. Then they were dragged off to be court-martialled, we were told, but we heard nothing more of them." At the first chance he got, after arriving in South Vietnam, Pak deserted and contacted the NLF.

I asked if he had known anything at all about life in North Korea. Pak said that because he was stationed in a coastal area, he had heard lots of stories from fishermen about big, new cities they could see from their fishing grounds; that when they accidentally met fishermen from the North they were always well-dressed, had good fishing equipment and were very friendly.

I asked about his first impressions of the North. "In the South at this time, it is the 'lean spring season,'" he said, "and all the people in my village will be out looking for roots and edible grass. But here in the North, they are eating rice on the farms. In the South, only the landlords' houses have tiled roofs. Here every village I have seen has only tiled roofs. And they all have electricity. There are no villages with electricity in the South."

"What else surprised you in the North?" I asked Pak.

"Tractors working in the fields," he said. "In our village of about one hundred households, only five have oxen. The rest either pull the ploughs themselves or hire oxen from the landlords. For every day you use the landlord's ox, you have to give him one day's work, as well as giving him about 60 per cent of the crop."

He spoke of the police terror in the village, in Seoul and in the army, different levels of spies and secret agents, so many of them that you never revealed your secret thoughts even to your closest friend.

As to what he was going to do in the North, Pak gave a huge smile and said that, as he had once worked in a scales, weights

and measures plant in the South, he was being given a job in a precision instruments plant in Pyongyang and would take a course in general education.

An Hak Su, Pak's fellow deserter, was a typical urban dweller, very different from the rough-spoken, peasant Pak with his stubby fingers and calloused hands. An had volunteered for service in Vietnam because volunteers were promised 100 U.S. dollars a month and he hoped to save enough money to study. He was in a medical unit which, he was told, would serve only the South Vietnamese civilian population.

He was among the many millions of unemployed when he was conscripted into the army. "It is impossible for a young person to get a job in Seoul unless he has some financial guarantee and a discharge certificate from the ROK army," he said. He knew nothing about North Korea except what the Seoul press and radio said. But when he got to Vietnam he found he had been lied to. First, he got no pay for the first four months, after counting the days until he'd get his first 100 dollars. Secondly when he did get paid, it was only 30 dollars a month. The Korean soldiers had already borrowed more than that from the ROK Embassy in Saigon and so were heavily in debt all the time. Thirdly, they treated ROK troops in their medical unit and not Vietnamese civilians. Finally, An found that it was not the "Vietcong" whom the Vietnamese people feared but the Americans and the Saigon troops. "I saw that I had been cheated all the time," he said, "and so probably I had been cheated about the northern half of my own country. I had some contact with Vietnamese civilians and they helped me to contact the NLF. I was afraid the latter might kill me but in fact the NLF troops treated me like a brother. They risked their lives to protect me during bombing raids and helped me to come to the North."

When I asked what he had known about the North, he said: "We were told that 'everything is destroyed; people are in rags and starving, living in caves and tunnels; nothing was rebuilt, there are no real jobs, only forced labor.' Now I've visited

factories and farms and for the first time I see the great strength of our nation. I realize what we could do if our whole nation of 40 millions was united." An Hak Su had been accepted by the Kim Il Sung University and was engaged in preliminary studies for a course in political economy starting in the 1967-68 scholastic year.

Both young men had laid special stress on the police nature of the regime in the South. An said he had not dared confide in anyone his doubts and worries; it was impossible even to mention one word of his awakened interest in the North, far less his intention to desert. "The army is riddled with police agents," he said, "and if you want to survive, you keep your thoughts to yourself."

The Police-Ridden State

South Korea, statistically, must be one of the most police-ridden states in the world. Most of the police, like most of the laws they are paid to enforce, are directed against moves, and even thoughts, to unify the country. Under Rhee's regime, which came to an abrupt end with a mass uprising against him on April 19, 1960, people were encouraged to talk about reunification. But Rhee's formula for reunification was the "march to the North." The present president, *Pak Jung Hi*, made it a crime to talk, write or think about reunification. He considers it "premature," the armed forces are not yet strong enough, so people's thoughts must not be turned in that direction. Pak is a former officer in the Japanese army, and one had to be a really devoted and efficient traitor to gain admittance into such company. Records show that president Pak took part in 110 Japanese punitive expeditions against his fellow countrymen in Korea itself and in Manchuria.

General *Pak Jung Hi* first came to power in May 1961, by a military coup directed against Rhee's immediate successor, John Chang. Chang had been South Korea's former ambassador to Washington and was considered by the CIA to be "too soft" on reunification. In time, using the same methods and

machinery that Syngman Rhee perfected, Pak consolidated his power. He removed his uniform to calm Washington's sensitivity to critics of military dictatorships and became an "elected civilian president."

According to data in the South Korean press, Pak is one of the most prolific law-makers in history, about one law per day having been enacted during his first six years of office. The severest of them are aimed at plugging any gaps in the total ban on acts or thoughts about reunification. There are laws with such finely nuanced differences as "special law on punishing special crimes," and "special law on punishing specific crimes," and "law on outdoor assemblies and demonstrations," among hundreds of others for the general public. For those that deal professionally in the written and spoken word there are the "law on newspapers and news agencies," and "law on radio broadcasting." There are laws for "controlling violence," for "purification of political activities," "political movements," "restriction of citizenship of offenders against democracy." There are laws for organized workers, such as "registration of social organizations," and "regulation of labor disputes." Two very special "anti-communist" and "state security" laws—the latter one enacted by Rhee but improved on by Pak—cover anything the others might have omitted, as instruments for hauling citizens before the torture and execution squads. Over 3,000 such laws so far are credited to President *Pak Jung Hi*.

Experts in such matters assure me that the "anti-communist" law far outdoes the "law on maintenance of public security," introduced by the Japanese, or Rhee's original "state security" law. Pak's law stigmatizes individuals or members of organizations advocating the peaceful reunification of the country as "political criminals" subject to capital punishment. Under Article I, paragraph 4 of this law, organizations which "wittingly or unwittingly" praise or show sympathy for the North will be declared "anti-state organizations" and their members, as well as people who praise or support such organizations, shall be severely punished. Under Article IV, paragraph 2, any person

writing an article calling for peaceful reunification, or any person who keeps such articles or pamphlets in their possession, may be jailed for seven years. Under Article V of the "special law on punishing special crimes," persons who communicate with anyone in the North, may be jailed for up to seven years on charges of "acting in the interest of anti-state organizations or communist circles outside the country." On the political level, this precludes any form of North-South contact at any level between individuals or organizations for any purpose whatsoever; in human terms, it makes even North-South letter-writing between husband and wife, or parents and children, a state crime.

The total ban on any North-South contacts is attacked from so many sides that no loopholes are left. Article I of the "state security" law provides that members of political parties who advocate North-South talks, economic and cultural exchanges, or post and telegraphic communications, can be punished by from five years in prison to death. Persons who "praise, sympathize with, encourage or support the activities of such organizations or members of such anti-state organizations or groups," according to the same article, may be sentenced to 10 years, life imprisonment or death.

Of course the most heinous crime in President Pak's view is that of "conducting agitation or propaganda for the purpose of overthrowing the government." The "special law on punishing specific crimes" condemns such offenders to a minimum of five years in prison and a maximum of death. Under the same law, up to 10 years in prison may be handed down to anyone inventing a "lie" about the government, or anyone "wittingly" spreading such a lie. Under other laws previously listed, permission to form any organization, group or circle must be obtained from the police; prior police approval must be had even to raise the question of a labor dispute.

The fact that the United States has still succeeded in presenting a regime which needs such laws for its survival as "free world" Korea is a triumph for their propaganda machinery; the fact that UNCURK finds in the *Pak Jung Hi* regime an "en-

couraging sign of democracy" shows how far the United Nations representation in South Korea has strayed from any respect for the UN Charter.

To enforce such laws, a massive apparatus of repression and informers is obviously needed. In factories it is estimated there is one police agent for every 15 workers; in higher education establishments, one for every eight students. Thirty-seven different intelligence organizations work at Seoul University. In terms of regular police per capita, the present regime has twice as many as the Japanese had at the height of their repressive rule in Korea, and three times as many as in the United States and Britain today. And Pak is planning to double the force within the next few years. That is regular police only. In the 10 sections of the Bureau of Internal Security of the Ministry of the Interior, directly under the control of U.S. advisers, there are 320,000 full-time paid police agents apart from the 40,000 regular police.

Coordinating all intelligence activities is the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency which is nominally under the direct control of Pak Jung Hi but in fact is subordinated to the Seoul branch of the American CIA. It has 15,000 staff members and 370,000 full-time agents. One of its branches is the Counter-intelligence Corps which works inside the ROK army with 20,000 agents.

The repressive machinery is not only aimed against the masses of the population, but is used as a private instrument for eliminating rivals to power. Thus in the third presidential "election" on May 15, 1956, Cho Bang Am, who dared stand against Syngman Rhee as head of the Progressive Party, polled 2,160,000 votes on a policy of peaceful reunification of the country, suggesting he might be a powerful rival in the next election. On February 27, 1959, Rhee had him arrested under the "state security" law and he was later executed. Shin Ik Hi, who represented the Democratic Party in the same election, died mysteriously in a train while on his final election tour 10 days before polling day.

In the next election, on March 15, 1960, Cho Bung Ok, successor to Cho Bang Am, and Syngman Rhee's rival as presidential candidate, died of an unknown disease in an American hospital one month before election day. As in the case of Shin Ik Hi, it was too late for the Democratic Party to present another candidate.

This form of politics has continued right up to the present. In May 1967, the first act of Pak Jung Hi after having been "re-elected" by the usual methods, was to arrest a rival candidate, Oh Jai Jung, for "violation of the electoral law." Oh had criticized Pak for his role in a well-known corruption scandal. Within a few more days, Pak arrested 83 opposition politicians who had announced their candidacies in forthcoming national assembly elections.

The Pak regime can claim credit not only as the world's fastest law-maker but also as the fastest law enforcer. In 1961, the year of Pak's military coup, the various courts handled 715,000 cases, 100,000 people having been arrested in the month following the coup. One judge of the Seoul district court disposed of a thousand cases a day for the two months of January and February 1962. The official Hapdong news agency reported on June 5 of that year that the "highest record in history of summary trials," 5,196 cases or one every 16 seconds, had been dealt with in the Seoul summary court the previous day. It is estimated that in the first two years of Pak's rule, at least one person in every 15 of the entire population of South Korea was punished by imprisonment or worse.

Apparently, Pak Jung Hi fears that the expansion of his forces of repression is not keeping pace with the growth of resistance which showed alarming strength in the 1964-65 demonstrations against the Japan-ROK Treaty. The strength of internal resistance is one of the reasons that Pak is planning to bring his old Japanese masters back into South Korea under the guise of "mutual defense."

North's Unification Policy

As to what the North can do in a practical way to facilitate the peaceful unification of the country and how this problem is viewed officially, I had a long talk in Pyongyang with members of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, who set forth their position as follows:

"Reunification should be brought about by the Korean people in a democratic, peaceful way. The best thing would be to set up a Unified Central Government through general, free elections in North and South Korea. But for this all foreign troops must be withdrawn from South Korea. Withdrawal is a pre-condition for the peaceful unification of the country. In order to have free, nation-wide elections the people of North and South must be able to express themselves freely, which they cannot do if half the country is under foreign occupation. We maintain that any political party or social organization should have absolute freedom to carry out their activities in the whole of Korea. People should be allowed to travel freely in the North and South to see things for themselves and judge matters accordingly. Only in such a way can people freely decide for themselves. If general elections were held in such a free atmosphere, then a unified, democratic government could be set up by general elections carried out by secret ballot, with all political parties free to campaign in all parts of the country.

"This is our fundamental position on the question of Korean reunification. But the South Korean authorities, with U.S. backing, have always obstructed the realization of our proposals.' In fact they should have nothing to fear if they are really for democracy, the population in the South being more than twice that in the North. But, as the South Korean authorities reject these proposals, we have repeatedly suggested transitional measures which would be short of complete reunification.

"For instance, a Confederation of North and South Korea could be set up by establishing first a Supreme National Committee, comprised of an equal number of representatives ap-

pointed by both sides, leaving intact for the time being the existing social and political systems of the DPRK and South Korea, and insuring the independent activity of both sides. The Supreme National Committee could however coordinate in a unified way economic and cultural development and could represent Korea as a whole in external affairs. Such a Confederation would not amount to complete reunification, but would create a favorable atmosphere for further steps toward this.

"This proposal was also rejected by the South Korean authorities, so we proposed setting up an Economic Committee, independent of political affairs, to handle trade and economic affairs between North and South. We proposed economic exchanges because in the North, as a result of the simultaneous development of light industry and agriculture with priority for heavy industry, we have laid down firm foundations for a strong, independent, national economy. We think that if we can organically connect the economies of North and South Korea, we can solve the problem of living standards for the South Korean people as well as those in the North. These problems could be solved by setting up such an Economic Committee.

"This proposal was also rejected. So we proposed to share with the South Korean people some of the economic gains we have made in the North. We proposed economic aid to the South, to build industries there, to supply food and consumer goods. Specifically, in 1964 we offered, for a start, to supply South Korea every year with 100,000 tons of rolled steel; 1,000 million kilowatt hours of electricity; 10,000 tons of chemical fibers; 300,000 tons of rice, as well as large quantities of cement, timber, machinery and other goods. This was refused and South Korean politicians and journalists advocating acceptance were arrested and some were even executed.

"We also made concrete suggestions to lessen the tense situation and accelerate the pace of reunification. If U.S. troops were withdrawn from the South as all foreign troops have been from the North, we could conclude a mutual treaty of peace and non-aggression, reducing the numerical strength of our

armed forces in North and South respectively to 100,000 or less, thus taking a considerable load off the economies of both parts of the country. And if the South abrogates its military treaties with the United States, we will likewise abrogate ours with foreign states. These proposals were also rejected.

"We thought at least some minimum steps could be taken to restore broken ties, so we suggested that post and telegraphic communications be reestablished. We send and receive letters and telegrams from all over the world, from places tens of thousands of miles away, but not from our compatriots only a stone's throw distant. But even this was not accepted.

"We are ready and able to give work to the unemployed in the South, to look after the war orphans and provide education for students who are unable to finance their studies, just as we finance the studies of thousands of Korean students in Japan. But we had the usual answer to that also.

"We are not against international mediation on reunification. We have proposed a North-South conference with each side nominating an equal number of foreign countries to take part on their respective sides to facilitate agreement. This too was turned down.

These proposals have all been incorporated into official documents at one time or another, the latest occasion being Kim Il Sung's written reply on January 4, 1967, to the President of the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington. In this latter document, incidentally, Kim Il Sung said that, "if the South Korean authorities take an independent stand even today,' abandoning their policy of relying on outside forces, we may hold talks with them too, in a neutral country or at any other place agreed upon."

North Korea is economically strong enough today that it could absorb a large proportion of the millions of unemployed in the South. It could immediately finance the construction of scores of factories; complete industrial units are already being exported to countries in Africa. A united Korea could quickly be built up into a really strong and prosperous economic unit,

completely independent of foreign capital. Instead, English language newspapers published in Seoul for the May 1967 presidential elections contained several pages of advertisements of leading Japanese banks. The Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumimoto groups urged readers to support "Pak Jung Hi for stability." Over a hundred leading Japanese monopolies, the same who bled Korea white in the old days, are already back in Seoul; the floodgates opened for Japanese capital with the signing of the Japan-South Korea treaty.

An Internal Task

While continuing to press for any moves that can lessen tension, the North Korean leaders are also preparing for other means to bring about reunification. These include strengthening the revolutionary forces in the South; pushing ahead with the industrial buildup in the North; and strengthening their military forces to, in the event of an attack, hit back and wipe out the Pak Jung Hi regime.

In his speech to a Workers' Party conference on October 5, 1966, Kim Il Sung said that now the revolutionary base in the North "had grown into an invincible force; victory in the country as a whole depends largely on the strengthening of the revolutionary forces in *South Korea* . . . The basic line of the revolution in South Korea at the present stage is to preserve their forces from the enemy's suppression and, at the same time, constantly accumulate and expand them for the decisive period in the revolution. . . . There may be various ways and means of accomplishing national unification. But whatever may be the concrete ways and means, the country must in any case be unified independently by the Korean people themselves and it cannot be otherwise. Korean unification is an internal affair of the Korean nation, the United Nations have no right to meddle in it . . . To try to accomplish unification by relying on outside forces is an illusion, it will only perpetuate the division of the nation and bring about its enslavement."

In my conversation with Premier Kim Il Sung, after referring me to the documents which set out the various initiatives on peaceful reunification, he said the following:

"We fought for three years against the Americans. We know what they are. We learned during our own war, and again from the experience of the Vietnamese, not to be afraid of U.S. imperialism. If they invade us again, we in the North are fully prepared to fight back. As for the people in the South, it is the same thing. They also have plenty of experience from their past struggles. There was the peasant war of 1894 which started in the South during the feudal period. There were many struggles against Japanese occupation that started in the South. The March First uprising in 1919 started in the South. When we fought the Americans, hundreds of thousands of South Korean youths volunteered to fight shoulder to shoulder with us. After the armistice agreements, it was the revolt of the South Korean people on April 19, 1960, which resulted in the overthrow of Syngman Rhee. The South Korean people are well-tested in struggle and this was shown again by their fight against the Japan-ROK treaty. Mass discontent over the dispatch of troops to South Vietnam also increases every day. I think there will be a great stepping up of the struggle of our compatriots in the South against the puppet regime of Pak Jung Hi.

"We still maintain our policy for the peaceful reunification of the country. But if American forces invade us again, the revolutionary forces in the North will unite with those of the South to wipe them out, and thus accelerate our country's reunification.

"The situation is tense—of course our people are not scared by this tension either. But it is why at our Party Conference (October 1966) we decided to continue building up the economy parallel with our military defenses until the moment war breaks out—if it comes to that. In any case, when the revolutionary forces in North and South have been still further strengthened, victory will be ours. Our country will be reunified."

These were the sentiments I heard wherever I went in North Korea.

KOREA-VIETNAM

That there should be 50,000 South Korean troops shedding their blood for U.S. interests in South Vietnam is in the nature of things, considering the vassal relationship of the Seoul regime to Washington. It is the fruition of the old Dulles dream of "Asians fighting Asians." In April 1954 when the late John Foster Dulles tried to organize an international army of intervention to save French colonialism in Indochina, he offered two ROK divisions, "already in the bag." Of the dozen countries approached, only one other country, my native Australia, offered to join. As the ROK troops were American armed, clad and paid, and most of Rhee's budget was American financed, it was hardly surprising that Dulles was able to extract this offer. But the scheme failed when Then Bien Phu fell. Shortly after, the French government responsible for events that led to Then Bien Phu also fell.

It took another 11 years and an ail-American policy in Vietnam to get two ROK divisions and a few Australian battalions fighting America's battles in Indochina. It is the first time in history that Korean troops have been used as mercenaries in a foreign war, although in 1956 Rhee offered to send troops to help the British and French fight Egypt over Suez. And in 1967, Pak Jung Hi sent a military advisory group to Rhodesia.

"Asians fighting Asians" is a paying proposition from the U.S. viewpoint. Estimates have been published to show that it costs \$45.57 a day to keep an American soldier in the field, and only \$1.25 for a South Korean.

Parallel Wars

In North Korea, the Vietnamese war is seen as a second edition of their own war, except the United States has no UN flag to hide behind this time. For a Korean, the problem seems so completely identical that it is accepted not as demagoguery but as simple truth when the leadership says: "The Vietnamese war is also our war." Vietnam is also a country divided against its will. It has a 17th parallel instead of a 38th. And if the U.S. government was not responsible for a line being drawn along the 17th parallel, at least it was clearly responsible for its becoming a permanent barrier dividing country and people. In both cases, the lines were drawn temporarily at international conferences for quite plausible reasons and perpetuated by U.S. trickery: for Korea's 38th parallel, to facilitate the disarming and dismantling of the Japanese occupation regime; for Vietnam's 17th parallel, to facilitate a separation of combatant forces to make a ceasefire effective. In both cases, once the lines were made quasi-permanent, the United States built up armed forces in the southern areas with an avowed aim of annexing the northern areas by force. In both cases the United States rejected the most elementary, democratic procedure by which the whole people of these countries could have expressed their will and had a regime of their own choosing. Both countries have been subjected by the same enemy to merciless bombings and other atrocities that amount to attempted genocide against their peoples.

In South Vietnam, the United States has concentrated over one third of its standing armed forces to subjugate the *South* Vietnamese people and prop up the puppet regime in Saigon; in South Korea the United States retains important forces to subjugate the South Korean people and prop up the puppet regime in Seoul.* Just one half of the United States armed

* The "UN" Command in South Korea is in fact the U.S. 8th Army which includes the U.S. 2nd and 7th Infantry Divisions, the U.S. 314th

forces, including all its elite divisions, are concentrated against the Korean and Vietnamese people.

The instrument originally conceived to use against Vietnam was SEATO; that which the U.S. experts are working to get together to use against the Korean people is NEATO, consisting of the United States as the senior partner, and Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as the junior partners. This concept lay dormant for a long time because of popular opposition in both Japan and South Korea to the conclusion of a Japan-ROK Treaty. Once that was signed, the concept was revived with Pak Jung Hi's visit to Taiwan in February 1966, and the Seoul Ministerial Conference of Asian and Pacific Countries in June of that year.

SEATO failed because of the reluctance of a number of its members, especially France and Pakistan, to risk burning their fingers in pulling exclusively American chestnuts out of the fire. But with NEATO, it is hoped to stimulate enthusiasm among the junior partners by sharing with them a few of the chestnuts. The United States already has bilateral military pacts with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. This means that the equipment, training and system of military command of the junior partners are standard—and American. A "Northeast Asian Army" could be organized in no time, with the component parts smoothly integrated. Plans call for this army to be under Japanese command, just as NATO ground forces are under a German general, but operating under overall U.S. command.

The Americans have learned from their failure to convert SEATO into a docile instrument of U.S. policy in Indochina. A senior member, France, rebelled because it was being asked to expend blood and treasure to facilitate the American takeover of its own interests in Indochina. Such a mistake is not to be repeated in NEATO; Japan and Taiwan are being offered

Air Division, the U.S. 4di Missile Unit, the U.S. 38th Anti-aircraft Brigade-and one company of Thai troops.

a solid share in the plunder of South Korea. But north of the 38th parallel, there is still an independent, economically and militarily strong North Korea; north of the 17th parallel there is still an independent, economically and militarily strong North Vietnam. Both have leaderships very well experienced in defending the national patrimony.

Historical Parallels

Korea and Vietnam are both ancient countries with age-old civilizations. They were unified states long before the United States existed; their capital cities existed as capitals long before Washington was built. Both countries are peninsula appendages of Asia. Throughout their history they have waged heroic, and in the main successful, struggles to preserve their independence. If they temporarily lost their independence, at least they preserved their national heritage; their very distinctive cultures, their language, traditions and customs, their arts and music, even their national dress. Both countries suffered from modern imperialism; the Vietnamese from French and Japanese versions, the Koreans from the Japanese; both now from U.S. imperialism.* Both Korea and Vietnam fought the dual battles against

* It is a historical irony that Korea's first brush with imperialism was with the United States. In August 1866, the General Sherman, an armed merchant boat, dropped anchor at the mouth of the Taedong river, and its Captain Preston demanded to proceed to the interior. "Though our ship appears to be a warship, we entertain no ill designs. We are interested only in peaceful trade," Preston is reported to have said. Trade with the United States was prohibited in those days and Korean court officials were sent aboard to refuse permission for the vessel to proceed further. But Preston weighed anchor and sailed upstream as far as Pyongyang, firing his cannon as he went, to impress potential resisters. When again presented with demands to withdraw, he demanded gold, silver, ginseng (already famous for its aphrodisiac qualities) and 150 tons of rice. When this was refused, Preston opened fire on river shipping in the area. Guerrillas went out at night and set the ship afire; it sank with all hands aboard in the Taedong river just opposite Pyongyang. A couple of other U.S. warships came later and

their own feudal rulers and against foreign invaders; both bitterly experienced imperialism in its eastern and western forms. Thus the Koreans feel completely at one with the Vietnamese.

Next to reunification and construction, solidarity with Vietnam is the most important theme in North Korea. It is expressed by posters and slogans everywhere; in art forms, in theater, and mass calisthenic displays, but also in practical forms of very considerable aid for the Vietnamese people. In almost every factory I visited, part of the production was set aside for Vietnam. Sometimes a whole department or section of a department, in some cases individual machines, were working for Vietnam. Big posters over departments, sections or machines announce the fact. Tens of thousands of tons of chemical fertilizers, tractors, rolled steel, small turbines for generating rural electricity, diesel engines, have all been sent as gifts to the Vietnamese people. "They are fighting for us," is the simple and universal expression one hears in explanation.

The Korean people believe that even if the United States withdrew from Korea, as long as her forces remain anywhere on the Asian continent, there could be no lasting peace; there would always be the danger of a comeback attempt. If Vietnam fell, the Koreans believe that the full force of U.S. power and that of her Asian partners would be turned against them. It is for the above reasons that the question of Vietnam has been presented by the Korean leadership as second only to urgent internal problems.

Vietnam Yardstick

Kim Il Sung has insisted that the attitude toward Vietnam should be made the yardstick, even within the socialist camp,

tried to make landings on the Korean coast, ostensibly in search of the merchant marauder, but the landing attempts were repulsed. Two five-inch cannons from the General Sherman today adorn two of Pyongyang's historical museums.

of devotion to international revolutionary principles. He has also insisted that Vietnam should be the rallying point within the socialist camp and world progressive movement around which differences should be buried and a united front formed. "As soon as U.S. imperialism started armed aggression against Vietnam," he said in his report to the Workers' Party Conference in October 1966, "our Party proposed to wage an anti-imperialist joint struggle; to make a collective counter-attack on the aggressors. A number of other fraternal parties have proposed the same. . . . We consider that despite the differences over a number of questions, there is an initial basis for taking joint action in countering U.S. imperialist aggression against Vietnam and aiding the Vietnamese people . . .

"Refusal to take joint action against imperialism is not an attitude of truly opposing revisionism and defending the purity of Marxism-Leninism, nor an attitude of contributing to the strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp and the cohesion of the international communist movement, and cannot be regarded as an attitude of opposing U.S. imperialism and aiding the fighting Vietnamese people. The basic attitude of the world revolution today is to direct the spearhead of attack against U.S. imperialism. We must clearly distinguish the friend who has made an error from the foe. The foe should be beaten, whereas the friend who has made a mistake should be criticized to take the right path. We should in this way join efforts with all friends and fight the main enemy. . . .

"The united front policy of Communists in the past played an important role in mobilizing people for struggle against imperialist wars. In the historic conditions of today, when the world's socialist forces have grown stronger, there exist greater possibilities for joint anti-imperialist action on an international scale."

Korea has been very active in promoting the idea of volunteers for Vietnam and there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands of young people, some of the toughest fighters in the world, would leave tomorrow if the call went out. They would not

be ignorant and unwilling conscripts like South Korea's Pak Song Ryol or motivated by a "hundred dollars a month" like An Hak Su but, rather, highly politically conscious fighters with first-class military training, eager to settle old blood debts with the Americans, quick to adapt themselves to climate, jungle and food.

So far North Vietnam is not accepting volunteers. The original position of the North Vietnamese leadership was that other socialist countries should not suffer because of their troubles—"the blood shed should be Vietnamese blood and not that of the fraternal countries," as one of their leaders expressed it to me. With American escalation and threats of further escalation this attitude has changed. I was present in February 1967, when Premier Pham Van Dong told a foreign delegation to Hanoi that the question of international volunteers was being "very seriously considered," and that the time might very well come, and come quickly, when they would be accepted. If this time comes, it is certain that North Koreans will be in the very forefront of the most valiant, most effective and most highly motivated of such troops.

Why New Provocations?

Here we return to the question posed at the beginning of this book. All the evidence is that the sudden great increase of incidents in and around the demilitarized zone since the October 1966 visit of President Johnson, has been provoked by U.S. and ROK forces. I had gone to Korea thinking that perhaps the North Koreans as a gesture of solidarity with the Vietnamese were applying a certain amount of pressure to pin down U.S.-ROK troops in the South; to prevent any further dispatch of ROK troops to South Vietnam and to prevent the withdrawal of any U.S. forces. But all the evidence I found was to the contrary. But why? Would it not be suicidal for the Americans to take the initiative in opening up another front?

One explanation could be that the United States is serving

a warning that, despite the dispatch of two ROK divisions, their forces are still strong in South Korea and the North should not entertain any ideas of either putting pressures on the South or weakening their own defenses by sending volunteers to Vietnam. This is a feasible explanation, but I believe it is only part of the real reason and not the most important.

Real strategy seems aimed at building up incidents to a point where the DPRK is forced to take counter-measures. The charge of "aggression" would then be made and, as a very first step, Japanese forces would enter South Korea to take over the repressive role of ROK troops. Over half (330,000) of the ROK army of 600,000 troops are permanently earmarked for repressive activities in the rear areas. With Japanese forces taking over this role, another 100,000 or so ROK troops could be sent to *South* Vietnam. The ideal would be to dispatch Japanese troops directly to the battlefields of South Vietnam, but public opinion in Japan and abroad would not accept it. However, to maintain security against a "communist threat" on the soil of Japan's treaty partner in South Korea is another thing. Premier Sato in Japan is working hard to get public opinion used to the idea that it would not breach the Constitution, which forbids the dispatch of troops overseas. This strategy could be put into operation as a preliminary move for the "Three Arrows" and "Flying Dragon" plans.

By pushing such provocations beyond the limits of tolerance, the United States is playing with fire. Things can move in two directions and American, ROK and Japanese forces could be caught up in a veritable whirlwind, the moment the latter were brought back to Korea with guns in their hands. Korea would certainly become a second Vietnam, but not in the sense desired by Washington's planning staffs. The first casualty would be the Military Demarcation Line.

ABUNDANT FRUITFUL ORCHARD

North Korea has been transformed into a remarkably beautiful and prosperous country, into that "abundant fruitful orchard" which, according to the imaginative words of General Chistiakov who commanded the liberating Soviet troops in August 1945, would take shape now that the Korean people had their destiny in their own hands. After they had defended a few years later, in an unprecedentedly devastating war, that which had been liberated, not only did the napalm-blackened mountains quickly turn green again; nature itself has been transformed.

Rivers have been disciplined and straightened out; arid stony slopes have been terraced and filled out with fertile soil. Trees have been planted by the millions; fruit trees on land and slopes too poor for grain crops; flowering trees on land too poor for fruit; trees on any gaps that remained. Korea is a land of nature-loving peasants. Villages are completely enfolded in greenery; at least half the space in towns is given over to parks and gardens. Both banks of the Taedong river at Pyongyang have been turned into tree-bordered embankments of lawns and flower beds. The rambling old river itself wherein lies the wreck of the General Sherman has been straightened and, when I was there, was being deepened to present an impressive, broad stretch of water, spanned by three new bridges and dotted with pleasure boats on Sundays.

Standing on the eastern bank and looking across the water, from the fine new theater built in classical style on the city's southern boundary to the almost completed TV tower which marks the northern boundary, the city presents an harmonious

profile of new and classical style buildings rising up from the embankment greenery.

A Throbbing Economy

Wherever one travels in the capital and outside it, one feels fertility and growth, the whole country fairly throbbing with vitality. In the capital itself, a new thermal power plant was being rushed to completion; the foundations were being set for a new skyscraper addition to the Kim Il Sung University. Outside the city, expansion work, amounting to double the existing capacities in some cases, was going on at every plant I visited; overhead power lines for electrification were being added to sections of the railway. New housing is going up in the villages as the state takes over home-building for the farmers, adobe homes built 13 years ago being torn down in favor of solid brick structures. Along the highways, surveyor teams work at straightening out roads and rivers and improving irrigation systems. Despite all that has been done, the country still seems to be a beehive of building activity. Everybody is working, but when one digs a bit deeper everyone seems to be studying also: farmers to improve their technical know-how and to acquire the consciousness of the new class into which they are being transformed; workers to become specialists; specialists to become engineers; children to become worthy heirs to all that was gained by the sufferings of their forefathers and built up, destroyed and built up again by their fathers and elder brothers.

One thing a visitor notes is that people work with great intensity. I have seen women planting out rice seedlings in many Asian countries but never at anything like the speed in today's Korea. But when they are not working, they are generally relaxed and in high good humor. I watched them in streets and shops, at bus stops or queuing for theater and cinema tickets. If people are being pushed a bit too far, it shows at such times. But there is relative absence of strain in

these faces. People's faces in the factories, farms and streets, are more important indices than reams of statistics and percentages. Chosen, "land of morning calm," as the Koreans call their land, is a happy country of well-fed, decently clad people in its northern half. For Asia this is almost a miracle. For an Asian country totally destroyed 14 years ago it is an absolute miracle.

Industrial consumer goods, all "made in Korea," are high priced in relation to salaries. But fundamentals, from rice to rents, are ridiculously cheap. When the government in the North says its citizens have no worries about housing, food, clothing, medical care, education and old-age, this is correct. Prices of industrial consumer goods are still high because the state has taken on its shoulders a great financial responsibility to insure that the essentials of life are available to all at minimum cost. The 1967-68 budget estimates provide for only two per cent revenue from income tax—it was 28 per cent 10 years ago; the rest is from profits of state industry and commerce. Taxation, wiped out for farmers in 1967 will be eliminated for workers in 1968.

All urban housing and service facilities, electricity, gas and water supply, are provided by the state, only part of the cost of which is recovered in the form of rent. In housing, the state bears 89 per cent of the cost; electricity and fuel are provided at half cost. Even rice provided according to the size of the family is sold at 13 per cent of the free market price. The fundamentals of rent, rice, fuel, water and lighting amount to about 10 per cent of the average family income. The state is also taking over all housing construction in the countryside, with farmers paying off only 11 per cent of the cost in gradual payments.

Children represent virtually no financial burden at all for a family. Mothers receive 77 paid days of leave during the childbirth period; nursery and kindergarten services are free and so is education and medical care. Once children start school, they get one winter and one summer school uniform free of

charge each year. Tuition from primary school to university is free, with stipends paid to all full-time students in the higher educational establishments.

Education

In April 1967, the new compulsory, technical education system was introduced under which all children in city and countryside alike will study for nine years, the last two at a technical school. There are now three ways to enter university and other higher educational establishments: after two years of high school following the basic nine years schooling; after three to four years in the higher technical schools attached to every large factory and at county centers for fanners; after a two-year course in a vocational training school plus a one-year preparatory university entrance course. Under the Japanese, there was not a single university in North Korea, now there are 98 higher educational establishments which have turned out 170,000 engineers and technical specialists in the years since liberation, and about 19,000 doctors and assistant doctors (the latter with two years of medical studies) or 19 per 10,000 of population.

Educational facilities have been improved at the same astonishing pace as economic construction. In 1956, it was considered a big step forward to have introduced compulsory four-year primary education, and another big jump ahead in 1958 when three years compulsory middle school education was added. The following year, school fees were abolished, and in September 1961 the target of nine-year, general technical education was announced for the final year of the seven-year plan. Because of defense needs, fulfillment of the production targets of the seven-year plan were spread over 10 instead of seven years, but it was typical that the plan for education was adhered to. Enormous importance is attached to this as the soundest investment for the future.

A fascinating aspect of this devotion to education, and also an expression of national sentiment, is the financing of edu-

cation for the children of some 600,000 Korean residents in Japan. The North Korean budget for 1967-68 allots over 800 million yen in Japanese currency (about 3.5 million U.S. dollars) in financial subsidies to Korean pupils and students in Japan; over the past years the equivalent of over 22 million U.S. dollars has been remitted for this purpose, with no possible guarantees that any of the beneficiaries will even return to Korea, let alone to North Korea, to pay back with their acquired knowledge this highly original form of investment.*

Growth and Defense

The Korean economy is going to surge forward again this year after a marking-time period in which vast sums earmarked for industrial expansion were diverted to defense spending. In view of U.S.-ROK designs on the North, some questioned whether it was worthwhile going ahead with the economic buildup and whether it was not better to concentrate on defense only. Kim Il Sung rejected this view in that section of his October 5, 1966, report dealing with economic problems. Referring to the danger of war, he said, "If essential economic reconstruction should be neglected for fear of war and the resultant devastation, it will be impossible to increase the might of the country and improve the people's living standards. . . . In the prevailing situation, we must continue to build our socialist economy and, along with this, carry on the building of defenses more energetically."

The 1967 budget reflected this dual task. An unprecedented—in times of peace—30 per cent, the equivalent of almost 480 million U.S. dollars was allocated to defense, compared to about two percent in 1963. Only in the 1950-53 war years did defense

*In fact, in recent years, almost 90,000 Koreans have been repatriated to North Korea from Japan—almost all of them of South Korean origin. Since the signing of the Japan-ROK treaty, the agreement under which this repatriation took place has been unilaterally denounced by the Japanese government. It was too embarrassing for the Seoul regime that those Koreans asking for repatriation unanimously opted for the North.

account for about 30 per cent of budget expenditure. But total revenue has increased many times since then. Even with this big slice out of investment funds, 26.8 per cent more money was being invested in capital construction than the previous year. Revenue from state enterprises is expected to rise by eight per cent and expenditure by 11 percent because of a handsome 40 million dollars surplus in the 1966-67 fiscal year.

Among works to be undertaken was the expansion of the Kim Chaik iron and steel works to add an annual capacity of one million tons of steel and the same amount of rolled steel products, almost doubling the country's existing output of rolled steel. There would be an 80 per cent increase of investments in the machine-building industry, a 50 per cent increase in the output of trucks; 60 per cent in excavators; 10 per cent in tractors and 80 per cent in various types of ships, including 3,500-ton refrigerator ships for the fishing fleet. New and expanded textile capacity would add 150,000 spindles and an extra 30 million meters of woollen textiles in mills to be completed during the year. As regards defense, Finance Minister Han Sang Du, in presenting the budget said: "There will be a great increase in the production of various materials needed for powerfully arming the People's Army with everything necessary in the way of modern military equipment and arming the entire people; for transforming the whole country into an impregnable fortress." Scientific research was also given a 20 per cent increase over the previous year.

The "abundant fruitful orchard" will be unimaginably heavy with fruit as the seven-year plan targets start to be met. Grain output is set for six to seven million tons, Kim Il Sung having told planners that in view of Korea's mild climate and fertile soil, land should be measured "by cubic meters instead of square meters." Chemical fertilizer production is to be pushed to over 1.5 million tons and the tractor stock is to be quadrupled. Even the production of five million tons of grain over the past few years is an astonishing performance, especially compared with South Korea, which used to be the country's granary, feeding

the grain-deficit North. But grain output in the South, which averaged 5.4 million tons a year in the 1936-1940 prewar period, dropped to an average of 4.7 million tons in the 1961-65 period. Grain output in the North more than doubled during that period and work has started to treble it. Instead of being an exporter, South Korea, with a population of well over 25 million, has become an importer of over 700,000 tons of grain annually. The two main reasons for this situation are the requisition of land by the tens of thousands of hectares for military purposes; and the fact that land reform not having been carried out, 73 per cent of peasant families in South Korea work less than a hectare with primitive implements that only scratch the soil, and they have to pay up to 60 per cent of their harvest to the landlords.

For the seven-year plan in the North, steel production is set at 2.5 million tons; coal at 23 to 25 million tons; electric power capacity is to reach 3.3 to 3.5 million kilowatts; and cement production, 4 to 4.5 million tons. Output of artificial and chemical fibers is set at 80 to 100 thousand tons and synthetic resins for plastics at 60 to 70 thousand tons. All these figures double or treble the existing production figures. Long before they are met, North Korea will have outstripped Japan in per capita output of all the main products of heavy industry and agriculture, allowing for the present rates of expansion of both countries. In per capita output, North Korea will easily be the leading nation in Asia. The plants that are to achieve these production figures are now being built or expanded.

In higher education, the plan calls for turning out 180,000 engineers and qualified specialists and 460,000 assistant engineers and specialists, graduated at secondary technical training colleges. Industry will move into such fields as high frequency electronics, the application of nuclear energy to certain branches, and a high degree of automation based on the country's own electronics industry.

The plan also calls for the building of 600,000 flats in the urban areas—most of which are already completed—and 600,000

houses for cooperative farmers which are now being built all over the country. These units will house at least five million people, according to the average size of a Korean family. It means half the population is, or soon will be, living in homes built since 1961.

Driving out homeward bound along the concrete highway leading to the airport, past Pyongyang's gleaming buildings, the air heavy with the scent of acacia blossoms, admiring again the neat grey and white villages, the carefully tended fields already green with thickly planted rice, my thoughts could not but turn to Kim Il Sung's warning that it might all be destroyed again soon. I thought of the former head of America's Strategic Air Command, General Curtis LeMay's solution for Vietnam: "Let's bomb 'em back into the Stone Age," and realized how right Premier Kim is to prepare the country organizationally and psychologically for more destruction. But I also thought how wrong was LeMay. You can bomb the Vietnamese and Korean people underground, but you cannot bomb them back into the "Stone Age." You cannot bomb out of existence those solid technical, intellectual and moral qualities they have acquired during the years of building and living under socialism. What stone age moralists such as LeMay would like to bomb out of existence is indestructible. If what has been built up in North Korea is destroyed again, the "abundant fruitful orchard" will grow faster than ever again. And the next time it will spread over the whole country.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Wilfred G. Burchett has, in recent years, frequently made headlines around the world with his exclusive news reports from North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front-controlled zones of South Vietnam. He has often in the past broken the news of proposals by the NLF or Hanoi. His reputation by now is not only of reporting the news, but of making it.

*His earlier book, *The Furtive War*, foretold the end of the Diem regime in Saigon. His work, *Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War*, an account of eight months with the NLF, received wide acclaim. He was the only foreign journalist to have made such a journey. His last book before the present one, *Vietnam North*, moved Bertrand Russell to write of Burchett's work: "It comprises a notable contribution to contemporary history, which will be read and studied with admiration for many generations. If any one man is responsible for alerting Western opinion to the nature of this war and for arousing consciousness about the struggle of the people of Vietnam, it is Wilfred Burchett."*

*The celebrated Australian war correspondent has been reporting wars and revolutions for over 25 years, at first for the London Times, and more recently for the Associated Press, Yomiuri of Japan, and dozens of other journals around the world. He has covered Asia for many years, including the Pacific theater during World War II. He reported the Korean War and the Panmunjom truce talks for two years for the Paris journal, *Ce Soir*. The present book presents Burchett's first-hand report of a two-month return visit to North Korea in 1967.*

In recent years he has spent most of his time in Southeast Asia, and has come to know the leading personalities as well as the common people of the former states of Indochina. He is thus able to view the present state of affairs against a rich background of many years of personal observation.

Perhaps the most authoritative and respected Western reporter in East Asia, Wilfred G. Burchett is certainly unique. He has been hailed as the John Reed of our time.

AGAIN KOREA / Wilfred G. Burchett

The author, who covered the Korean War and the Panmunjom truce talks for two years from "the other side" recently returned to North Korea for an intensive survey. In this in-depth report, he tells of the vast reconstruction into a modern industrial society, the new war anxiety in that land and its relation to the Vietnam War

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